

# IMMIGRATION


An American Dilemma

## *Problems in American Civilization*

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Immigration - An American Dilemma  
Loyalty in a Democratic State



HEATH NEW HISTORY SERIES  
ALLAN NEVINS, *General Editor*



# IMMIGRATION

## *An American Dilemma*

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY  
*Benjamin Munn Ziegler*

*Problems in American Civilization*

READINGS SELECTED BY THE  
DEPARTMENT OF AMERICAN STUDIES  
AMHERST COLLEGE

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## INTRODUCTION

WHAT kind of immigration policy best suits the needs of the United States? For well over a hundred years the conditions under which immigrants should be admitted into the United States has been a hotly disputed subject. This issue has not only appeared repeatedly in the political sphere, as witness the Order of the Star Spangled Banner Party of 1850, but occasionally it has even led to rioting and mob violence. With each reappearance, at least until very recently, the problem has been dealt with by Americans as a strictly internal one; little or no attention has been given to the impact of our policies on foreign countries. But in the last few years this situation has radically changed. With its new responsibilities of world leadership since World War II, the United States has become acutely, though reluctantly, sensitive to world opinion. Consequently the regulation of immigration can no longer be treated as merely a domestic problem; it must now be developed in the knowledge that every step will be followed not only by the anxious eyes of our foreign friends but also under the critical scrutiny of our critics in other countries.

The whole problem of immigration as it today concerns the United States, as well as the rest of the world, has been well put by Kingsley Davis of Princeton University:

Demographically speaking the potential migration pent up in today's world is enormous. Not only is the earth's total population increasing at the fastest rate ever known, but the increase is extremely unequal as between different regions. Generally the fastest growth is occurring in the poorest regions, the slowest growth in the richest. As a result the previous inequalities of population distribution are being aggravated rather than alleviated. Certain backward, primarily agricultural regions are glutted with people and are showing signs of even greater glut in the future, while other areas, primarily industrial, are casting about for means of increasing their birth rates. Between the two kinds of areas the differences in level of living are fantastic. What more natural, then, than to expect the destitute masses of the under-privileged regions to swarm across international and continental boundaries into the better regions? The situation is analogous to atmospheric pressure. The human population of

the earth is characterized by high and low pressure areas, and one expects an inevitable current of migration from one zone to the other.

Actual migration, however, is not governed solely by high and low pressure. It is governed by economic costs, political barriers, ethnic attitudes, and limited horizons.<sup>1</sup>

It is essentially with these economic costs, political barriers, ethnic attitudes, and extended horizons that this book concerns itself.

The first group of articles sets forth the historical background of our immigration policy. It portrays the numbers and kinds of peoples who came to the United States and the reasons for their coming, as well as the pressures that were involved in the establishment of policies to admit or exclude them. The division at the time of World War I is of more than historical significance. It marks the dividing line between what has been called our "old" immigration policy and the beginning of our "new"—a line which is designed to give preference to immigrants from Northern European countries and to restrict those entering from Southern and Eastern Europe who began arriving here in such unprecedented numbers beginning late in the nineteenth century. Professor Wittke, Dean of the Graduate School of Western Reserve University and one who has written much in the field of immigration, tells about these older immigrants, while Professor Hutchinson of the Sociology Department of the University of Pennsylvania discusses the newer immigrants and the policies adopted to deal with them.

In the second group of writings we are concerned more immediately with the effect of the established immigration policies on the general welfare within the United States as a means of evaluating future immigration policies. This in turn means an evaluation of the general effect on American culture, the general effect on our social and economic status, and the general effect on the entire body politic. As to the problem of American culture, Professor Fairchild, a prominent

<sup>1</sup> From the *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, January, 1947, Vol. XXV, No. 1, page 44.

American sociologist, indicates that the whole idea that the United States was a melting pot is a great mistake, while on the other hand Professor Kallen, former head of the New School of Social Research, maintains that cultural pluralism has been one of the factors which has made the United States great. As the view has been widely held that immigrants in the United States have been directly responsible for many of our ills ranging from those of crime to those of the low standard of living, low wages, disease, etc., the article by Professor Fairchild is utilized to demonstrate how this particular opinion has been reached, while the article by Mr. Bernard sets forth the opposite point of view. The effect of immigration on the entire body politic is presented in order to demonstrate the actual participation in the affairs of state to which these peoples address themselves. Professor Ross of the Sociology Department of the University of Wisconsin argues that in essence these immigrants not only have added nothing of a positive nature to the American political scene but in fact have been the tools, if not the direct cause, of political corruption and the worst aspects of political life in the United States. The recent Pulitzer prize winner, Professor Handlin of Harvard University, has tried to moderate this extreme position by demonstrating that in essence these immigrants are conservative in their political affiliations and have not been the direct cause of the political evils so often attributed to them. The charge that the immigrants are here in the United States merely to have economic security and a certain social betterment is answered by Mr. Gavit, once of the editorial staff of the *New York Evening Post*. He holds that the immigrants have in reality become Americans by choice with the full knowledge of what citizenship in the United States implies.

The foregoing can be looked upon as a necessary prelude to the understanding of the immigration issue in the United States today. That it is an issue can hardly be doubted. Under the guidance of Senator McCarran a committee of Congress has made a study of our immigration laws and needs. After three years of work it produced, in 1952, the McCarran Immigration Bill of over 300 pages. In form it is tendered to the American people as a codification and simplification of all of our immigration laws. But

that in reality it does more has been the essence of the dispute which has grown up around the bill. The next group of articles focuses on this bill. Since this measure provides the basic structure of our policy regarding our future immigrants, this group of readings begins with an article by Frank L. Auerbach, a foreign affairs officer in the Visa Division of the State Department, which tells who the potential new immigrants are that would be affected by any future legislation of which the McCarran bill is the core. Space does not permit a detailed analysis of the bill itself, but an excerpt from the bill is included in order to give its tone as well as some of its major premises. It is left, however, to President Truman's veto message to deal with the bill in its more specialized aspects so that the reader can discern for himself not only what is included in it, but why such inclusions are believed by him to be against the best interests of the United States. As the bill was passed over the President's veto, Senator McCarran speaks for himself in his Senate speech which influenced that body to believe in the worthwhileness of the McCarran Bill as the accepted policy of the United States in regard to future immigrants. The Commission, appointed by President Truman to reexamine the whole immigration policy and laws of the United States, has submitted its Report and a summary of its conclusions appears as the next item in this volume, along with Senator McCarran's reply.

The immigration problem is obviously far too large to be handled exclusively or conclusively by the individual action of individual states. Even the United States cannot deal with this problem by itself. To demonstrate the international implications of the whole problem of international migration, as well as of our American immigration policy, the final article, written by Professor Goodrich of the Economics Department of Columbia University, provides a view of the immigration problem from the standpoint of international control, setting forth its possibilities and its limits.

The final word on this pressing question has not yet been written. Congress, and in final analysis the citizens of this country, must decide whether the foreigner who seeks to come to our shores shall be faced with a wall or a door, and if a door, how generously it shall be opened.

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## THE CLASH OF ISSUES

- I. "Give me your tired, your poor,  
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,  
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,  
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me:  
I lift my lamp beside the golden door."  
Inscription on the Statue of Liberty, New York Harbor.  
From *The New Colossus* by Emma Lazarus.

### *McCarran Act*

"The blood that made this nation great  
Will now be tested at the gate  
To see if it deserves to be  
Admitted to democracy,  
Or rather to that small elite  
Whose hemoglobin counts can meet  
Requirements of purity  
Consistent with security  
And with that small and rabid mind  
That thinks itself above mankind."

*The Reporter*, July 22, 1952

- II. "Our immigration policy is equally, if not more, important to the conduct of our foreign relations and to our responsibilities of moral leadership in the struggle for world peace."

President Truman in his veto of McCarran-Walter  
Immigration Bill, June 25, 1952

"I totally disbelieve in the theory that the prosperity of the United States depends upon the prosperity of the rest of the world. I believe precisely the reverse is true, that the prosperity of the rest of the world . . . depends upon . . . the United States."

Merwin K. Hart, President, National Economic  
Council, Testimony before House Judiciary  
Subcommittee on Immigration, June 25, 1947

- III. "The typical immigrant of the present does not really live in America at all, but, from the point of view of nationality, in Italy, Poland . . . or some other foreign country."

Henry Pratt Fairchild, *The Melting-Pot Mistake*

"Irrevocably it [immigration] was building a new America, an America of new institutions, new stocks, new ideals, with a richer and more varied cultural inheritance and therefore cultural prospect."

Horace M. Kallen, *Culture and Democracy in the United States*

- IV. "If immigration has not absolutely lowered the urges and standard of living of the American workman, it certainly has kept them from rising to the level that they otherwise would have reached."

Henry Pratt Fairchild, *Immigration*

"... the general history of the United States disproves the theory that immigration tends to lower the wage scale. No country has admitted so large a number of immigrants, yet no country has so high a wage scale or standard of living."

William S. Bernard, *Economic Effects of Immigration*

- V. "The injury of unrestricted immigration to American wages and American standards of living is sufficiently plain and is bad enough, but the danger which this immigration threatens to the quality of our citizenship is far worse."

Henry Cabot Lodge, *Congressional Record*,  
March 16, 1896

"... one may search in vain for any defensible hereditary mental or spiritual characteristic that will fit or typify all or even many of the 'pie-bald millions' who inhabit and vote, attain success or honor, and as need enlist or submit to conscription for war . . . in our tremendous stretch of territory."

John Palmer Gavit, "Americans by Choice,"  
*Survey* (February 25, 1922)

## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

*Carl Wittke:* IMMIGRATION POLICY PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I

MORE than sixty years ago, in 1886, the Statue of Liberty, on Bedloe's Island, was dedicated as a gift of the French nation to the American people and as a symbol of their eternal friendship. The statue was the work of Auguste Bartholdi, an Alsatian who had fought for France in 1871 and for Italian liberty under Garibaldi. The funds needed to build a pedestal for the monument were raised by a campaign sponsored by the *New York World*, owned by Joseph Pulitzer, a Hungarian refugee, and it was Emma Lazarus who wrote the immortal lines for the tablet inside the pedestal, with their oft-quoted invitation to "the tired, the poor, the homeless and the tempest-tost," "the huddled masses yearning to breathe free."

More than 18 million people have entered the port of New York since that monument to liberty was unveiled. Immigration added a total of 38 million to the American population. The number of immigrants who passed through the gates of New York in a single year in the quarter of a century preceding World War I was greater than all the barbarian forces that brought about the fall of the ancient Roman Empire. New York and other metropolitan centers became a modern Babel of tongues, and the ethnic complexity of many of our American cities has become an important feature of our present-day civilization.

Until after the close of the First World War, the gates of this American land of liberty and opportunity stood open and

practically unguarded to all who had the courage to risk the great adventure across the Atlantic. Keeping the gates open was a deep-seated American tradition. It was part of the vision of American democracy to welcome men and women of every national origin who wanted to share the peace and prosperity which this country had to offer. Here they might shed the burdens and the strife of the Old World, and join with all men of strong muscles and stout hearts in the building of a new America. It was only when the complicated problems of the new industrialism, and the conflicts in Europe which involved the United States in two world wars, raised issues of hitherto undreamed-of proportions and complexity, that the United States abandoned its traditional policy of welcoming all comers, and though the gates were left slightly ajar, they were, for all practical purposes, virtually closed after World War I.

### *Sources of Colonial Population*

The blood of 1776 was already a mixed blood. The Anglo-Saxon element predominated overwhelmingly in the colonial population and determined the main features of American political, legal, and social development. But there were sizable German and Scotch-Irish elements in colonial Pennsylvania, and all along the frontier, from the Mohawk in New York to Georgia. The Swedes and the Dutch left the evidences of their language and customs in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware; the French

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Huguenots in New England and in South Carolina; and Spanish and Portuguese Jews in the port towns along the Atlantic seaboard. Many of these early immigrants came as "redemptioners" and indentured servants, who paid for their passage by binding themselves out for years of servitude to masters who bought their contracts from the ship's captain who brought them over. Some were recruited by real estate agents, ship companies, and proprietors like William Penn who had both freedom of conscience and an abundance of land to offer prospective settlers.

In the colonial period there were no restrictions or quota laws, and there was a callous indifference to the immigrant traffic as such. A few feeble attempts were made to ensure a pitifully small minimum of air space for the passengers who were jammed into the dark and crowded holds of immigrant ships, but such regulations proved ineffective and were more generally ignored than enforced.

#### *Colonial Discrimination*

Even in the colonial period, there were some who feared lest some of these non-English-speaking strangers from Europe might prove unassimilable. An early statute of colonial Pennsylvania was designed to keep out immigrants who might become public charges; oaths of allegiance were required of the newcomers; a small head tax was frequently imposed on the immigrant, and a somewhat higher charge on the ship captain who brought them in; and with the exception of Rhode Island, the colonies had discriminatory legislation against "Papists" and Jews. The first provost of the University of Pennsylvania advocated a vigorous program for the assimilation of non-English immigrants to his Anglo-Saxon, Church of England standards, and he would have

denied the suffrage to the "ignorant" for at least twenty years.

The border lawlessness of Scotch-Irish frontiersmen was a constant source of trouble for the Quaker aristocracy who controlled colonial Pennsylvania, and many of the German sects, which had come into the colony by the scores, had strange notions not only about religion but also about secular matters. Their "tender consciences" forbade them to take legal oaths or to render military service, and they insisted on separate religious schools for their children, and helped to delay the public school movement in Pennsylvania until well into the nineteenth century. It is a fact also that many immigrants were dumped upon the colonies by local governments in Europe which no longer wanted to bother with paupers and violators of the law. Great Britain, as well as some of the Continental countries, looked upon America as a dumping ground for undesirables.

#### *Stand of the Federalists*

The first organized attack on the immigrant in the national period of United States history occurred during the administration of John Adams. It was a time of crisis in Franco-American relations, and an undeclared naval war actually was in progress between the United States and France. Under the pretext of defending the country against French spies and saboteurs, a Federalist Congress enacted the series of laws which are remembered in history as the "repressive measures" of John Adams' administration. Two alien acts gave the President extraordinary powers to arrest or deport such aliens as he regarded as dangerous to the peace and security of the United States. Though most historians now agree that the laws were unnecessary, they may be defended



as measures motivated by genuine considerations for the national security during a period when a violent Gallomania had gripped a considerable portion of the American people. The Naturalization Act, however, with its provision to extend the requirements for citizenship from five to fourteen years, was clearly an attack on the many immigrants and political refugees from Europe who had entered the United States since 1789, largely because of the political upheavals in France and the British Isles during the period of the French Revolution. These newcomers had affiliated with the opposition party led by Jefferson, and as prospective voters, politicians, and officeholders, had joined in the hue and cry against Adams and the Federalists. The loosely drawn Sedition Act virtually made political criticism and opposition a crime.

The debates on these measures indicate that some would have been glad to abolish the naturalization process altogether. Some wanted to deprive the immigrant of all political rights; others were content to keep him from holding public office. The laws were speedily repealed after the Jeffersonians won the election of 1800, and constituted a major reason for the final defeat of the Federalist Party.

#### *The Immigrant from Ireland*

In the period between 1830 and the outbreak of the Civil War, 3.5 million immigrants landed at the port of New York alone, and nearly 1.150 million of that total arrived in the 1840's. Many came from Britain; the Scandinavian tide was slowly beginning to flow toward the American West; and a trickle of immigration was evident from Italy and Austro-Hungary; but the great bulk of this human cargo came from Ireland and Germany.

Ireland was virtually a conquered country, burdened by an alien church, absentee landlords, and crushing economic restrictions imposed by the mother country. For a long time, the people of the "Emerald Isle" had lived on the very edge of famine conditions, and a season of "potato rot" plunged thousands over the brink into starvation and acute suffering. As a result, hordes of Irishmen were ready to expend the last penny of their meager resources to secure passage to America. The voyage to the Promised Land, in horribly overcrowded emigrant ships, proved to be anything but pleasurable, but though there might be "many inconveniences" in the United States, the Irishman was convinced that he would find no "empty bellies."

His resources completely exhausted when he landed at an American port, and without the means to travel inland, the Irishman huddled with his fellow countrymen in the "shantytowns" that sprang into life in the larger American cities of the East, or crowded the hospitals and almshouses as an object of public charity. In the hands of shrewd political bosses, the Irish became willing political tools of the party machines. They were herded to the polls on election day, and fraudulently registered to cast equal votes with the native born. Condemned upon their arrival to the most menial tasks, the Irish performed the lowliest and hardest kind of unskilled physical labor, and with pick and shovel worked in the construction gangs that built our American cities and the canals and railroads that extended into the West.

The Irishman's love of whisky; the rioting and boisterousness that seemed to accompany each payday; the strange dress, uncouth manners, and rough brogue that marked the recent arrivals; the filth and

squalor in which many had to live, and their devotion to a church which Americans still viewed as a "foreign church" ruled by a "foreign potentate"—these features convinced many of older stock in the United States that the melting pot was boiling over because of a new ingredient which was likely to prove completely unassimilable.

#### *The German Element*

The majority of the Germans who came before the Civil War came primarily for economic reasons, although among them was a group of political refugees who left their fatherland after the unsuccessful uprisings of 1830 and 1848. These were men of education and social standing, university graduates, pamphleteers, journalists, professional men, and genuine republicans. They gave the rank and file of the German element a political and cultural leadership which no other immigrant group had in the United States at the time. Many Germans went west and took up farming. Others who were highly skilled Old World craftsmen found employment at their old trades, and took part in the beginnings of the American labor and socialist movements. The intellectuals and political refugees stayed in the cities, for the most part, published newspapers, slowly entered the business or profession for which they had been trained, or as refugees who could not find a stable and secure footing again in a new land, sank gradually into oblivion and were forgotten by both their old and their new fatherland.

Although the German element, like the Irish, was in due time recognized as a group that helped mightily in the building of nineteenth-century America, the Germans in the 1850's aroused the suspicions and incurred the enmity of large segments of the older American population. Native Americans referred to the

political refugees among them as "hair-lipped, red-republicans," wild-eyed reformers and iconoclasts who not only wanted to continue the struggle for the liberation of Europe on American soil, but also attacked venerable American institutions and advocated reform along most radical lines. Many among them were agnostics, freethinkers, and atheists, who had nothing but contempt for American Puritans and "Methodists," and attacked church and clergy in the most intolerant and scurrilous language.

These newcomers regarded slavery as the darkest blot on the escutcheon of a free America, and had no patience with the compromises by which the major parties had managed for decades to postpone the irrepressible conflict. The growing temperance movement struck at the Germans' love for lager beer, and outraged their concept of "personal liberty." Their Continental Sunday was a challenge to American church people, whose notions of Sabbath observance were in sharp conflict with the Germans' Sunday picnics, dances, theater performances, parades, gymnastic exhibitions, and beer gardens.

Finally, it should be added that native workers and small businessmen in every period have resented the competition of foreigners who threatened their standards of labor and wages. In the 1850's the workers were especially alarmed because immigration was breaking down existing rules of apprenticeship, and they demanded a protective tariff for American labor as well as American industry.

#### *Mid-century Nativism*

The point of the preceding discussion is to emphasize that the nativist agitation of the 1840's and 1850's, the most violent in our history, was not directed against allegedly unassimilable groups of "dagos," "wops," and "hunkies" from Slavic or Latin Europe, but against "splay-footed

Irish bog trotters" who were importing "Popish idolatries" and Jesuit intrigue, and "dumb" and "damned lop-eared Dutchmen," infidels who lusted for Sunday pleasures, organized "barbarous clubs" to make sure they got them, and consumed indecent quantities of lager beer. Protestant divines alerted their congregations to the incompatibility of the Papacy with American liberty, and pamphlets combining honest arguments for restricting immigration with obscene, pornographic tales about what was supposed to be going on in monasteries and nunneries poured from the printing presses to arouse Americans to a realization of the danger. Mob violence and street fighting were the inevitable consequences of this battle of the books and the pulpits, and the Irish were regularly referred to as dirty, stupid, riotous, intemperate, bigoted, corrupt, and immoral, and the Germans as radicals, infidels, socialists, "red-republicans," desecraters of the Sabbath, and "lager-beer loafers."

In 1844, New York elected a nativist mayor. The 1830's and 1840's were marked by the burning of a convent in New England, bitter fights over parochial schools and Sunday closing laws, and street fighting between Irish Catholics and Protestants. The 1850's produced "beer riots" in which Germans were involved, and several bloody encounters in Columbus, Cincinnati, New York, Louisville, and elsewhere between native Americans and German organizations, as the latter returned from Sunday outings with bands blaring and spirits stimulated by a day of convivial drinking. Local nativist political parties appeared in the eastern cities, and in 1845 and 1847 native-American conventions demanded twenty-one years' residence for naturalization, the restriction of immigration, and the limitation of officeholding to native Americans.

**THE KNOW-NOTHINGS.** The whole anti-foreign movement of the period before the Civil War reached a climax in the Know-Nothing Party of the 1850's. The natural successor of earlier nativist political groups, the growth of the order was greatly stimulated by the unusually heavy immigration from Ireland and Germany after 1848, and by the corruption and political abuses which marked the elections in many metropolitan centers, and were attributed in large measure to the manipulation of the immigrant vote. Conservative property owners protested that immigration was raising their taxes, and American workmen organized to combat the degradation of their standard of living.

Such considerations, plus a liberal dose of religious bigotry and intolerance, account for the phenomenal rise of the Know-Nothing Party in the 1850's. It was especially strong in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, and in certain parts of the South. In Massachusetts it elected a governor by a majority of 33,000 and controlled the state legislature, and in at least a half-dozen other states there were governors and legislatures of Know-Nothing persuasion. Horace Greeley believed the Know-Nothings controlled from seventy-five to a hundred seats in Congress, and leading newspapers seriously discussed the likelihood of a Know-Nothing President of the United States by 1856. The movement was not confined to activity at the ballot box. In its train there followed another epidemic of rioting directed against Irish Catholics and German radical organizations, and a new flood of books and pamphlets that reached a new high in intolerance, bigotry, and lurid exaggeration and misrepresentation.

Actually, the movement disappeared about as quickly as it had arisen, and the issues which it had dramatized sank into

relative insignificance in view of the rapidly mounting sectional antagonisms over slavery which presently disrupted all existing political party alignments. In their platform and through their representation in state legislatures and the Federal Congress, the Know-Nothings had demanded an end to the admittance of foreign paupers and criminals and to the granting of public lands to unnaturalized residents of the United States; a twenty-one-year residence requirement for American citizenship; the repeal of all state laws which permitted unnaturalized foreigners to vote; Bible reading in the schools; the restriction of officeholding to Americans by "birth, education and training"; and opposition to the power and influence of the Roman Catholic hierarchy.

These issues were vigorously aired in legislative halls, and bills were introduced to translate them into law, but Know-Nothingism accomplished little of practical consequence. During the course of the Civil War the doors to the United States were thrown open wider than ever. The loyal support which naturalized Americans gave to the Union in time of war, and their distinguished record on the battlefields of the Civil War, went far to integrate the adopted citizen with the native born, silenced many of their nativist critics, and opened the doors of political preferment to representatives of foreign-born groups, who could point with pride to their war record and as veterans of the Grand Army of the Republic could claim their share of the spoils of office.

#### *New Antiforeign Agitation*

Nativism has been a hardy perennial in the garden of American politics, and the storms of the Civil War and the Reconstruction era did no more than sear its leaves. Some of its roots lived on, under-

ground, ready to sprout again as the flood of "new immigrants" engulfed the United States, particularly in the decades between 1880 and World War I. By that time the older strains had been fairly well assimilated and accepted, and were quite ready to participate in opposition to the newcomers. In contrast with these older, "desirable," and "respectable" immigrants, the mass migrations from eastern and southern Europe represented peoples who spoke strangely alien tongues and came from a political and social background that seemed to raise almost insuperable problems of Americanization.

Nativism came to full bloom again in the American Protective Association movement of the early 1890's and the Ku Klux Klan of the First World War era. Many who had been quite moderate and tolerant in their attitude now favored a reduction in the total volume of immigration and advocated some kind of test to separate the undesirable from the desirable. Extreme conservatives, like Chauncey Depew, maintained that the foreigners now entering the United States were coming "to destroy our government . . . and divide our property." The separatist policies of the Catholic Church, whose membership practically doubled in the last quarter of the nineteenth century because of the heavy immigration, and which advocated separate schools and other separate Catholic institutions, played a prominent part in the revival of the nativist agitation. Quarrels over public versus parochial schools and over curricular standards became lively political issues in some communities. Large eastern cities elected Catholic mayors for the first time in their history, and the rapid growth of new and solidly clannish immigrant areas in the urban and industrial centers revived many of the old arguments, and often with good reason, about

the manipulation of foreign-born blocs in municipal elections.

The APA was born in Iowa in 1887, and a half-dozen years later claimed a large membership in some twenty states, especially in the Middle West. Essentially, it represented an anti-Catholic movement; indeed, it admitted foreign-born citizens to membership provided they would agree to have no traffic with Catholics. The bitter opposition of American workers to Slavic, Italian, and other competitors from eastern and southern Europe played its part in building up the APA to its peak strength in 1893 and 1894. The anti-Catholic issue provided the emotional pressure behind the movement, and there was a recurrence of rioting. But the APA also stressed the menace of unrestricted immigration and pointed out the danger to American institutions, now that the "floodgates" were open to the "\$9.60 steerage slime" of Europe. It denounced the political manipulation of the "foreign vote," favored increasing the period of residence required for citizenship, and proposed a plan for strictly selective immigration. The APA played a role in some state legislatures, sometimes in close alliance with the Republican Party organizations, but it too could not compete successfully for public attention with the larger issues that arose in American politics at the turn of the century.

The Ku Klux Klan, reborn in Georgia in 1915, represents, with its "Nordic cult" and its gospel of "hundred per cent Americanism," the most recent revival of the nativist spirit. It preached "pure Americanism," "white supremacy," "Nordic superiority," and anti-Semitism, and thrived on the "red-baiting" that marked the war period. It was anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti-Jew, and antforeigner generally, though it stressed these issues in varying degrees in various parts of the country.

It recruited many typical middle-class Americans who believed that American institutions, and especially the "little red schoolhouse," were seriously threatened by foreigners and Catholics, and that Jews and Negroes needed to be kept in their proper places. The Klan became financially prosperous, and its initial ventures into the arena of politics were surprisingly successful. Eventually, its influence broke down largely because of the racketeering, corruption, and terrorism which marked its fight for the political spoils in several midwestern states.

#### *Federal Legislation before 1918*

The story of Federal legislation dealing with immigration in the period before 1918 can be quickly told. Until well after the Civil War, the individual states had virtually a free hand in setting up whatever local regulations they desired in the field of immigration. Some eastern states imposed mildly restrictive measures on immigrants and the ship companies that brought them in; middle western and western states, on the other hand, eager to encourage settlement in their area, offered attractive concessions to immigrants, and maintained immigration offices and commissioners to direct the stream of Europeans into their respective commonwealths.

Before 1835 there was no Federal legislation on the subject, with the exception of the act of 1819 which for the first time provided for the assembling of statistics on immigration and established a few mild regulations to protect steerage passengers at sea. In 1837 the United States Supreme Court upheld the power of the states to regulate immigration under their police powers. By the middle of the century the Court was ready to assume jurisdiction over aliens who were passengers in foreign commerce, but it continued to

uphold the right of the state to impose regulations to protect the public health and morals, provided such regulations did not include the levying of fees or duties on immigrants and were not unreasonable or in conflict with specific Federal enactments. In 1876, however, the Court branded state laws which taxed immigrants and the owners of the vessels on which they came as unconstitutional attempts to regulate foreign commerce, thus virtually forcing the issue upon the attention of Congress. Congressional committees, and Congress as a whole, had several times considered the frauds associated with the naturalization process and had studied proper requirements for citizenship and ways and means to exclude undesirables; but even the bills sponsored during the Know-Nothing period failed of enactment. The law of 1819 was amended in the 1840's to give greater protection to immigrants traveling in steerage, but such amendments were opposed by the nativists, who wanted to make the immigrant traffic less and not more attractive.

During the Civil War, as men were drawn off into the war effort, immigrants were actually recruited abroad, and efforts were made at the ports of arrival to get them to join the Army at once. President Lincoln, in 1864, signed a bill to create the post of Commissioner of Immigration, and to permit the entrance of contract labor from Europe under agreements which legalized as much as twelve months' labor in payment for the immigrant's passage to the United States. Though an immigration office was opened in New York and several contractors took advantage of the new enactment, the law was repealed four years after its passage as a result of strong popular disapproval.

President Grant pointed out the need for Federal legislation on immigration, but the period of national control did not

begin until 1882, when, upon recommendation of President Arthur, the first general United States immigration law was enacted. It began the policy of collecting a head tax from all immigrants, and by subsequent legislation the amount was gradually raised from fifty cents to eight dollars. The law also began the practice of exclusion of undesirables, such as lunatics, idiots, convicts, and those likely to become public charges. In 1885 a law was passed to prohibit contract labor, which because of its defects had to be amended two years later. The power to deport those who had gained admission in violation of the laws was first lodged with the Secretary of the Treasury. In 1903 it was transferred to the new Department of Commerce and Labor, and still later, to the Department of Labor.

**NEW RESTRICTIONS.** During the 1880's a series of Congressional investigations revealed the inadequacy of existing regulations and the persistence of fraud and evasion. By this time, both major parties were beginning to concern themselves with the desirability of restricting the volume of immigration. In 1891 a new law provided for additional exclusions based on health standards; it included polygamists, as a result of the controversy that had arisen with the Mormons over the admission of Utah. The law forbade the solicitation of labor abroad and created a staff of Federal employees to enforce these restrictions and to provide proper inspection at the ports of entry. Organized labor consistently favored such legislation; Atlantic steamship companies and certain employer groups frequently lobbied against it.

**THE LITERACY TEST.** In 1897, near the close of President Cleveland's second term, Congress for the first time passed a bill to impose a literacy test on immigrants. Similar bills were passed in the

administrations of Taft and Wilson, with the avowed purpose of discriminating against the newer immigrants and in favor of the older groups. The law required demonstration of ability to read and write in English or some other language, but provided generous exemptions for the physically handicapped, for those under sixteen years of age, and for the parents, grandparents, wives, and minor children of admissible immigrants. Presidents Cleveland, Taft, and Wilson all vetoed the legislation and essentially on the same grounds, namely, that a literacy test could only test what opportunities had been open to the immigrant in his native land, and provided no proof of either his intellectual capacity or his moral worth. Finally, in 1917, under the excitement and strains of the First World War, Congress was able to muster the two-thirds majority necessary to establish the literacy test over the Presidential veto.

**OTHER DEVELOPMENTS.** In 1902 the Industrial Commission published an excellent report on the whole subject of immigration. In 1903, following the assassination of President McKinley in 1901, it was made unlawful to assist in the illegal admission or naturalization of foreign-born anarchists. In 1907 the Immigration Commission was established, and the President was authorized to carry on discussions of the problems of immigration with foreign nations in international conferences. Additional legislation was designed to make illegal and fraudulent entry from the insular possessions into the United States more difficult, and in 1910 a law was enacted to suppress the traffic in women for immoral purposes.

#### *The Oriental Immigrant*

The problem of Oriental immigration was limited almost exclusively to the Pacific Coast states, where there was vio-

lent opposition to Chinese immigrants in the 1860's and 1870's, and later against the Japanese. Various local ordinances and state laws were passed to discriminate against the Oriental in California, and in the case of the Japanese to prohibit the ownership and lease of real estate. Though many of these measures were unconstitutional, they accomplished their immediate purpose. The problems of Chinese immigration were settled rather easily in 1880 by a new treaty in which China surrendered her earlier most-favored-nation status and agreed to the exclusion of her nationals from the United States, with the exception of teachers, students, travelers, and merchants. The year 1882 marked the passage of the first Chinese exclusion act. The problems arising from the immigration of the Japanese to the Pacific Coast proved far more difficult to settle. Japan insisted on equal rights with other nationals, Californians stubbornly clung to their anti-alien land legislation, and the result was a series of misunderstandings between the two countries which played their part in the gradual deterioration of Japanese-American relations in the present century.

#### *After World War I*

The legislation summarized briefly above reveals the slow evolution of a new policy of restricted immigration. World War I practically stopped all immigration, and thus provided the necessary pause for a review of the whole historic American policy. The United States was no longer a young, undeveloped country, with an abundance of free lands and resources. She was becoming a highly urbanized and industrialized Nation, and under the impact of modern industrialism life in America became more complicated with each passing decade. The United States learned to its sorrow that an indus-



trial society brings evils as well as benefits in its wake. Unions resented the apparently inexhaustible cheap and relatively docile labor supply which was streaming in from Europe obviously for the benefit of their employers, and argued that each newcomer simply displaced a native American and provided no net addition to the strength of the Nation. Poets like Thomas Bailey Aldrich, and champions of Nordic supremacy like Lothrop Stoddard and Madison Grant, hoisted their storm signals to warn the American people of a barbarian invasion which came in "a wild, motley throng," with "unknown gods and rites," and constituted an alien menace "to our air." Even scientific students of immigration agreed that the day had passed when the United States could absorb a million immigrants a year.

In spite of the mounting chorus of warning voices which arose at the turn of the century to demand a complete reversal in immigration policy, it is doubtful whether the drastic legislation of the 1920's, which lies beyond the scope of the

present paper, could have been enacted had it not been for the First World War. The war accentuated American nationalism to a remarkable degree. The early 1920's witnessed growing labor unrest and an increase in unemployment. The experience with certain "hyphenated Americans" during the war aroused some of the patriotic societies. The Bolshevik Revolution created a fear in some quarters that American institutions were in danger from outside forces, and in the 1920's the United States experienced one of its worst periods of "red hysteria" and illegal interference with civil rights. Many Americans were alarmed by the clannishness and the peculiar traits and customs of the "newer" immigration, and feared that all of Europe now would be on the move to America, and that millions would spend their last penny on a transatlantic voyage, to escape from their war-torn continent. Considerations of this kind produced the climate of opinion necessary for the enactment of the quota laws of the 1920's.

### *Edward P. Hutchinson:* IMMIGRATION POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR I

THE long-continued controversy over immigration policy in the United States can be viewed as a protracted contest between two opposing views, an anti-immigration view favorable to restriction of immigration and a pro-immigration view favorable to a liberal immigration policy. As the tide of immigration to the United States rose higher and higher through the nineteenth century and up to World War I, restrictionist sentiment rose also. The war itself, although it

sharply decreased migration from Europe, nevertheless created a climate of opinion favorable to restriction. Anti-alien sentiments were aroused, together with fears of allegedly unassimilated foreign-born minorities and "hyphenated Americans." In the face of a determined but outnumbered opposition in Congress, enough votes were finally assembled in the House and the Senate to pass the Immigration Act of 1917 and to carry it over Presidential veto.

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The 1917 act represented a notable victory for the restrictionists. The act doubled the head tax on immigrants, added drastically to the powers of immigration officials to exclude and deport aliens, set up the Asiatic Barred Zone which denied entry as immigrants to the peoples of southeastern Asia, and required literacy on the part of aliens over sixteen years of age as a condition for permanent residence in the United States. The literacy test, passed after some twenty years of effort by the restrictionists and after four Presidential vetoes, was viewed with the greatest optimism by its advocates, who held it to be a panacea for the Nation's immigration problem. It was believed to be at once restrictive and selective in its action, promising not only to limit the number of aliens who could qualify for admission, but also to check the immigration of such undesired classes of aliens as potential public charges, delinquents and southeastern European laborers.

#### 1918 to 1920

The end of the war brought a quick increase in alien departures from the United States, probably representing a return to Europe of aliens who had been held in the United States by the war. During 1919 emigration averaged over 20 thousand per month, and was greater than alien arrivals. Some concern at this loss of labor was expressed, but disappeared rapidly with the temporary decline of business activity soon after the end of the war and with growing rumors that a new and unprecedented wave of immigration was impending. Immigrant arrivals rose steadily through 1919 and 1920 as transatlantic shipping facilities were restored. Steerage accommodations were fully booked for months ahead, and steamship companies reported a tremen-

dous volume of immigrant travel in prospect. Estimates of the number of Europeans ready to migrate to the United States ran to many million, with 25 million as the highest estimate. As further cause for public alarm were the reports that large numbers of criminals and radicals were among the aliens seeking passage to the United States.

Meanwhile, it was becoming apparent that the literacy test and the other immigration controls contained in the 1917 act were incapable of preventing immigration on a scale never seen before and that the number of migrants promised to be limited only by the amount of shipping. According to steamship agents, as quoted in Congress, 10 million immigrants could be booked immediately if space were available. Because of the economic and social dislocation of postwar Europe, immigrants were now being drawn from classes of European society to which the literacy and other tests of admissibility were no obstacle. With the realization that the 1917 act was not a barrier to large-scale immigration, there arose a widespread demand for effective legislation. Endorsing the demand for restriction were such politically influential organizations as the American Legion, the American Federation of Labor, and the National Grange.

A number of restrictionist bills began to appear in Congress. At least six bills to suspend or prohibit immigration were introduced in the third session of the Sixty-fifth Congress (December 1918 to March 1919) and an equal number appeared in the first session of the following Congress (May to November 1919), but none were brought to a vote. The following session of Congress likewise took no action to limit or restrict immigration, but passed the Act of June 5, 1920 containing very broad provisions for the exclusion

and deportation of anarchistic and radical aliens.

#### *The Quota Act of 1921*

In December of 1920 the House finally considered a bill to suspend immigration: the Johnson bill, which called for a two-year suspension. This was passed by a vote of 296 to 42 after reduction of the period of suspension to fourteen months and insertion of certain exemptions. The Senate, however, refused to accept a suspension of immigration and voted as a substitute a 15-month restriction of immigration by means of a quota system. The quotas were to be applied to immigration on a national basis, the annual quota for a country to be 3 per cent of the number of "foreign born persons of such nationality resident in the United States" as recorded in the 1910 Census. By this formula, quota immigration would be limited to approximately 357 thousand per annum.

This means of restriction was accepted by the House and the bill went to the President on February 28, 1921. It received a pocket veto. Substantially the same bill was introduced in the next session of Congress, was passed by overwhelming majority, and was signed by the President on May 17, 1921 to become the first quota act.

The Quota Act of 1921 marked a turning point in American immigration policy. Heretofore the evolution of legislative controls on immigration had been toward progressively higher standards of admissibility and successive additions to the excludable classes. The 1917 act carried this policy of regulation through selection and exclusion about as far as it could be carried. When it became apparent that limitation of immigration to moderate numbers could not be achieved in this direction, the quota formula was devel-

oped to put a ceiling on the number of migrants admitted in any one year. Since 1921 the United States has applied a double set of controls to immigration. The first is *selection* of the migrants through the application of certain tests or standards of admissibility. The second is *restriction* of quota immigration to a specified maximum number per annum.

#### *The Quota Act of 1924*

The Quota Act of 1924 introduced a new formula for computing national quotas, based on the foreign-born population of the United States in 1890 instead of 1910, and reduced the quotas from 3 per cent to 2 per cent of the base population. On July 1, 1929, after successive postponements from 1927 and 1928, the national origins quota formula came into operation. This apportioned quotas relative to the estimated national origins distribution of the white population of the United States in 1920.

Of more significance than the quota formulas themselves is the purpose or intent back of the particular formulas that were adopted. The intent of the policy makers is not always fully apparent from the wording of legislation, but in the case of the quota acts the full debate in Congress gives evidence of the thought back of the acts. A first and clear intent was to reduce the permissible volume of immigration. Under the 1921 act a maximum quota immigration of nearly 357 thousand per annum was permitted. The 1924 act reduced this figure to approximately 162 thousand. The national origins formula reduced it still further to approximately 153 thousand. These quota limits were not absolute, however, for some classes of aliens have always been exempted. The 1921 act exempted several classes of aliens, of which the principal one was that of aliens who

had resided continuously in a country of the Western Hemisphere for one year immediately preceding admission to the United States. In 1922 the residence requirement was raised to five years. Since 1924 exemption has been granted to certain close relatives of American citizens, to professors, ministers, and their immediate families, to persons born in independent countries of the Western Hemisphere, and to several minor classes of aliens. The result of these exemptions has been that a considerable amount of immigration has entered outside of the quotas. In many years since 1921, non-quota immigrant admissions have exceeded quota admissions.

#### *The Allocation of Quotas*

But more than an attempt to reduce immigration was involved in the quota formulas. Much of the opposition to immigration was aroused not so much by the volume of immigration itself as by the fact that an increased proportion of the immigrants was coming from southern and eastern Europe. The quota formulas were deliberately designed to check this "new" immigration. In the last fiscal year preceding World War I, immigrants from southern and eastern Europe outnumbered those from northern and western Europe by almost six to one. The 1921 quotas, based on the foreign-born population of 1910 and therefore weighted in favor of the countries of older immigration, were in the ratio of five for northern and western Europe against four for southern and eastern Europe. The 1924 act,\* by shifting the quota base back to 1890, still further favored the countries of older immigration and gave to northern and western Europe a quota approximately six times that of southern and eastern Europe. The national origins quotas, which possessed the advantage

of a seemingly less arbitrary basis of allocation, maintained approximately the same division between the regions of Europe, but within northern and western Europe gave greater weight to the countries of colonial period migration.

The stated purpose of the national origins quota formula and of the preceding quota allocations, which operated in a differential fashion between the old and the new immigration, was to maintain the cultural and racial homogeneity of the United States by the admission of immigrants in proportions corresponding to the composition of the present population. In this purpose, it may be noted, the quota laws did not succeed — first, because of the considerable immigration outside of quota; second, because the countries of northern and western Europe to which large quotas were given have normally contributed much less than their full quota of immigrants since 1921. During the seventeen years of operation of the national origins quota system up to 1946, northern and western Europe used on the average only 18.3 per cent of its annual quota of 125,853; southern and eastern Europe during the same period averaged 41.6 per cent of its annual quota of 24,648. A further effect of this failure to use the full quotas was to reduce quota immigration considerably below the full amount. The quota ceiling of approximately 153 thousand per annum which has existed since 1929 has little meaning for the reason that a considerable fraction of the total is assigned to countries which under normal conditions do not use the full quota.

The immigration laws went further in controlling the cultural and racial composition of immigration, for certain peoples were completely excluded. Chinese have been denied permission to enter the United States for permanent residence

since 1882. The Immigration Act of 1917 set up the so-called Asiatic Barred Zone to exclude the peoples of southern and eastern Asia. Japanese immigration was much reduced after 1907 by the Gentlemen's Agreement, and was finally prohibited altogether in 1924 when eligibility to citizenship was made a condition for admission as an immigrant to the United States. This was in effect a racial barrier to immigration, for in 1924 only members of the white and Negro races could be naturalized.

#### *1924 to 1939*

The legislative history of immigration shows that there was little change of either law or policy during the fifteen years from the passage of the 1924 quota act to the outbreak of World War II. The first half of the 1920's had been a period of great legislative activity during which the restrictionist view had triumphed decisively and the United States had made a major change in its immigration policy. During the next decade and a half restrictionist sentiment remained strong, and many attempts were made to restrict immigration further or to suspend it altogether. Depression and unemployment after 1929 led to renewed demands for drastic control measures and gave additional strength to the restrictionist cause, but by that time the political composition of Congress had changed. As a result perhaps of this change the restrictionists, who were to be found in both political parties, could no longer command sufficient votes to carry through their proposed legislation. In addition it was found that restriction of immigration below the quotas could be achieved by means of a more strict interpretation of the already established excludable classes of aliens, especially those considered likely to become public charges.

The efforts of the antirestrictionists since 1924 seem to have been exerted largely in a holding action to prevent the passage of more drastic control legislation. Prior to World War II attempts to lower the barriers to immigration met with no success, and no more could be accomplished in the direction of liberalization than a removal or softening of certain hardships.

#### *Wartime Legislation*

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 and the revelation of the uses to which a "fifth column" could be put by an enemy nation led to renewed fears of subversive and hostile alien activities. The Seventy-sixth Congress passed a bill (H. R. 6724) granting broader powers for the deportation of aliens guilty of sabotage or espionage. This bill was vetoed on April 6, 1940 on the grounds that sufficient powers were contained in existing legislation. On June 28 of the same year, however, the Alien Registration Act of 1940 was approved. This act defined and prohibited subversive acts, created five new classes of deportable aliens, and required the registration and fingerprinting of aliens fourteen years of age or older who remained in the United States for thirty days or longer. A wartime measure, the act was designed to enable the authorities to keep the alien population of the United States under closer surveillance. The act is still in force, although the five-year deportation period for failure to register under the act has now expired.

As the war continued, and especially as the postwar problems of reconversion of industry and of re-employment of military manpower loomed ahead, there were introduced in Congress an increasing number of bills to suspend immigration for a specified period or whenever unemployment exceeded a specified amount.

The effect of the war while still in progress, however, was to produce a limited liberalization of the immigration laws rather than a restrictive trend of legislation. After extensive hearings at which it was testified that the enemy was making damaging propaganda use of the exclusion of Asiatics from the United States, the Chinese Exclusion Acts were repealed by the act of December 17, 1943. By this act alien members of the Chinese race were made eligible both to enter the United States as immigrants and to acquire citizenship through naturalization. In the act of July 2, 1946 similar action was taken with respect to natives of India. Equal treatment for other Asiatics has been proposed.

To be included in the list of liberalizing immigration legislation is the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (June 25), which permits the entry into the United States of 202 thousand displaced persons over a two-year period. Although only temporary legislation rather than a permanent amendment of the immigration laws this act nevertheless evidences a willingness on the part of Congress to authorize limited departures from quota restrictions and admissibility controls on immigration.

#### *Immigration Problems of 1918 and 1948*

There is little parallel between World War I and World War II in so far as immigration problems and legislative trends are concerned. The earlier conflict was preceded by a period of very heavy migration to the United States. It came at a time when restrictionist sentiment was rising, and by its stirring up of national and antialien feeling led to the passage of restrictive legislation. The recent war was preceded by a quarter-century during which immigration never approached its pre-1914 level and during much of which immigration was very low. The immedi-

ate effect of this war was not to produce further legal restrictions but rather an at least selective and limited liberalization.

Both wars left Europe in such condition as to encourage many of its people to emigrate. In 1918 the United States was not provided with effective barriers to immigration, and barriers had to be erected hastily. At the time of the recent war the United States was well provided with such barriers, preserved from the First World War period. There have accordingly been few immigration problems not already met by existing laws, and little need for new legislation. One parallel between the immigration problems following the two wars is an increased concern with the political ideologies of immigrants. It is to be expected that for some time to come the political beliefs and past record of applicants for immigration visas will be closely scrutinized.

#### *Questions of Future Policy*

The admission of aliens to the United States is still largely controlled by legislation of World War I vintage. That is, the acts of 1917 and 1924 are still the basic immigration laws of the United States, and the policies which they embody continue to control immigration. The immigration problem as a whole has not been thoroughly reviewed since 1911, and the 1917 act is the most recent comprehensive immigration act. The question to be faced is whether this legislation of a quarter-century or more ago still expresses the immigration policy which the United States wishes to follow.

In so far as the policy of careful selection of immigrants is concerned there is no prospect of change in the foreseeable future. The present qualifications for admission have been developed gradually since 1875 and will not easily be changed.

With the exception of the racial criteria of admissibility it is unlikely that there will be any lowering of the qualifications for admission, and they may well continue to be raised from time to time as additional classes of aliens are declared excludable. The immediate prospect is for a more careful screening of applicants for admission on the basis of their political beliefs and past record. An effort will certainly be made to exclude aliens with a non-democratic background, whether of the leftist or rightist extreme, but this could be accomplished under the present laws without recourse to new legislation.

There is clear need for a review of those sections of immigration law which set up racial barriers to admission. At the present time, under the 1917 Asiatic Barred Zone and the 1924 eligibility to citizenship provisions, admission for permanent residence is limited to members of the white and Negro races, native peoples of the Western Hemisphere, Chinese, Filipinos, and natives of India. The exclusion of other peoples and races is now so inconsistent with American declarations of principles and objectives that a revision of this element of national immigration policy is called for. An extension of the national origins quota formula to cover all countries now excluded from immigration would give to each such country a token quota of only 100 per annum.

Most controversial is the policy of restriction of the number of immigrants. On one side are those who would suspend

immigration during times of unemployment or make a permanent reduction of the quotas. It is also proposed from time to time that the immigration from Western Hemisphere countries, now unlimited, be brought under quota system. On the other side are those in favor of a more liberal immigration policy, who contend that the present restriction of immigration is contrary to the economic welfare of the United States and that more immigrants should be admitted as a security measure at a time when the United States is threatened by a declining birth rate at home and by aggression from abroad.

A liberal trend of immigration policy has been noted during and immediately after the recent war. It is too early to say whether that trend is to be continued or whether the long-run effect of the war will be a resumption of the trend toward further restriction of immigration. The course of policy to be followed in the immediate future will be largely determined by economic conditions and international relations during the next few years. A period of widespread unemployment in the United States or a continuation of international suspicions and tensions would be conducive to restrictive legislation. One favorable tendency is, however, to be noted. That is the tendency to consider immigration policy in a wider perspective, to base immigration legislation less on purely domestic issues, and to give more weight to considerations of national policy and international relations.

# IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 1820-1951<sup>1</sup>

*From 1820 to 1867 figures represent alien passengers arrived; 1868 to 1891 inclusive and 1895 to 1897 inclusive immigrant aliens arrived; 1892 to 1894 inclusive and from 1898 to the present time immigrant aliens admitted.*

YEAR	NUMBER OF PERSONS	YEAR	NUMBER OF PERSONS	YEAR	NUMBER OF PERSONS	YEAR	NUMBER OF PERSONS
1820-1951	39,531,199	1849	297,024	1881-1890	5,246,613	1917	295,403
1820	8,385	1850	369,980	1881	669,431	1918	110,618
1821-1830	143,439	1851-1860	2,598,214	1882	788,992	1919	141,132
1821	9,127	1851	379,466	1883	603,322	1920	430,001
1822	6,911	1852	371,603	1884	518,592	1921-1930	4,107,209
1823	6,354	1853	368,645	1885	395,346	1921	805,228
1824	7,912	1854	427,833	1886	334,203	1922	309,556
1825	10,199	1855	200,877	1887	490,109	1923	522,919
1826	10,837	1856	200,436	1888	546,889	1924	706,896
1827	18,875	1857	251,306	1889	444,427	1925	294,314
1828	27,382	1858	123,126	1890	455,302	1926	304,488
1829	22,520	1859	121,282	1891-1900	3,687,564	1927	335,175
1830	23,322	1860	153,640	1891	560,319	1928	307,255
1831-1840	599,125	1861-1870	2,314,824	1892	579,663	1929	279,678
1831	22,633	1861	91,918	1893	439,730	1930	241,700
1832	60,482	1862	91,985	1894	285,631	1931-1940	528,431
1833	58,640	1863	176,282	1895	258,536	1931	97,139
1834	65,365	1864	193,418	1896	343,267	1932	35,576
1835	45,374	1865	248,120	1897	230,832	1933	23,068
1836	76,242	1866	318,568	1898	229,299	1934	29,470
1837	79,340	1867	315,722	1899	311,715	1935	34,956
1838	38,914	1868	138,840	1900	448,572	1936	36,329
1839	68,069	1869	352,768	1901-1910	8,795,386	1937	50,244
1840	84,066	1870	387,203	1901	487,918	1938	67,895
1841-1850	1,713,251	1871-1880	2,812,191	1902	648,743	1939	82,998
1841	80,289	1871	321,350	1903	857,046	1940	70,756
1842	104,565	1872	404,806	1904	812,870	1941-1950	1,035,039
1843	52,496	1873	459,803	1905	1,026,499	1941	51,776
1844	78,615	1874	313,339	1906	1,100,735	1942	28,781
1845	114,371	1875	227,498	1907	1,285,349	1943	23,725
1846	154,416	1876	169,986	1908	782,870	1944	28,551
1847	234,968	1877	141,857	1909	751,786	1945	38,119
1848	226,527	1878	138,469	1910	1,041,570	1946	108,721
		1879	177,826	1911-1920	5,735,811	1947	147,292
		1880	457,257	1911	878,587	1948	170,570
				1912	838,172	1949	188,317
				1913	1,197,892	1950	249,187
				1914	1,218,480	1951-	
				1915	326,700	1951	205,717
				1916	298,826		

Data are for fiscal years ended June 30, except 1820 to 1831 inclusive and 1844 to 1849 inclusive fiscal years ended Sept. 30; 1833 to 1842 inclusive and 1851 to 1867 inclusive years ended Dec. 31; 1832 covers 15 months ended Dec. 31; 1843 nine months ended Sept. 30; 1850 15 months ended Dec. 31, and 1868 six months ended June 30.

<sup>1</sup> United States Department of Justice - Immigration and Naturalization Service.



IMMIGRATION QUOTAS<sup>1</sup>  
(As of 1951)

COUNTRY OR AREA	QUOTA	COUNTRY OR AREA	QUOTA
Afghanistan . . . . .	100	Lithuania . . . . .	388
Albania . . . . .	100	Luxemburg . . . . .	100
Andorra . . . . .	100	Monaco . . . . .	100
Arabian peninsula except Muscat, Aden Settlement and Protectorate, and Saudi Arabia . . . . .	100	Morocco (French and Spanish zones and Tangier) . . . . .	100
Australia (including Tasmania, Papua, and all islands appertaining to Australia) . . . . .	100	Muscat (Oman) . . . . .	100
Austria* . . . . .	1,413	Nauru (British mandate) . . . . .	100
Belgium . . . . .	1,304	Nepal . . . . .	100
Bhutan . . . . .	100	Netherlands . . . . .	3,153
Bulgaria . . . . .	100	New Guinea, Territory of (including appertaining islands) (Australian mandate) . . . . .	100
Cameroons (British mandate) . . . . .	100	New Zealand . . . . .	100
Cameroun (French mandate) . . . . .	100	Norway . . . . .	2,377
China . . . . .	100	Palestine (with Trans-Jordan) (British mandate) . . . . .	100
Chinese Race . . . . .	105	Philippine Islands*** . . . . .	100
Czechoslovakia . . . . .	2,874	Poland . . . . .	6,524
Danzig, Free City of . . . . .	100	Portugal . . . . .	440
Denmark . . . . .	1,181	Ruanda & Urundi (Belgium mandate) . . . . .	100
Egypt . . . . .	100	Rumania** . . . . .	291
Estonia . . . . .	116	Samoa, Western (mandate of New Zealand) . . . . .	100
Ethiopia (Abyssinia) . . . . .	100	San Marino . . . . .	100
Finland . . . . .	569	Saudi Arabia . . . . .	100
France . . . . .	3,086	Siam . . . . .	100
Germany* . . . . .	25,957	South Africa, Union of . . . . .	100
Great Britain & Northern Ireland . . . . .	65,721	South-West Africa (mandate of the Union of South Africa) . . . . .	100
Greece** . . . . .	310	Spain . . . . .	252
Hungary . . . . .	869	Sweden . . . . .	3,314
Iceland . . . . .	100	Switzerland . . . . .	1,707
India . . . . .	100	Syria** . . . . .	100
Iran . . . . .	100	Tanganyika Territory (British mandate) . . . . .	100
Iraq . . . . .	100	Togoland (British mandate) . . . . .	100
Ireland (Eire) . . . . .	17,853	Togoland (French mandate) . . . . .	100
Israel** . . . . .	100	Trieste, Free Territory . . . . .	100
Italy** . . . . .	5,677	Turkey . . . . .	226
Japan . . . . .	100	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** . . . . .	2,798
Jordan (formerly Trans-Jordan)** . . . . .	100	Yap and other Pacific islands under Japanese mandate . . . . .	100
Latvia . . . . .	236	Yugoslavia . . . . .	938
Lebanon** . . . . .	100		
Liberia . . . . .	100		
Liechtenstein . . . . .	100		
		TOTAL . . . . .	154,277

\* Effective September 28, 1945

\*\* Effective July 27, 1949

\*\*\* Effective July 4, 1946

<sup>1</sup> President's Proclamation No. 2283 of April 28, 1938.



# IMMIGRATION AND AMERICAN CULTURE

*Henry Pratt Fairchild: THE MELTING-POT MISTAKE*

TO live in America, then, is to live in the atmosphere of these immaterial standards and values, to possess them in one's own character, and to be possessed by them. This means to live in close, spontaneous, daily contact with genuine Americans. For the native-born American of American ancestry, as already stated, this is natural and automatic. What is it for the foreign immigrant?

In the discussion of naturalization it was stated that the average immigrant of a century ago could hardly help coming in contact with true Americans and participating in genuine American life. Today, just the reverse is true. The typical immigrant of the present does not really live in America at all, but, from the point of view of nationality, in Italy, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, or some other foreign country. Let us look into the causes of this situation, and examine the barriers that keep the foreigner out of America.

The first cause of the change is found in a modification in the American nationality itself. During the century and a half of our independent national life we have developed from a simply organized, agricultural community into an elaborate, complicated, mechanical, and industrial society. The whole quality of our group life has altered correspondingly. Instead of homogeneity and essential equality have come heterogeneity and class distinctions. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the character of the typical American community was much like that

of the mediaeval village, of which it has been said that its distinctive feature was that "every one knew everything about everybody else." Class differentiation existed only in the rudimentary stage. The relation of employer and employee existed, but it was developed only on a small scale, and was distinctly personal in character. It was typified by the association between the farmer and his "hired man." The latter was just as self-respecting and often of just as good family as the former. The hired man worked side by side with his employer in the fields on terms of essential equality, ate his meals with the family, and on Sunday evening put on his "store clothes" and took the daughter of the house to church. The situation in which the employee never met his boss, and did not know his appearance or even his name, would have been almost inconceivable. A German visitor, traveling through the United States about the middle of the last century, commented on the remarkable independence of the working classes. He stated that if one went to make a call, and inquired of the servant who answered the door, "Is your master in?" he was likely to get an indignant look with the reply, "I have no master. Perhaps you mean Mr. So-and-so." He also observed that an offer of a tip — *mirabile dictu* — was invariably refused with scorn.

The contrast between this picture and the present situation scarcely needs comment. The employee, or wage-earning, class is now a distinct and separate ele-

ment in the population. While there is a theoretical possibility, and not infrequent actual examples, of moving up out of this class, the feasibility or likelihood of such an outcome is so slight as to exercise very little influence on the general situation. Workers to-day are characteristically employed not by the boss himself, or even by his personal representative, but by an official who is himself an employee, and often not much superior in caliber to the applicant. What is true in the industrial relation is equally true in the associations of religion, the family, sports, art, and even politics. Much as we dislike to admit it, sharp class differentiations have become an integral feature of American life, and the contacts of the lower with the higher classes (in the accepted meaning of those terms) are becoming yearly more tenuous.

All this has serious implications enough for the American population itself. But it is decidedly more significant in the case of the immigrant. For the great majority of immigrants come here as members of the wage-earning class, and most of them remain so. Most of them, also, are poor. So in their efforts to penetrate the stream of Americanizing influences they have to face the handicap not only of alien origin and character, but also of an inferior economic status and absolute poverty. To cap the climax, the differentiation of occupations has gone so far that to-day a large number of callings are almost completely given over to foreign workers, often of specific national groups. They have become "Wop labor," "Hunkie labor," "Kike labor," etc. Consequently the foreigner, not to speak of associating with "upper class" Americans, does not even have the opportunity of mingling with genuine Americans in his own walk of life. The typical immigrant of to-day is not only

hired, paid, and fired by a person scarcely less foreign than himself, but he also works side by side and shoulder to shoulder with a group of persons who are usually "greeners" like himself and quite frequently members of his own nationality.

A second great cause of the change in the conditions of assimilation is found in the altered type of the immigrants themselves, as already pointed out in the distinction between the old and the new immigration. The typical immigrants of the first one hundred years of our national life came from the same nationalities as the ancestors of the native Americans. The change that they had to undergo in order to be assimilated was the same change that the ancestors of their associates had passed through. Herein lies one of the significant applications of the fact, established at some length in earlier pages, that the American nationality was in all essential respects closely akin to the English nationality, and not far remote from the nationalities of the countries of northwestern Europe. To-day, the immigrants represent as diverse and inharmonious nationalities as are to be found among all the branches of the white race. The transformation necessary for assimilation is therefore both more sweeping and more difficult. Even if our modern immigrants had equal opportunities of contact with genuine Americans to those of two or three generations ago — a supposition, as we have seen, contrary to fact — they would still have a vastly more arduous road to travel before they could justly claim the title "American." Faced, as they are, with virtually insuperable barriers to association, they find assimilation hardly even a remote possibility.

One of the most characteristic of the National Americanization Committee's "Pay Envelope Series" reads as follows:

## AMERICA

You Live in America

You Work in America

Why Not Be a Part of America?

Citizenship Makes You a Part of America

We have seen how viciously false is the statement that citizenship makes the foreigner a part of America. Equally false is the assertion that the foreigner lives and works in America, and the implication that the act of becoming a "part of America" is — to use the vernacular — strictly "up to him." The only way to become a part of America is to live in America for an extended period of time. But the immigrant does not live in America. So what is he to do, and what are we to do?

The outstanding fact in this connection is that as a result of a century and a half of immigration there have been built up within the physical boundaries of what is called America extensive and deeply entrenched offshoots of numerous foreign nationalities. These are most conspicuous, and probably most frequent, in our great cities, and any one who has participated in any form of social case work has inevitably become familiar with them. But they exist in equally well-developed forms in the less crowded sections of the country devoted to agriculture, mining, and other extractive pursuits. In a certain section of Nebraska, a generation ago, one could drive for miles without meeting an adult who could speak English, and "Dutch Bohunk" was a customary epithet of opprobrium among the native American children of the town. Similar situations exist all over the land, furnishing conclusive refutation of the common argument that "distribution" can be relied upon to solve all the evils of immigration.

These "foreign colonies," as they are commonly called, are living evidences of

the tenacity of nationality. They show how vigorously every individual clings to his own original national traits, how choice and dear they seem to him, and how difficult it is for him to change them even if he wishes. There are many sections of the United States in which even the third generation of immigrants does not speak English.

The persistence of nationality, and the revolutionary nature of the transformation involved in a change of nationality, can hardly be comprehended by one who has never been called upon to undergo such a process. For the average native-born American, whose life has been spent continuously in the congenial atmosphere of his own nationality, perhaps there is no better means of illustrating the nature of assimilation than by considering the change that is involved in a movement from one part of the United States to another, such as tens of thousands of Americans have experienced. Take, for example, the case "of a young man who has been brought up in a strictly Puritanical community, and, in his early twenties, let us say, moves to a community with a less rigid code. He has been trained not to play cards, not to dance, not to smoke, perhaps not to attend the theater or play pool or billiards. He has been made to believe that these things are wrong, and so he does actually regard them as wrong. Yet in his new environment he sees the very best people doing all of these things without any compunction or even any sense of their being questionable. Their code is different from his. Such a person goes through a very difficult and trying transition period. If he has a good intellect and if his moral sentiments are healthy and sound, he usually works his way out all right. But in the meantime his pathway is surrounded with many pit-

falls."<sup>1</sup> Even in a country as closely unified as the United States there are many varying social environments. The change from one to another is always a soul-trying experience, yet it is as nothing compared to that which every immigrant must undergo who actually moves into America.

Illustrations of the nature of the contrasts between diverse nationalities, and the difficulty of harmonizing them, might be multiplied almost indefinitely. Some have already been given. A few more may be added to emphasize the true nature of the experience which we demand of the immigrant when we call upon him to be assimilated.

Two young men, an Englishman and an American, both teachers in schools in a Turkish city and therefore familiar with a variety of national institutions, were sitting at one of the outdoor tables in front of a café in Athens. There passed by an officer of the Greek army in uniform in the company of a civilian apparently of humble status. The young Englishman was struck by the incident, and commented upon it.

"You would never see anything like that in England."

"Why not?" inquired the American.

"Because in England the officers come from the aristocratic families, and would not condescend to walk on the streets with a common man. It's a very good system too, because it creates a profound respect for the officers on the part of the enlisted men."

"But it can not be nearly as effective as the American system," said the other, "where the officers are chosen for ability or distinguished conduct. That is a much more powerful basis for respect than mere birth."

The point was argued at length, with

of course no change in the ideas of either disputant. Now the ancestors of the American and the Britisher might well have been kinsmen and neighbors in some English village not so many generations ago, yet their views on this fundamental subject were as wide apart as the poles. Ask yourself, proud descendant of old Pilgrim lineage, how long you would have to live in England before you became convinced that the system of a hereditary aristocracy was a sounder basis for military gradation than individual ability and achievement. Yet in other respects, these two young men were vastly closer to each other than they were to their Greek and Armenian pupils, who simply could not conceive, for instance, how their teacher could innocently take a walk in the country alone with a young woman.

One of the recent characteristic expressions of the American nationality is the attempt to secure the suppression of the use of alcoholic beverages by national legislation. It is a unique and courageous adventure, and the American people certainly ought to have the opportunity to try it out, in accordance with established American institutions and constitutional procedure, without the interference of millions of persons whose traditional attitude toward both the use of alcoholic drinks and constitutional and representative government is so distinctly foreign that they can not possibly even comprehend the character and spirit of this undertaking. Yet there can be no doubt that the alien elements in this country form one of the most serious obstacles, not to the success of the Prohibition Movement — upon which genuine Americans hold very divergent opinions — but to the legitimate prosecution of the experiment in democratic government which the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act represent. In spite of all that is said about the "machinations of an organized minor-

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from the author's "Elements of Social Science," page 115.

ity," there can be no doubt that these two measures were carried out in strict conformity to the established legal procedure of the United States. But the enforcement of them is immeasurably hampered by the activities of countless individuals who are completely indifferent to American institutions and completely unresponsive to American public opinion. The situation has been humorously described in the following words: "Many of these people simply fail to get the idea of prohibition. Thousands of them think it was put into force by executive decree of President Wilson. I have heard them talk about it for hours and advocate a twenty-four hour national strike in protest, believing that thus they can force President Harding to rescind the decree. To try to explain the theory of prohibition to a group of Italian workmen is very much like trying to explain to you, the reader, that in Siberia people walk on their ears. In other words, it sounds interesting, but it does not 'get over.' A friend of mine, a Red Cross worker during the war, related to me his futile effort to explain American prohibition to an Italian Senator in Italy. The Senator listened with attention for three quarters of an hour and then asked 'But what kind of wine do they drink now?' The fact that they are not supposed to drink wine at all simply failed to register with him. It was inconceivable. People of this type, who are otherwise law-abiding and patriotic and well-intentioned, protect bootleggers and otherwise violate the Volstead Act with the same faith in the justice of their actions that a group of Middle Western Americans would have in evading a law that prohibited them from planting corn."<sup>2</sup>

It is significant that most of the bootleggers, at least as far as one can judge

<sup>2</sup> C. T. Crowell, "How Prohibition Works," *Independent and Weekly Review*, Jan. 14, 1922.

from ordinary evidence — statistics do not seem to be available — appear to be foreigners. Doubtless a handsome proportion, if not the majority, of their patrons are native-born Americans. But this does not alter the case. It seems that one of the features of the American nationality in its immediate phase is a nice distinction between patronizing a bootlegger and being a bootlegger. If there were not abundant non-Americans who were quite willing to be bootleggers, the trade would almost certainly fall off markedly. It can not be purely by chance that a map of "wetness" in the United States is almost a replica of a map showing the distribution of the foreign-born. All of this, be it remembered, is not an argument for or against Prohibition, but an illustration of the difficulty of expressing the national will in an experimental policy when national unity does not exist.

These special national loyalties and affiliations persist for many generations, even when the individual descendants of the original immigrants are almost completely assimilated. Group feeling as expressed in group pride is one of the most enduring of all human sentiments. Mention has already been made of the elaborate exposition called "America's Making." This was conceived as a means of promoting a better understanding, not only between Americans and foreigners, but also between the various groups of foreigners — an aspect of the Americanization problem, by the way, all too frequently neglected. Doubtless many useful results were accomplished in this direction. But behind the scenes, according to the newspaper reports, some lively and incongruous displays of group jealousy marred the serene atmosphere of the enterprise. These clashes were largely caused by rival claims as to the group affiliation of certain prominent Americans of various early periods. It is significant

that antagonism was sharpest not among the representatives of the new immigration, who are presumably least completely assimilated, but among the Scotch and the Irish. An Irishman, checking over the list of notables displayed in the Scotch booth, was outraged to find a number of persons included whom he claimed as pure Irish. The chairman of the Scotch group, however, maintained that "the Scotch-Irish of the north of Ireland always have been and always will be Scotch regardless of where they make their home." The Welsh also entered the controversy by claiming President Monroe, who was listed in both the Welsh and the Scotch booths. Even as these words are being written the newspapers print an account of a journey of the President of the United States halfway across the continent to take part in a great "Norse" celebration, in commemoration of the completion of one hundred years of Norwegian settlement in this country. Doubtless the celebrants are all loyal and patriotic, yet the vivid consciousness of their foreign origin is a definite factor in American national disunity, just as it is in the case of any other group similarly inspired.

All of this may seem very trivial and inconsequential to the native American who has never been thrown into the stress of conflicting nationalities. But nationality is largely a matter of things that are in themselves trivial, but nevertheless have a profound effect in creating group feeling. A whimsical presentation of this truth has been given by Mr. Clarence Day, Jr., in a sketch which deserves to be quoted in full, but of which this paragraph must stand as representative.

"Why is it," the old explorer was wondering, "that men care so for trifles? Even death and danger won't stop us, or make us less fussy. In a country where a man knows that he's likely to be killed

any day, in the middle of his career, he ought to have a little sense of proportion. But life's not safe a minute in Kiboa, for instance, and have they any sense? Not a bit. People there are exactly as finicky as everywhere else. They spend most of their time being preoccupied with meaningless nothings. I did more for those Kiboans than I have ever done for any tribe since — I stamped out two fever epidemics and taught them how to build mill wheels — and yet, at their great banquet to celebrate the lives I had saved, they were horrified because I used the wrong stick to eat with at table. There were two sticks, a prong and a flat one. I ate peas with the flat one. I should have used the prong. Well, that ended me. They still tried to be grateful, but it was painful to them — I had turned out low caste.'"<sup>3</sup>

It would be the gravest mistake to conclude, however, that nationality is all a matter of nonessentials or superficialities. There should, indeed, be no doubt on that point at this stage of our discussion. Nationality includes all the deepest, dearest, most inalienable, and most unquestioned elements in the social inheritance of every individual. This can be appreciated by recalling that the moral code itself is a part of nationality. It is true that there are certain fundamental resemblances among the moral codes of all civilized peoples, and even of barbarous or savage peoples, just as there are basic physical resemblances among all the races of man. But this is only because, nationally as well as racially, men are much more alike than they are different. Nevertheless, it is the differences that divide men into groups, and differences in moral codes are as nearly insuperable as any barrier that exists. During the unreflective and uncritical years of character for-

<sup>3</sup> *The New Republic*, October 18, 1922, page 198.

mation the authority of the moral code of one's own particular group is absolute. Consequently, by the time one reaches an age of analytical comparison the sway of one's own code has become so firmly established that it is almost impossible, by the exercise of any processes of reasoning, to emancipate one's self from it. You may convince yourself that in some particular respect the code of France, or Turkey, or Japan is higher, or more rational, or more conducive to human well-being than your own. But it is quite a different thing to make yourself feel comfortable when you begin to pattern your conduct after that code. A remarkable illustration of these truths was furnished by the case of the young Albanian who killed his countryman, Essad Pasha, in Paris in 1920. In the course of the trial the fact was brought out that Essad Pasha had previously been instrumental in causing the death of the father of his slayer. According to Albanian law and social usage it was not only the right, but also the duty, of the younger man to pursue the man who had killed his father, until he had accomplished his death. The remarkable feature of the case is that although the crime was committed on French soil, and the case was tried before a French court, the decision was that the young Albanian was governed by the Albanian

code, and hence in committing what we would call a murder he not only *thought* he was right but he *was* right. He was therefore acquitted.

The process of Americanization, then, for the immigrant is infinitely more difficult than for the native because the former, during the years before his arrival in the United States, has already acquired more or less completely a foreign nationality. This nationality is dissimilar in most respects, and absolutely contradictory and inconsistent in many respects, to the American nationality. Yet to the foreigner it is his natural and authoritative spiritual tradition and social environment. He may hold a critical attitude toward certain aspects of it, just as most Americans are dissatisfied with some phases of the American nationality, but taken as a whole it represents to him truth, beauty, goodness, morality, justice, propriety, efficiency, custom, order, and — home. Let the critical and self-satisfied American of native birth reflect that in the process of Americanization this whole spiritual endowment must be abandoned, and another taken in its place, and it may help him dimly to perceive how tragic, how soul-wracking must be the experience of assimilation, though probably no one who has not actually gone through it can appreciate the stress and tragedy involved.

### Horace M. Kallen: DEMOCRACY AND THE MELTING POT

THIS book is a study in the psychology of the American peoples. It brings together a series of reflections upon the nature of culture and of democracy, upon their bearing to one another in the United States, and upon their underlying dynamics in the nationalities, the cultural

traditions, the political forms, the economic pursuits, and the social and spiritual endeavors of the many peoples striving toward life, liberty, and happiness amid the varied settings of the American scene. . . .

The standpoint of these essays can be

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described briefly as Cultural Pluralism. The outcomes of the observations they embody is the view that democracy is an essential prerequisite to culture, that culture can be and sometimes is a fine flowering of democracy, and that the history of the relation of the two in the United States exhibits this fact.

So old-fashioned a teaching is at the present time popular nowhere in the United States. Both American Tories and American intellectuals reject it. They reject it because they find themselves all at once undermined in all their customary securities — in their securities of habit, of thought, of outlook — by the shift of the social facts upon which the securities were postulated. And they have taken sides accordingly.

The story of their partisanship and conflict is one of the recurrent ironies in the confused tale of the American mind. It is the gigantic irony in the adventure of culture in the United States. What brought them to light and leading is the Great War. This sharply transformed the fission of class feeling into a gulf between the classes: the growing uneasiness of the native-born in the presence of the immigrant from an unconscious strain into a conscious repulsion, the condescending certainty of native superiority into an alarmed proclamation of it, and the naïve assurance that it cannot be otherwise into frenzied argument that it must be sheltered to survive. . . .

A widespread hysterical taking of stock began. Immigration, formerly more than welcomed as an economic boon, was now scrutinized as a eugenic menace. The stuff and form of the American being were re-examined, not by visitors from abroad any longer, but by scared lodgers at home. Racial theories were promulgated desecrating variously upon the magical supe-

riority of the Nordic stock. In the decade 1914-1924 a succession of manifestos appeared, each painting a blacker and blacker picture, until finally, the faint new patterns of association generated by the industrial development of the United States were represented as an assault upon civilization. An appearance of scientific precision and mathematical certainty was imparted to the jeremiads by the statistical tables culled from the "intelligence tests," army and civilian. . . . What, broadly, the tables exhibited, was a correlation between "native" Americans of position and importance, with habituation in the use of the English language and the positions which, on the whole, such Americans hold. From this exhibition, which is a foregone conclusion, fear and vanity both drew their class and group confirmation. Fear, because the "inferior" stocks were declared to be increasing so much more rapidly than the "superior," and, like the proverbial camel, crowding the master out of the tent. Vanity, because the "intelligence quotients" were inferred to demonstrate that the "upper" classes are so by original nature and not by institutional accident. In them the excellence of mankind was held to be automatically concentrated.<sup>1</sup> The argument had of course the circular character of all such arguments. Its archetype is the Brahminical explanation of the Brahmins of India that they are the highest caste because they sprang from the head of Brahma and they know that they

<sup>1</sup> Cf. W. MacDougall: *Is America Safe for Democracy?*; C. C. Brigham: *A Study of American Intelligence*; L. Stoddard: *The Assault on Civilization*, and *The Rising Tide of Color*. The parent of all these alarms and excursions seems to be H. S. Chamberlain's *Grundzüge des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*. Chamberlain's racial fantasies were, so far as I know, first restated in the United States with American implications by Mr. Madison Grant, in *The Passing of the Great Race*.



sprang from the head of Brahma because they are the highest caste. . . .

This prejudice is the natural spontaneous prejudice of a social class in its own favor. Given its privileges and its position, given the challenge to them which the Great War made clear, what else could follow, in its mobilization of its intellectual defenses, than a view of human nature by which qualities conventionally regarded as superior — such as intelligence — shall be fixed and invariant in character and in quantity, and that they shall be distributed in such a way that the privileged shall be privileged by merit and not by accident, and that they shall be justified in retaining their privileges by inherent nature and not by force? From the head of Brahma sprang they; where, then, in the social order, can their place be, save at the head? . . .

In none of the confrontations here enumerated can the antagonists be said to have anything new in their hearts. Essentially, the relations that obtain between them have always obtained. But before the Great War they were passive rather than active. The new was suffusing and displacing the old, continuously, imperceptibly, surely. Irrevocably it was building a new America, an America of new institutions, new stocks, new ideals, with a richer and more varied cultural inheritance and therefore cultural prospect. Then a thing happened not unlike the thing that happened to Christian Europe when Luther the monk turned the gradual displacements of the Renaissance into the swift antagonisms of the Reformation. Old things dying began to feel themselves die and to struggle against death. The passions of such a struggle are often courage in the individual, but in groups and communities, they are fear and hatred. Thus, the vindicators of the old, the tra-

ditional, the tried assurances of faith and hope, evince a depth of rancorous passion without parallel among the exponents of the newer ways. . . .

There is a culture in the United States and not an ignoble one. . . .

It is founded upon variation of racial groups and individual character; upon spontaneous differences of social heritage, institutional habit, mental attitude and emotional tone; upon the continuous, free and fruitful cross-fertilization of these by one another. Within these Many, gathered upon the American scene from the four corners of the earth and taking root and finding nourishment, growth and integrity upon its soil, lies the American One, as poets, painters, musicians and philosophers feel and utter this One.

From the days when the New England school first turned its heart to Europe for spiritual sustenance and workmanlike guidance to the days when all the cultural enclaves of Europe began to make a new life upon the North American continent, the culture of the United States has gathered volume and headway; has gathered variety, color and significance. It has gathered them because, regardless of the compulsions toward conformity that have periodically swept like tides over the nation, the spacious continent has permitted the spontaneous self-rooting and automatic growth of differentiated communities and the free flow, impact, compenetration and reordering of spiritual values between them. It has gathered them because in the spaces of the continent democracy could not but prevail, and the lives of cultural groups retain their integrities even as the lives of individual spirits.

This democracy — in character and constitution social and intellectual rather than political — for its principle is, not one man one vote, but one temperament, one point

of view, one vote — is that which is to-day at stake in the United States. It lies — as the history of the culture of any land makes amply clear — at the foundation of culture everywhere. It is the indispensable prerequisite to the existence and growth of culture in the United States. In manyness, variety, differentiation, lies the vitality of such oneness as they may compose. Cultural growth is founded upon Cultural Pluralism. Cultural Pluralism is possible only in a democratic society whose institutions encourage individuality in groups, in persons, in temperaments, whose program liberates these individualities and guides them into a fellowship of freedom and cooperation. The alternative before Americans is Kultur Klux Klan or Cultural Pluralism. . . .

Words may be broadly divided into two classes — those that stand predominantly for ideas or things and those that stand predominantly for attitudes, moods, emotions. No word, not even the nakedest symbol of the mathematician nor the emptiest gurgle of the popular songwriter, stands purely for one thing or the other; each is hyphenated, and in each a meaning and a mood interpenetrate. The word "Americanism" is no exception, and its character involves this interpenetration to a very high degree. Its meaning, however — or rather one aspect or another of its meaning — is articulate and precise only to a thoughtful few: to the man on the street it expresses a mood, potent, excellent, desirable; to him the distinction between "American" and "un-American" is the distinction between good and evil; but he cannot tell when pressed what is American, and what is un-American — he can only feel, dumbly, ineffably, that some actions and ideals are approvable by that term and others are not, and this is the end of the story. These actions and ideals, occurring in the same person at

the same or different times, may be each other's exact opposites. Their practical and logical relationships may be profoundly in conflict, and they themselves in rapid change. The mood will nevertheless unite them, give them the only continuity they possess, or more deeply, reflect a continuity they contain. It is in the latter possibility alone that any hope lies of crystallizing into some form of statement a thing at once so diffuse and organic, so protean and continuous as that cluster of attitudes and ideals that goes by the name "Americanism." . . .

To-day the United States is one; more or less, in Lincoln's phrase, "a government of the people, by the people, for the people," whether good or ill, and mitigated only by privileged economic controls; a democracy in which the consent of the governed is the ultimate basis for governmental action, even though that basis rarely gets referred to; and "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" remain in a way and after a fashion its goal. The American people, however, are no longer one in the same sense in which the people of Germany or the people of France are one, or in which the people of the American Revolution were one. They are a mosaic of peoples, of different bloods and of different origins, engaged in rather different economic fields, and varied in background and outlook as well as in blood. . . .

And the problem of Democracy is so to perfect the organization of society that every man and every group may have the freest possible opportunity to realize and perfect their natures, and to attain the excellence appropriate to their kind. In essence, therefore, Democracy involves, not the elimination of difference, but the perfection and conservation of differences. It aims, through Union, not at uniformity, but at variety, at a one out of

many, as the dollars [sic] say in Latin, and a many in one. It involves a give and take between radically different types, and a mutual respect and mutual cooperation based on mutual understanding. It is this ideal which to my mind seems most naturally the proper content of the interplay of the terms Liberty and Union and Democracy. . . .

*Democracy versus the Melting Pot*<sup>2</sup>

It was, I think, an eminent lawyer who, backed by a ripe experience of inequalities before the law, pronounced the American Declaration of Independence to be a collection of "glittering generalities." Yet it cannot be that the implied slur was deserved. There is hardly room to doubt that the equally eminent gentlemen over whose signatures this orotund synthesis of the social and political philosophy of the 18th century appears conceived that they were subscribing to anything but the dull and sober truth when they underwrote the doctrine that God had created all men equal and had endowed them with certain inalienable rights, among these being life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That this doctrine did not describe a condition, that it even contradicted conditions, that many of the signatories owned other men and bought and sold them, that many were eminent by birth, many by wealth and only a few by merit — all this is acknowledged. Indeed, they were aware of these inequalities; they would probably have fought against their abolition. But they did not regard them as incompatible with the Declaration of Independence. For to them the Declaration was neither a pronouncement of abstract principles nor an exercise in formal logic. It was an instrument in a political and economic conflict, a weapon

of offense and defense. The doctrine of "natural rights" which is its essence was formulated to shield social orders against the aggrandizement of persons acting under the doctrine of "divine right": its function was to afford sanction for refusing customary obedience to traditional superiority. Such also was the function of the Declaration. Across the water, in England, certain powers had laid claim to the acknowledgment of their traditional superiority to the colonists in America. Whereupon the colonists, through their representatives, the signatories to the Declaration, replied that they were quite as good as their traditional betters, and that no one should take from them certain possessions which were theirs. This is the whole, actual, historic meaning of the Declaration of Independence: this is what it expressed as an *action* — resistance to the aggrandizement of a traditionally superior force. Formulas are, however, much more indefinite than actions, for if deeds speak louder than words, words last longer and spread farther. Hence, what has survived of the Declaration in the imagination of Americans is not its practical meaning; what has survived is its verbal and logical meaning. And hence, again, a paradox —

To-day the descendants of the colonists appear to be reformulating a Declaration of Independence. Again, as in 1776, Americans of British ancestry apprehend that certain possessions of theirs, which may be lumped under the word "Americanism" are in jeopardy. The danger comes, once more, from a force across the water, but the force is this time regarded not as superior, but as inferior. The relationships of 1776 are, consequently, reversed. To conserve the inalienable rights of the colonists of 1776, it was necessary to declare all men equal; to conserve the inalienable rights of their descendants in

<sup>2</sup> Printed in *The Nation*, February 18 and 25, 1915.

the 20th century, it becomes necessary to declare all men unequal. In 1776 all men were as good as their betters; in 1920 men are permanently worse than their betters. "A nation may reason," writes one nervous professor, in embattled defense,<sup>3</sup> "Why burden ourselves with the rearing of children? Let them perish unborn in the womb of time. The immigrants will keep up the population.' A people that has no more respect for its ancestors and no more pride of race than this deserves the extinction that surely awaits it."

Respect for ancestors, pride of race! Time was when these would have been repudiated as the enemies of democracy, the antithesis of the fundamentals of the North American Republic, with its consciously proclaimed belief that "a man's a man for a' that." And now they are being invoked in defense of democracy, against the "melting-pot," by a sociological protagonist of the "democratic idea." How knowingly purposeful their invocation is cannot be said. But that its assumptions have unconsciously colored much of the social and political thinking of the United States from the days of the Cincinnati on, seems to me unquestionable, and it seems even more unquestionable that this apparently sudden and explicit conscious expression of them is the effect of an actual felt menace. This professor, in a word, is no voice crying in a wilderness. He simply utters aloud, and in his own peculiar manner, what is thought and spoken wherever Americans of British ancestry congregate feelingly. His sentiment utters the more recent phase of the operation of these forces in the social and economic history of the United States; he is, in effect, a voice and instrument of theirs. Being so, he could, of course, neither take account of them nor observe

them; he could only react in terms of them to the processes of American society that seem to threaten the supremacy of his stock and caste. The reaction is secondary, the threat is secondary. The standards alone are really primary and, perhaps, ultimate. Fully to understand the place and function of "the old world in the new," and the attitude of the "new world" toward the old, demands an appreciation of the influence of these primary and ultimate standards upon all the peoples who are citizens of the country. . . .

Now it would seem that the preservation, though not the development, of any given type of civilization rests very largely upon these two conditions — like-mindedness and self-consciousness. Without them art, literature, culture in any of its nobler forms, appear to be unlikely: and colonial America had a culture — chiefly of New England — but representative enough of the whole British-American life of the period. Within the area of what we now call the United States this life was not, however, the only life. Similarly animated groups of Frenchmen and Germans in Louisiana and Pennsylvania regarded themselves as the cultural peers of the British, and because of their own common ancestry, their own like-mindedness and self-consciousness, they have retained a large measure of their individuality and spiritual autonomy to this day, after generations of unrestricted and mobile contact and a century of political union with the dominant British populations. . . .

In sum, when we consider that portion of our population which has taken root, we see that it has not merely stippled the country in small units of diverse ethnic groups. It forms rather a series of stripes or layers of varying sizes, moving east to west along the central axis of settlement, where towns are thickest; i.e., from New York and Philadelphia through

<sup>3</sup> E. A. Ross in *The Old World in the New*.

Chicago and St. Louis, to San Francisco and Seattle. Stippling does not prevail even in the towns, where the variety of population is generally greater. Probably more than half of that population is either foreign-born or of non-British stock, yet even so, the towns are aggregations, not units. Broadly divided into the sections inhabited by the rich and those inhabited by the poor, this economic division does not abolish, it only crosses, the ethnic one. There are rich and poor little Italys, Irelands, Hungarys, Germanyys, and rich and poor Ghettos. The *common* city-life, which depends upon like-mindedness, is not inward, corporate and inevitable, but external, inarticulate and incidental, a reaction to the need of amusement and the need of protection, not the expression of a homogeneity of heritage, mentality and interest. Politics and education in our cities thus often present the phenomenon of ethnic compromises not unknown in the former Austria-Hungary: concessions and appeals to "the Irish vote," "the Jewish vote," "the German vote" vary with concessions and appeals to "the business vote," "the labor vote," and "the woman vote"; occasionally there are compromise school-committees whose members represent each ethnic faction, until, as in Boston, one group grows strong enough to dominate the entire situation.

South of Mason and Dixon's line the cities exhibit a greater homogeneity. Outside of certain regions in Texas the descendants of the native white stock, often degenerate and backward, prevail among the whites, but the whites as a whole constitute a relatively weaker proportion of the population. They live among nine million negroes, whose own mode of living tends, by its mere massiveness, to standardize the "mind" of the poor white, of the proletarian south, in speech, manner and the other values of social living,

and to determine the terrible pattern which, among other things, the fear of negro competition makes race-prejudice take. . . .

All immigrants and their offspring are by the way of undergoing "Americanization" if they remain in one place in the country long enough — say six or seven years. The general notion of "Americanization" appears to signify the adoption of the American variety of English speech, American clothes and manners, the American attitude in politics. "Americanization" signifies, in short, the disappearance of the external differences upon which so much race-prejudice often feeds. It appears to imply the fusion of the various bloods, and a transmutation by "the miracle of assimilation" of Jews, Slavs, Poles, Frenchmen, Germans, Hindus, Scandinavians and so on into beings similar in background, tradition, outlook and spirit to the descendants of the British colonists, the "Anglo-Saxon" stock. Broadly speaking, these elements of Americanism are somewhat external, the effect of environment; . . .

Other things being equal, a democratic society which was to be a realization of the assumptions of the Declaration of Independence, supposing them to be true and socially operative, would be a leveling society such that all persons in it became alike either on the lowest or the highest plane. The outcome of free social contacts should, according to "the laws of imitation," establish "equality" on the highest plane; for imitation is said to be of the higher by the lower, so that the cut of a Paris gown at \$1,000.00 becomes imitated in department stores at \$17.50, and the play of the rich becomes the vice of the poor. This process of leveling up through imitation is facilitated by the so-called "standardization" of externals. In these days of ready-made garments, fac-

tory-made furniture, refrigerating plants, "boiler-plate," movies and radio, it is almost impossible that the mass of the inhabitants of the United States should wear other than uniform clothes, use other than uniform furniture, utensils or eat anything but the same sorts of food, read anything but the same syndicated hokum, see anything but the same standardized romances and hear anything but the same broadcasted barbarisms. . . .

Immigrants appear to pass through four phases in the cause of being automatically Americanized. In the first phase they exhibit economic eagerness, the greedy hunger of the unfed. Since external differences are a handicap in the economic struggle, they "assimilate," seeking thus to facilitate the attainment of economic independence. Once the proletarian level of such independence is reached, the process of assimilation slows down and tends to come to a stop. The immigrant group is still a national group, modified, sometimes improved, by environmental influences, but otherwise a solitary spiritual unit, which is seeking to find its way out on its own social level. This search brings to light permanent group distinctions and the immigrant, like the Anglo-Saxon American, is thrown back upon himself and his ancestry. Then a process of dissimilation begins. The arts, life and ideals of the nationality become central and paramount; ethnic and national differences change in status from disadvantages to distinctions. All the while the immigrant has been uttering his life in the English language and behaving like an American in matters economic and political, and continues to do so. The institutions of the Republic have become the liberating cause and the background for the rise of the cultural consciousness and social autonomy of the immigrant Irishman, German, Scandinavian, Jew,

Pole, or Bohemian. On the whole, the automatic processes of Americanization have not repressed nationality. These processes have liberated nationality, and more or less gratified it. . . .

Two genuine social alternatives are before Americans, either of which they may realize if they will. In social construction the will is father to the fact, for the fact is hardly ever anything more, under the grace of accident and luck, than the concord or conflict of wills. What do Americans *will* to make of the United States — a unison, singing the old British theme "America," the America of the New England School? or a harmony, in which that theme shall be dominant, perhaps, among others, but one among many, not the only one? . . .

The mind reverts helplessly to the historic attempts at unison in Europe — the heroic failure of the pan-Hellenists, of the Romans, the disintegration and the diversification of the Christian church, for a time the most successful unison in history; the present-day failures of Germany and of Russia. In the United States, however, the whole social situation is favorable as it has never been at any time elsewhere — everything is favorable but the basic law of America itself, and the spirit of the American institutions. To achieve unison — it can be achieved — would be to violate these. For the end determines the means and the means transmute the end, and this end would involve no other means than those used by Germany in Poland, in Schleswig-Holstein, and Alsace-Lorraine; by Russia in the Jewish Pale, in Poland, in Finland; by Austria among the Slavs; by Turkey among the Arabs, Armenians and Greeks. Fundamentally it would require the complete nationalization of education, the abolition of every form of parochial and private school, the abolition of instruction in other tongues than English,

and the concentration of the teaching of history and literature upon the English tradition. The other institutions of society would require treatment analogous to that administered by Germany to her European acquisitions. And all of this, even if meeting with no resistance, would not completely guarantee the survival as a unison of the older Americanism. For the program would be applied to diverse ethnic types under changing conditions, and the reconstruction that, with the best will, they might spontaneously make of the tradition would more likely than not be a far cry from the original. . . .

The attainment of the other alternative, a harmony, also requires concerted public action. But the action would do no violence to the ideals of American fundamental law and the spirit of American institutions nor to the qualities of men. It would seek simply to eliminate the waste and the stupidity of the social organization, by way of freeing and strengthening the strong forces actually in operation. Taking for its point of departure the existing ethnic and cultural groups it would seek to provide conditions under which each might attain the cultural perfection that is *proper to its kind*. The provision of such conditions has been said to be the primary intent of American fundamental law and the function of American institutions. And all of the various nationalities which compose the American nation must be taught first of all this fact, which used perhaps to be, to patriotic minds, the outstanding ideal content of "Americanism" — that democracy means self-realization through self-control, self-discipline, and that one is impossible without the other. . . .

Men may change their clothes, their politics, their wives, their religions, their philosophies, to a greater or lesser extent: they cannot change their grandfathers.

Jews or Poles or Anglo-Saxons, in order to cease being Jews or Poles or Anglo-Saxons, would have to cease to be, while they could cease to be citizens or church members or carpenters or lawyers without ceasing to be. The selfhood which is inalienable in them, and for the realization of which they require "inalienable" liberty is ancestrally determined, and the happiness which they pursue has its form implied in ancestral endowment. This is what, actually, democracy in operation assumes. There are human capacities which it is the function of the state to liberate and to protect in growth; and the failure of the state as a government to accomplish this automatically makes for its abolition. Government, the state, under the democratic conception is, it cannot be too often repeated, merely an instrument, not an end. That it is often seized by the powers that prey, that it makes frequent mistakes and considers only secondary ends, surface needs, which vary from moment to moment, of course is obvious: hence the social and political messes government is always getting into. But that it is an instrument, flexibly adjustable to changing life, changing opinion and needs, the whole modern electoral organization and party system declare. And as intelligence and wisdom prevail over "politics" and special interests, as the steady and continuous pressure of the "inalienable" qualities and purposes of human groups more and more dominate the confusion of their common life, the outlines of a possible great and truly democratic commonwealth become discernible. Its form would be that of the federal republic; its substance a democracy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously through common institutions in the enterprise of self-realization through the perfection of men according to their kind. The common



language of the commonwealth, the language of its great tradition, would be English, but each nationality would have for its emotional and involuntary life its own peculiar dialect or speech, its own individual and inevitable esthetic and intellectual forms. The political and economic life of the commonwealth is a single unit and serves as the foundation and background for the realization of the distinctive individuality of each *natio* that composes it and of the pooling of these in harmony above them all. Thus "American civilization" may come to mean the perfection of cooperative harmonies of "European civilization" — the waste, the squalor and the distress of Europe being eliminated — a multiplicity in a unity, an orchestration of mankind. As in an orchestra every type of instrument has its specific *timbre* and *tonality*, founded in its substance and form; as every type has its appropriate theme and melody in the whole symphony, so in society, each

ethnic group may be the natural instrument, its temper and culture may be its theme and melody and the harmony and dissonances and discords of them all may make the symphony of civilization. With this difference: a musical symphony is written before it is played; in the symphony of civilization the playing is the writing, so that there is nothing so fixed and inevitable about its progressions as in music, so that within the limits set by nature and luck they may vary at will, and the range and variety of the harmonies may become wider and richer and more beautiful — or the reverse.

But the question is, do the dominant classes in America want such a society? The alternative is actually before them. Can they choose wisely? Or will vanity blind them and fear constrain, turning the promise of freedom into the fact of tyranny, and once more vindicating the ancient habit of men and aborting the hope of the world?

## THE IMMIGRANT: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

*Henry Pratt Fairchild:* CONDITIONS IN AMERICA AS  
AFFECTED BY IMMIGRATION

TURNING to those aspects of the immigration situation in this country which more immediately affect the life of the American people as a whole, we find that they group themselves under nine main heads, as follows: wages and standard of living, pauperism, crime, insanity, industrial efficiency and progress, amount and distribution of wealth, crises,

social stratification, and politics. In each of these categories certain preliminary effects are already observable, and other much more extensive ones may be predicted on a theoretic and hypothetical basis.

As regards wages, we have already made a careful study of what may be taken as typical immigrant wages. The

Henry Pratt Fairchild, *Immigration* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1913), pp. 301-340. Used by permission. [Footnotes omitted.]



question now is, how have these wages affected the earnings of the great body of American workmen? Has this admittedly low wage scale of the foreign labor body exercised a depressing effect upon the remuneration of the native American, or has the latter been enabled, by relinquishing the lower grades of labor to the foreigner, to avail himself of higher and better paid positions?

This question, like many others of its class, involves the problem of determining what would have happened if history had been different in some single particular. It is a most perilous, and often profitless, field to enter. It is apparently impossible for statisticians to determine with certainty what has been the course of real wages within the past half century or so. There is no doubt that money wages have gone up. There is also no doubt that the average price of commodities has gone up. The question is whether average prices or average wages have gone up the faster. The most reliable tables covering this subject are probably those of the Bureau of Labor, and these have been discontinued since 1907. As far as the showing which they make can be depended upon, it seems to indicate that there has been a very slight rise in the purchasing power of full-time weekly wages since 1890. Granting this, the question still remains, would not the American workman have enjoyed a much greater increase in real wages during this period if he had been allowed to reap the full advantage of his economic position in the country, without having to meet the competition of vast numbers of foreign laborers? The answer to this question must rest on pure theory, as its statistical proof would involve a reenactment of past history, which is a manifest impossibility.

According to the established laws of economics there are two ways in which

immigration may operate to lower wages. First, by increasing the supply of labor in the country, and thereby diminishing the amount of remuneration which the individual laborer can command. Second, by introducing a body of laborers whose customary wage in the countries they come from, and whose corresponding standard of living, is much lower than the prevailing standard in the new country. This factor operates, not by increasing the number of laborers bidding for employment, but by lowering the amount of the initial bid on the part of a sufficient number of laborers to fix the remuneration for the whole lot. As to the first of these ways, . . . it is not probable that in the long run immigration has materially increased the total population of the United States. But it has, from time to time, caused a marked temporary increase in the body of unskilled labor, and this, as will be shown later, is an important matter. However this may be, the second of these two ways has undoubtedly been by far the more instrumental in reducing the average wage of the American workman. It is not because he has had to compete with more laborers, so much as with cheaper laborers, that the American workman has failed to secure a higher remuneration for his services. It is what Professor Commons has called the "competitive struggle for standards of living" which has been the determining factor, and the whole matter can be best understood by taking it up in the light of the general standard of living, rather than of mere wages.

The standard of living is the index of the comfort and true prosperity of a nation. A high standard is a priceless heritage, which ought to be guarded at all cost. The United States has always prided itself on the high standard of living of its common people, but has not always understood on what that standard rests. The

standard of living is the resultant of two great factors, the stage of the arts, and the ratio of men to land. It may be improved by bettering the methods of production and utilization of natural resources, or by reducing the ratio between men and land, i.e. by limiting the increase of population. It may be lowered either by a retrogression in the stage of the arts — something which can hardly be conceived of under our present civilization — or by an increase in the ratio between men and land. Both of these suppositions assume that the amount of land remains stationary. If large tracts of good land are made available by any means, it gives opportunity for a decided improvement in the standard of living, and if we can conceive of large areas of good land being actually lost, there would be an inevitable lowering in the standard. In point of fact, standards of living are much more likely to go up than down. The history of civilization has been that of increasing standards. A retrogression in the stage of the arts is not likely to take place on a large scale; neither is it probable that, other things being equal, men will increase their rate of reproduction, for the very reason that such an increase would involve a lowering in the standard of living.

A standard of living, once established, has great tenacity, and people will suffer almost anything in the way of hardship before they will reduce it. If, for any reason, the dilemma is presented to a people of lowering their standard or of limiting their rate of increase, they will in general adopt the latter alternative. This will come about, not so much as the result of a conscious choice, as by the unconscious adaptation to surrounding conditions. On the other hand, if natural conditions are gradually and steadily improving, it may frequently happen that the rate of reproduction will keep pace

therewith, so that the standard of living will remain essentially the same. But if some sudden improvement in conditions appears — like the opening up of great stretches of new land, or some far-reaching improvement in the arts — the standard of living may rise appreciably before the forces of reproduction have had time to offset the new advantage. In other words, the rise of standards of living does not take place ordinarily by a steady and unvarying progress, so much as by successive steps or waves. The regular, continuous improvements in conditions account for lifted standards less than the exceptional, epochal occurrences. Such occurrences, being inherent in the cosmic laws and in the constitution of human nature, transpire with sufficient frequency to make possible great advances in standards of living over long periods of time.

Let us apply these principles to the case of the United States, and seek to determine what part immigration has played in their operation. At the beginning of its career the United States was most favorably circumstanced as regards its standard of living. A people whose knowledge of the arts represented the highest product of the civilization of the day was set down in a practically uninhabited country, apparently unlimited in extent, and of marvelous fertility and abundance of natural resources. All of the old checks to population were removed, and there resulted a natural increase of numbers unprecedented for a corresponding area and extent of time in the annals of the race. But even this could not keep up with the development of natural resources, and a general standard of living was established far ahead of any other nation of the period.

Into this favored section of the earth's surface have been introduced ever increasing numbers of the lower classes of

foreign nations. What has been their effect upon the prevailing standard of living? As a major premise, it will be granted that the standard of living of the working classes of the United States has been and still is superior to that of the nations which have furnished the bulk of the immigrants. Common observation and general testimony establish this beyond the need of proof. Particularly at the present time, if this were not so, very few of our immigrants would come, for, as we have seen, this is the great incentive which draws them. It is significant, however, that the bulk of immigration has been recruited from more and more backward races of Europe as the decades have succeeded each other. There is not now the relative advantage for the peasant of England, Germany, or Scandinavia that there was during the first two thirds of the nineteenth century. As regards the new immigrants — those who have come during the last thirty years — the one great reason for their coming is that they believe that on the wage which they can receive in America they can establish a higher standard than the one to which they have been accustomed. And this wage for which they are willing to sell their labor is in general appreciably below that which the native American workman requires to support his standard. What does this mean? It means in the first place that the American workman is continually underbid in the labor market by vast numbers of alien laborers who can do his work approximately as well as he. But it means more than this. It means that he is denied the opportunity of profiting by those exceptionally advantageous periods which as we have seen recur from time to time, and provide the possibility of an improved standard. From his point of view these periods include any circumstances which occasion a sudden increase

in the demand for labor — such as the establishment of a great new industry or the opening up of new territory by the completion of a railroad or recurring “good times” after a period of depression. If this new demand must perforce be met by the labor already in the country, there would be an opportunity for an increase in wages to the working man. But the condition which actually confronts the American workman at such a time is this — not only is the amount of wages which can be successfully demanded by labor profoundly influenced by the number and grade of foreign workers already in the country, but there comes at once, in response to improved conditions, a sudden and enormous increase in the volume of immigration. Thus the potential advantage which might accrue to the laborers already in the country is wholly neutralized. The fluctuating nature of the immigration current is of vital importance to the American workman. It means that for him the problem is not that of taking the fullest advantage of a possibility of an improved standard, but of maintaining intact the standard which he has. We have seen that, in the long run, the only way in which he can do this is by limiting the size of his family.

The familiar argument that the immigrants simply force the native laborers up into higher positions is often urged in this connection. It is hard to see how any one can seriously hold this opinion. The fallacy of it has already been shown. It is, of course, perfectly obvious that at the present time most of the native workmen in industry are in the better paid positions, and that the lower grades are occupied by foreigners. But the question is, are there as many native workmen in high positions as there would have been in all positions if there had been no immigration? This is what the “forcing up” argu-

ment assumes, and the falsity of the position seems self-evident. It appears much more reasonable to believe that while a few native workers have been forced up, a vastly larger number are working side by side with the immigrants and earning approximately the same wages — to say nothing of that other body of native labor which the immigrants have prevented from ever being brought into existence.

Even if it were true that the native American himself is as well off as he would have been without immigration, that would not settle the matter. The question is that of the standard of living of the American workman. If the American workman happens to be a foreigner, it is just as important for the welfare of the nation, and of humanity, that he be properly housed, fed, clothed, educated, and amused as if he were a native. We would still have to face the fact of a standard continually retarded by accessions of newcomers, representing ever lower economic strata. Can we afford, as a nation, to allow the standard of living of the workman, whoever he is, to suffer in this way?

It appears that the forces whose working has been outlined in the preceding paragraphs can have only one logical outcome — namely, the depression of the wage scale of the American workman. If immigration has not absolutely lowered the wages and the standard of living of the American workman, it certainly has kept them from rising to the level that they otherwise would have reached. . . . For it must not be forgotten that poverty, and riches, and standards of living are all purely relative terms. It is not a question of how much a man has, absolutely, as of how much he has in comparison with those around him, or how much he might have had. So that the common statement

that the American workman of to-day has more of the comforts and luxuries of life than one in the same class fifty or one hundred years ago, by no means meets the case. If his share in the wonderful prosperity of the nation has not increased at least in the same proportion as that of the capitalist, or the professional man, or other members of society, then he has really suffered loss.

Immigration has seriously complicated the problems of the trade-unions in this country. Both the need and the difficulty of organization have been greatly increased. The traditional attitude of the unions toward immigration has been one of opposition. Restrictive measures, in particular the contract labor law, have met with their approval and support. But when the immigrants are once admitted to the country, the unions are under the necessity of either receiving them or suffering from their competition. A large body of unskilled laborers, with low standards, unaffiliated with the unions, is most prejudicial to the success of unionism. Alien races differ as to their adaptability to union control. Some of the races of southeastern Europe are looked upon as natural strike-breakers. The Irish, on the other hand, are natural organizers, and at the present time tend to monopolize the direction of the unions. In some cases a large influx of foreigners has practically put the unions out of the running. In others, the unions come to be made up largely of foreigners. At times it is necessary to organize the different racial elements into separate subgroups.

On the other hand, the unions exercise a great educative influence on the immigrants — often practically the only one with which the adult foreigner comes in contact. They encourage him to learn English, imbue him with higher stand-

ards of living, and teach him the principles of independent thought and self-government.

One of the chief objections to unrestricted immigration has always been the belief that it seriously increased the amount of pauperism and crime in the country, and added to the burden of relief and correction. We have seen how large a part this objection played in the early opposition to immigration, not only in colonial days, but during the first half of the nineteenth century. Even in our day, in spite of the laws prohibiting the entrance of criminals, paupers, and persons likely to become a public charge, there is a widespread impression that these two evils are increased through immigration. . . . As a result of careful studies by the Immigration Commission, this is one of the very few effects of immigration about which we may feel justified in setting down definite conclusions.

According to statistics for the year 1850 a native-born population of 21,947,274 contributed 66,434 of the paupers who were wholly or partially supported in the country, while a foreign-born population of 2,244,602 contributed 68,538. This was manifestly enough to arouse deep consternation, and had not the current of immigration fallen off in the latter fifties we should probably have had a pauper restriction clause in the federal statutes long before we did. The enactment and enforcement of such a statute has prevented the recurrence of any such state of affairs in recent years. Nevertheless, as one glances at random over the reports of various charitable organizations he is impressed with the fact that the number of foreign-born paupers is out of all proportion to the total number of foreign-born inhabitants. Thus in Massachusetts in 1895, a foreign-born popula-

tion of 30.6 per cent furnished 47.1 per cent of the paupers. The report of the Associated Charities of Boston for 1894 stated that nearly all of their applicants were of foreign birth or parentage, while in the same city, three years later, the Industrial Aid Society reported that 56 per cent of the men given work in the men's department were foreign-born, while 66 per cent of those aided by the Provident Aid Society were of this class. The reports of the Wisconsin State Board of Charities for the years 1871 to 1898 show that, on the average, the foreign-born paupers considerably outnumber the native-born. Similar figures may be obtained from many sources.

But the question can be settled only by taking the whole country into account. The Special Report of the Census Bureau on Paupers in Almshouses, 1904, gives the following figures as to the proportions of foreign and native paupers in the almshouses of the country (p. 6):

Nativity	Per Cent Distribution of Paupers			Per Cent Distribution of General Population		
	1903	1890	1880	1903	1890	1880
White:						
Native	51.6	50.2	56.8	74.5	73.2	73.4
Foreign	39.3	37.8	34.6	13.4	14.6	13.1

These figures are the most authoritative and inclusive which there are, covering the almshouses of the country, and show a ratio of paupers among the foreign-born vastly in excess of the ratio of total population.

The paupers in almshouses, however, do not by any means include the total number of persons who belong in that category. There are large numbers of persons receiving relief, who never get inside the almshouses. To cover this class, the Immigration Commission made a special

study of immigrants as charity seekers, which included the work done by the charity organization societies in forty-three cities, during the six months from December 1, 1908, to May 31, 1909. The total number of cases for which information was secured is 31,685. Of these, the head of the case was foreign-born in 38.3 per cent of the cases, native-born of foreign father in 10.7 per cent, native-born white of native father, 39.9 per cent, and native-born of native negro father, 11 per cent. Of the persons represented, 37.5 per cent were native white of native father, and 42.3 per cent foreign-born. For exact conclusions, comparison should be made of the relation of the percentage of foreign-born paupers to the percentage of foreign-born in the total population in each separate city. For general purposes it is sufficient to note that in the cities of 25,000 or over in 1910 — which include all of the forty-three cities studied — the percentages of foreign-born were 20.2 for cities of 25,000 to 100,000, 22.1 for cities of 100,000 to 500,000, and 33.6 for cities of 500,000 and over.

In fifteen out of the forty-three cities one half or more of the cases, classed by the head of the case, were foreign-born, Milwaukee standing at the head of the list with 67 per cent. In twelve out of the forty-three cities, more than 15 per cent of the cases were immigrants of the second generation, Milwaukee again standing at the head with 25.5 per cent. These two classes make up 92.5 per cent of all the cases for this city. There is evidently more than one thing that makes Milwaukee famous, with a possible connection between them.

In regard to the relative importance of the various foreign races in this respect, we find that the Germans show the largest proportion, amounting to 6.8 per cent of the total number of cases and 7.1 per

cent of the total number of persons. The next in order are the Polish, with 6.5 per cent of the cases and 8.6 per cent of the persons, and the Irish, with 6.2 per cent of the cases, and 6.3 per cent of the persons.

As might be expected, the proportion of foreign-born is much larger (more than half) in the cities of the North Atlantic states than in the rest of the country, and very small (10 per cent) in the southern cities.

One more piece of evidence may be taken from the Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration for 1908 (p. 98). It is there shown that in the charitable institutions (other than for the insane) in the United States, including Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico, both public and private, there were, at the time this investigation was made, 288,395 inmates, of whom 19,572 were aliens, 40,453 naturalized citizens, and 228,370 native-born. The percentages are native-born 79.2 per cent and foreign-born 20.8 per cent. It appears that the proportion of foreign-born in institutions is not so extremely excessive as among those seeking a more temporary relief. This is what might be expected in the light of certain considerations respecting the make-up of the foreign-born group which are now to be considered.

It thus becomes evident that from whatever source the figures are taken, the percentage of foreign-born dependents is sadly out of proportion to their relative number in the general population. The absolute figures themselves are bad enough. But a further consideration of the composition of the foreign-born element will demonstrate that the actual showing is much worse than the figures would indicate on their face.

We have seen that as respects their economic efficiency the immigrants are a

picked group. The same is true of the foreign-born in the country. This is especially evident as regards the age distribution. . . .

It will be seen that there is a much larger proportion of the foreign-born in the middle-age groups, that is, in the period of greatest productivity, than of the native-born. There ought accordingly to be a smaller percentage of pauperism, rather than a larger one.

The sex distribution contributes a further element to this disparity. In 1910, in the native-born white population there were 102.7 males to 100 females. In the foreign-born white population there were 129.2 males to 100 females. This should lessen the liability of the foreign-born to pauperism.

Another factor which enters in to complicate statistical comparisons of pauperism among immigrants and native-born is the matter of the age at which persons become dependent, or, in the case of the immigrants, the number of years they have resided in the United States before they become dependent. There are two periods at which the immigrant is most likely to need relief. The first is immediately after landing, when he has exhausted his slender store of money, and has not yet found means of self-support. Seven per cent of the entire Jewish immigration to the United States, in one year, found it necessary to apply at the office of the United Hebrew Charities in New York, within a short time after their arrival. Relief granted at this time is liable to be temporary, and the immigrant cannot justly be considered a pauper. If he actually becomes dependent, he is of course liable to deportation.

The second, and vastly more important, period is several years after arrival, when the immigrant has exhausted the prime of his strength, and becomes one of the

unfit in the keen struggle for economic existence. Those who become dependent at this time are likely to remain so for life. They are those who have been unable or unwilling to make provision for old age, perhaps being so dazzled by the apparent richness of America that they gave no thought to a possible future dearth, perhaps having sent all their meager savings year by year back to friends or relatives in the old country, possibly never having been able to earn more than a bare living wage. Individuals of this class make up the vast majority of the foreign-born paupers in our almshouses. The census of 1890 showed that 92 per cent of the foreign-born male paupers in the almshouses of the United States had been in this country ten years or more. The corresponding figures for the twelfth census show that out of 27,230 foreign-born paupers whose length of residence in this country is known, 26,171, or 96 per cent, had been here ten years or more. The facts furnished by the investigation of the Immigration Commission in respect to persons aided by the Charity Organization societies are similar; it must be borne in mind, also, in respect to these cases, that they largely represent instances of temporary distress, rather than settled dependence. Of all the foreign-born heads of cases aided by these societies, 44 per cent had been in the United States twenty years or more, and 70.7 per cent ten years or more. When it is recollected how small a proportion of our foreign-born population have been in this country twenty years or over, or even ten years or over, it is manifest how misleading are comparisons in respect to pauperism between native-born and foreign-born, based on the total population of the two classes. Thus, according to the census of 1910, only 62.2 per cent of the total foreign-born population, and 60.2



per cent of the foreign-born population in the urban communities, had immigrated in the year 1900 or earlier. These facts also point to a possible great increase of pauperism among the foreign-born, as the average length of residence of this class increases.

The age of admission to the almshouse of the different population groups gives corroborative evidence along the same line. The following figures, taken from the census report on Paupers in Almshouses (p. 129), give the average age at admission of the different groups in 1904: native white of native parentage, 45.6 years; native white of foreign parentage, 41.7 years; native white of mixed parentage, 38.3 years; foreign-born white, 56.9 years. The high average age of the foreign-born is due in part to the relatively small number of foreign-born children in the country. But it is undoubtedly also an indication of the effectiveness of the system of examination in weeding out those whose liability to dependence in the near future can be detected. It furthermore adds to the apprehension with which we must look forward to the time when a greater proportion of our foreign-born residents will be above the specified age.

These considerations have an especial bearing on the effort to establish the relative tendency toward dependence of the different immigrating races. As one runs over tables of dependence or pauperism, arranged by nationality, he is impressed by the immense preponderance of the Germans and Irish among those listed. His first conclusion is likely to be that the popular idea of the greater desirability of these races over the newer immigrants is an error; but as soon as he recalls how much longer these races have been in this country, on the average, than the southwestern Europeans, he realizes that these

tables, taken by themselves, are wholly unreliable as indicating relative tendencies among races.

Taking these figures as they stand, we may say roughly that the Irish have thirty times as many paupers as those born in Russia and Poland, and forty-six times as many as the natives of Italy or Hungary and Bohemia, and twice as many as the Germans. But this evidently does not represent the relative tendencies to pauperism of these races. The first correction to be made is in regard to the relative numbers of each group in the total population. The Irish have 3.3 times as large a total population as the Italians, which reduces the ratio of relative tendency to pauperism down to about fourteen to one. By a similar reckoning we find that the Germans manifest only about one third the tendency to pauperism that the Irish do, but 4.2 times as great as the Italians. But before even approximately accurate figures for the relative tendencies of these races can be secured, a further correction must be made for the relative average length of residence of the different groups. This unfortunately cannot be done in the present state of our information. . . .

The Immigration Commission also made a study of the patients admitted to Bellevue and Allied Hospitals for the seven months period August 1, 1908, to February 28, 1909. The total number of charity patients or cases was 23,758. Of these 18.5 per cent were native-born of native father (2.5 per cent negro), 28.5 per cent native-born of foreign father, and 52.3 per cent foreign-born. The Irish foreign-born are far in the lead, having approximately one fifth of all the cases treated. If we add the Irish native-born of foreign father, we have over one third of the total. . . .

The same distinction appears here be-



tween the old and new immigrants that we should expect — a high percentage for the old immigrants in the group over twenty, and a high percentage for the new immigrants in the group under five.

Whether the newer races, as their average length of residence in this country increases, will approach the degree of pauperism of the Irish and Germans, time alone can tell. The strictness of the tests of admission to the United States has steadily increased, and this has had the effect of giving the later immigrants a better showing, as a body, than the earlier ones. It is not impossible that time will prove that thrift and foresight are more distinguishing features of the southern races than of the northern, purchased though they are at the cost of a very low standard of living. A large amount of relief is undoubtedly sought by members of the newer races of immigrants. Among the Charity Organization cases studied by the Immigration Commission, 14.2 per cent of the Russian foreign-born heads of cases had been in the United States less than one year, and the following percentages of foreign-born heads of cases had been in the United States less than five years: Magyar, 44.1 per cent; Russian, 38.7 per cent; Italian, south, 26.6 per cent; Syrian, 25.8 per cent; Italian, north, 25.6 per cent. The races having the largest percentages of foreign-born heads of cases residing in the United States twenty years or over were: Irish, 71.3 per cent; Welsh, 70.4 per cent; French, 62.9 per cent; German, 62.8 per cent; Canadian, French, 58.5 per cent.

The Hebrews exhibit a large amount of dependence, but as they are almost wholly looked after by their own race they seldom appear in large numbers in the public reports. The United Hebrew Charities of New York, in the year 1904, received 10,334 applications at their relief

bureau, representing 43,938 individuals, and expended for relief alone \$124,694.45. In 1912 the number of applications had fallen to 7140, representing 31,835 individuals, but the expenditure for relief had risen to \$254,188.71. This indicates, as the report points out, that the present applicants are in need of permanent relief to a much greater extent than those of a decade ago. The report of the same organization for October 1, 1901, gives the estimate that from 75,000 to 100,000 Jews in New York alone are not self-supporting.

There can be but one conclusion from the foregoing discussion, namely, that our foreign-born residents add to the burden of public and private relief an amount largely out of proportion to their relative numbers in the general population, and that this burden is likely to be an increasing one. Mr. Prescott F. Hall publishes an estimate that the total annual cost of caring for the foreign-born poor of New York State alone equals \$12,000,000. It is worth noting that while the expense of this burden of relief is borne by the public and by benevolent individuals, the real benefit goes to the employer of cheap labor. He secures his labor at a wage which will barely maintain its efficiency for a period of years, without any provision for the future, and when that period is over, and the laborer is no longer an efficient producer, he is cast aside with absolutely no responsibility resting on the employer for his future support or care. At the customary rate of wages there seem to be but two alternatives open to the workingman's family — either to live on a frightfully low standard, and make some slight provision for the future, or to live on a somewhat higher standard and run the risk of dependence in old age or misfortune. It is obvious that both of these are unqualifiedly bad.

As to the causes of this abnormal

amount of pauperism Miss K. H. Claghorn makes the following statement: "While it is plain enough that foreign immigration has some connection with the problem of pauperism since common observation and all the statistics available unite in showing that the majority of the recipients of our charity, public and private, are of foreign birth, it is equally certain on the other hand that pauperism is not something that the immigrant brings with him, but is the result of a considerable period of life and experiences here." This opinion, coming from so high a source, emphasizes two facts — first, that it is not altogether, if at all, the immigrant's "fault" that there is so much pauperism among this class. Those who have been paupers before, or seem likely to become so, are refused admission. Second, that there is something radically wrong in the industrial adjustment of the United States when so large a number of foreigners, who come here primarily for motives of financial betterment, and who are not by nature thriftless, are unable during a long period of faithful labor to lay up anything against the period of helplessness. We cannot escape the accusing finger which points toward the United States, demanding recognition of the fact that we are by no means prepared to accept the tremendous responsibility of admitting unlimited numbers of aliens whose entire future destiny depends upon the soundness of our political, social, and economic fabric.

It may be worth while to note some of the general causes which lead to pauperism among the foreign-born. (1) Lack of intelligence. This is sometimes represented by figures of illiteracy. This is hardly a fair basis of judgment, however, as illiteracy may be often the result of poor opportunity, rather than of low intelligence. Nevertheless it is true that the average immigrant of the present

generation is probably inferior to the average native workingman, and hence is handicapped in the competition with him. (2) Lack of industrial training. Most of the immigrants have had no training in their home countries to fit them for higher industrial pursuits, and many of those who have, find that it is not adapted to American conditions. (3) Lack of foresight. This must not be generally asserted of the immigrant class, for undoubtedly a large proportion of them are well equipped with an appreciation of the future. Yet in many cases, the ease with which a comparatively comfortable living may be secured in the first years of residence, and the apparently inexhaustible riches of the United States, combine to make the alien neglectful of a future period of dearth. (4) Large families. The birth rate of the foreign-born is a high one, and a large number of young children is always a predisposing cause of pauperism in a struggling family. In this connection some significant figures are furnished by the investigation of the charity organization cases, made by the Immigration Commission, and already referred to. Of all the foreign-born male persons, aided by these societies, who were twenty years of age or over, 81.5 per cent were married, 5 per cent deserted, separated, or widowed, and only 13.5 per cent single. Of the females, 62.3 per cent were married, 33.9 per cent deserted, separated, or widowed, and only 3.8 per cent single. When we remember how much the single men outnumber the married men in the general population of the foreign-born above twenty years of age, we see that if the time ever comes when immigration becomes more of a family matter than at present — in many ways a condition much to be desired — it must inevitably bring with it a tremendous increase in the amount of foreign-born pauperism. (5) Money sent home. If the

situation of the immigrant was such that these large sums could be retained in this country, as a reserve fund against future want, his liability to pauperism would be much diminished. This, of course, cannot be expected, since much of this money is sent back to meet obligations which no one would wish the immigrant to evade. In cases where it is sent back to support a family, it is doubtless a more economical arrangement than if the wife and children were maintained in the United States. (6) Low wages, and the maladjustment between the supply of labor and the demand. Enough has already been said to establish this as a fundamental condition, and it is the proximate cause of pauperism in the majority of cases. The attempt to analyze and classify the causes of pauperism is unsatisfactory at best; yet a certain amount of light may be shed on the subject in this way if carefully done. The Immigration Commission's Report on Immigrants as Charity Seekers assigns the cases studied to certain general causes. . . .

There is no great difference in the proportions of the different causes in the different general groups. It may be significant to note that the per cent of cases due to the neglect or bad habits of the breadwinner is a little larger for the native-born white of native father than for the foreign-born, and larger for the native-born white of foreign father than for either. If we take persons instead of cases, the showing of the native-born of foreign father is even worse. The relatively small number of cases due to this cause — the only one which may be charged directly to the "fault" of the breadwinner — indicates that the difficulty lies rather with the industrial system of the United States than with the culpability of the individual.

That assimilation, in so far as it is represented by ability to speak English, will

not remedy the situation is indicated by some suggestive figures given in the report on Charity Seekers above quoted. It is shown (p. 70) that of the total number of persons assisted, six years of age or over, belonging to non-English speaking races, 76.3 per cent were able to speak English. Now in the report on Manufactures and Mining it appears that only 53.2 per cent of the foreign-born employees studied, belonging to non-English speaking races, could speak English. That is, the percentage of dependents, who are so far "assimilated" as to be able to speak English, is much greater than the percentage of those who are at work, in spite of the fact that the former class includes younger children than the latter. This harmonizes with the fact already demonstrated, that dependent foreigners have been in this country much longer than the average of their group. It also lends color to the suggestion made by a charity worker, that one reason why the newer immigrants do not appear in larger numbers on the books of philanthropic organizations is that they are not yet "on to the ropes," and that as they become familiarized with American methods, they will seek relief in increasing numbers.

The subject of crime is customarily linked with that of pauperism in the discussions of immigration, and the same claim is frequently made, viz. that immigration has increased the amount of crime in this country. The attempts at proof of this assertion generally follow the same method adopted in the case of pauperism, that is, they consist in an examination of the relative tendency toward criminality of the general groups of native-born and foreign-born. In other words, the line of argument is, if the foreign-born manifest a larger proportion of criminals among their number than do the native-born, all increases in the foreign-born population will mean a more than proportional in-

crease in crime for the country as a whole. There is, however, another way in which immigration might operate to increase crime. That is, by interfering with the natural adjustment of economic relations between different classes, it may so alter the condition of the native-born as to lead to an increase in crime in this class. For instance, it has been claimed that a large proportion of the "hobo" class (who are, to be sure, not necessarily criminal) are native Americans who have been forced out of employment by foreign competition. In a similar way, other individuals may have been driven into active crime. This proposition, whatever the incidental evidence for or against it, is manifestly incapable of statistical proof, and for any semi-mathematical demonstration we must rely on the other method of approach.

In the matter of crime the effort to make generalizations is complicated by the fact that it is necessary to take into account, not only the number of crimes, but the nature and severity of the criminal act. Tests of criminality, to be accurate, should include quality as well as quantity. This is obviously very difficult to do. We are accustomed in everyday phraseology to speak of one crime as being worse than another. Presumably crimes against the person are more serious than crimes against property. In the case of crimes against property, we might naturally consider it "worse" to steal \$1000 than \$5, but it would not necessarily be so.

These conditions frequently result in an injustice to the immigrant. The police and court records of our great cities show an amazing proportion of crimes chargeable to the foreign population. For instance, out of 71,253 persons held for trial or summarily tried and convicted in the Magistrates' Courts of New York City in

1907, only 30,261, or considerably less than half, were born in the United States. But when these records are studied more closely it becomes apparent that a large share of the offenses of the foreign-born are violations of the city ordinances, offenses which are comparatively trivial in themselves, do not indicate any special tendency toward criminality, and are in many cases intimately associated with a low station in life. The moral character of alien groups may in this way be seriously misrepresented. . . .

In response to the questions, "Is the volume of crime in the United States augmented by the presence among us of the immigrant and his offspring?" and "If immigration increases crime, what races are responsible for such increase?" the Commission says that no satisfactory answer has ever been made, or can ever be made, without much more complete data than have ever been collected or are available. Certain general conclusions, however, have been reached by the Commission, which harmonize with those reached by other students, and are worthy of acceptance as far as they go. First, "No satisfactory evidence has yet been produced to show that immigration has resulted in an increase in crime disproportionate to the increase in adult population. Such comparable statistics of crime and population as it has been possible to obtain indicate that the immigrants are less prone to commit crime than are native Americans." Second, "Immigration has, however, made changes in the character of crime in the United States." These changes have been in the direction of an increase in offenses of personal violence, and offenses against public policy (disorderly conduct, drunkenness, violation of corporation ordinances, etc.), some of which are incident to city life, and probably in offenses against chastity. There

does not appear to have been any increase in the majority of offenses against property, or, as they may be better called, gainful offenses. Comparing the different races as regards criminality, it appears that the Irish stand at the head as regards the total number of offenses and the Germans next. In respect to major offenses, however, the Germans stand first, while the Irish take first place in the minor offenses. The Germans are much addicted to crimes against property, the Irish and Scotch to drunkenness, Greeks and natives of Russia to violations of corporation ordinances, and immigrants from France, Russia, Poland, and Canada to crimes against chastity. The Italians are preeminent in crimes of violence or crimes against the person.

It is even more difficult to postulate the causes of crime than of pauperism. Until the criminologists have furnished us with a more efficient means of determining the causes of crime in general, there can be no profit in the attempt to classify the causes of crime among a particular group of the population. In respect to the nature of crime committed by different races, there seems to be something in the racial character of some of our immigrants which predisposes them in a certain direction, as exemplified in the preceding paragraph. There is also evidence that among some of the newer immigrants, crime is largely a matter of economic position. This is well illustrated by the case of the Greeks. Among the members of this very recent immigration group, there has been a noteworthy decline in the average of criminality within the last few years, and the explanation appears to be that the crimes of the Greeks are such as correspond with a low economic situation — violations of corporation ordinances, of the sanitary code, etc. As a larger and larger proportion of the individuals of

this nationality rise above this lowly estate, the percentage of crime among them falls off correspondingly. This emphasizes once more the responsibility of the United States for some of the evil conditions for which we habitually blame the immigrants.

There are two particular forms of crime which are closely associated with foreign groups in the United States. These are the Black Hand outrages and the white slave traffic. The former of these is confined almost wholly to persons of the Italian race. In some of its features it recalls the Molly Maguire occurrences of a generation earlier. In fact, the resemblance between the Irish societies and the Mafia of southern Italy was noted in a contemporary magazine article at the time of the disturbances in the anthracite region of Pennsylvania. In both cases no organic connection between the societies in the new world and the old is manifest. In fact, the best judgment in regard to the Black Hand appears to be that there is no real organization in existence in America, but that individuals of Italian race use the power of the dreaded name to accomplish their own ends. Like the Molly Maguires, the Black Hand operators utilize warning letters, but they differ from them in that their purpose is often, if not usually, blackmail, which was seldom the case with the Irish society.

The white slave traffic has aroused tremendous public interest during the last few years, and has been thoroughly exploited in the daily and periodical press. Only the essential features, particularly in their bearing on immigration, need to be reviewed in the present connection. Not all of the girls concerned in this business are immigrants, nor are all the persons who draw a revenue from it foreigners; yet the various investigations of the subject have demonstrated that the whole

trade is fundamentally an affair of our foreign population.

One surprising thing about this traffic is that essentially it is an economic phenomenon. It is not a perverted sex passion which demands the perpetuation of the inhuman system; it is the desire for large and easy profits, and the life of indolence that goes with them, which actuates the promoters of the traffic, while on the part of the alien women it is frequently the desire for larger earnings which brings them to our shores. The demand has to be stimulated.

There are two classes of these alien girls who are brought over. One consists of innocent girls who are brought over under a false understanding. The incentive is usually a false promise of employment or of marriage. Sometimes false marriages, and occasionally actual marriages, are resorted to. With this class of subjects, the male importer is naturally the most successful. All kinds of inducements are offered by the procurer, including an apparently sincere love-making. About the only inducements which female importers can offer to such girls are easier or more lucrative employment. The other class, probably constituting a large majority, are women who have already been leading an immoral life on the other side, and come in the hope of bettering their prospects, although they recognize the power of the importer. . . .

Alien women are particularly desirable to the promoters of this traffic because their lack of connections in this country, and their ignorance of the language and customs of the country make it more difficult for them to escape or to make trouble for their men than in the case of native girls. . . .

The great majority of the alien women found by the Immigration Commission

engaged in these pursuits, as well as the men who prosecute the traffic, are French and Hebrews. Belgians are largely engaged in it, according to Commissioner Bingham. Germans are numerous, and there are a few Irish and Italians, with of course a scattering of individuals of other races.

A number of these women are detected at the port of entry and returned, and a good many are deported. But it is a practice very difficult of detection, and it is not easy to get at the facts in regard to its extent in this country. It is certain that the class of abandoned women in this country is largely recruited in this way. Commissioner Bingham estimated in 1908 that there were more than 100,000 such women on the Pacific coast and in Mexico, who had come in through New York.

No evidence has been found to justify the suspicion that there was an organization controlling this traffic in this country. But those engaged in the trade naturally are acquainted with each other, and are always ready to help each other against a common enemy. They have various meeting places where they get together for gambling, conference, and divers forms of recreation.

The efforts of the Immigration Commission and other governmental agencies within the last two or three years have accomplished a good deal in breaking up some of the resorts, and deporting or imprisoning the culprits. But while the traffic has received a serious setback, it is by no means killed. This is emphatically one of the things where eternal vigilance is the price of safety. Nothing short of a sweeping change in public opinion and practice will ever put it out of the way beyond the possibility of resurrection.

In respect to juvenile delinquency the most unenviable place is held by the



native-born children of immigrants. They not only manifest two or three times as great a tendency toward crime as the native-born children of native parents, but they are much more criminal than foreign-born children. Of the juvenile delinquents committed during 1904, according to the census report, 76.7 per cent were native white. This percentage was made up as follows: native parentage, 37.6 per cent; foreign parentage, 24.9 per cent; mixed parentage, 9.7 per cent; parentage unknown, 4.5 per cent. An exact comparison of the children of native parents and of foreign parents in this respect would require information as to the total number of the two classes in the country in the year in question, which is not available. But it cannot be supposed that the number of native-born children of foreign parents compared with the number of native-born children of native parents in anything like the ratio shown in the above figures. This high degree of criminality is attributed by Professor Commons and by the Immigration Commission largely to concentration in the cities. Whatever the cause, this tendency toward lawlessness among the second generation of immigrants is indisputable, and is one of the most disturbing elements in the whole situation.

Still another way in which the immigrant becomes a burden upon the American public is through insanity. The laws are very strict in regard to the admission of aliens who are liable to be subject to this misfortune. Yet it is impossible to prevent the entrance of large numbers who ultimately appear in the category of the insane. The maladaptation of the immigrant to his environment shows itself in this way perhaps as clearly as in any other.

In the institutions for the insane, both

public and private, in the United States, including Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico, in 1908, there were, according to the Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 172,185 inmates. Of these 25,066 were aliens, 25,128 naturalized citizens, and 121,451 native-born. Thus the percentages were 70.5 per cent native-born and 29.5 per cent — nearly one third — foreign-born.

An even larger percentage of foreign-born appears among the insane persons enumerated in hospitals in continental United States on December 31, 1903 — 34.3 per cent of the white insane of known nativity — while of the persons received at Bellevue and Allied Hospitals for treatment for insanity during the period of the investigation of the Immigration Commission, 63.4 per cent were foreign-born, and 36.6 per cent native-born. Moreover, among the native-born, more than half (20.6 per cent of the total) were native-born of foreign father.

Summing up the matter of insanity, the Commission speaks as follows: "For the high ratio of insanity among the foreign-born, several causes have been assigned, and while it is difficult to determine the values of the various factors it is probably true that racial traits or tendencies have a more or less important influence. A further cause of mental disease is probably to be found in the total change in climate, occupation, and habits of life which the majority of immigrants experience after arrival in the United States."

The efficiency of the inspection in regard to feeble-mindedness is shown by the very small proportion of foreign-born of that class appearing in the statistics. This is an affliction which can more easily be detected than the liability to insanity, of which there may be no observable indication at the time of admission.

*William S. Bernard:* ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION

IN an effort to reach a conclusion as to whether immigration should be further reduced, maintained at the same level, or increased somewhat, this chapter presents data relevant to the relation between immigration and economics, with emphasis on more recent evidence. It also undertakes a critique of some of the theories and arguments which have been advanced by the more extreme opponents of immigration as to its economic effects on the receiving country and the numerous economic fallacies which have developed in popular thinking on the subject.

The huge population movement of thirty-eight million persons from Europe to the United States in the hundred years from 1820 to the early decades of the twentieth century was an economic phenomenon of the greatest significance. This redistribution of population was regarded as valuable from the economic viewpoint. The liberal philosophy of the nineteenth century taught that freedom of migration was an economically rational process. This belief in individual freedom of movement was directly related to the doctrine of free trade which dominated economic thinking during much of the period of large immigration to the United States. Men, like goods, it was held, should be allowed to go where they were in greatest demand and would be of the greatest value, without the imposition of legal restrictions or governmental barriers. It seemed a truism that adults who had been nurtured in their native lands and in their maturity offered their labor and skills to the lands to which they emigrated were economic assets to the countries of their adoption.

The dominant point of view during

most of the nineteenth century thus accepted as a matter of course the desirability of immigration. In recent decades, partly because of a change in the conditions of American life and partly because of changes in our economic philosophy, the pendulum in many respects has swung to the opposite extreme. Without justification the immigrant has often been made the scapegoat for the unsolved problems of our industrial society.

The tremendous contributions made by immigrants to our national development are undeniable. Indeed, they have played such an integral part in the growth of our economic system and our total culture that it is sometimes difficult to sift their contributions. Since immigrants have from the earliest days been completely absorbed into American life, in one sense it is almost impossible to conceive what American economic institutions might have been without the contribution of the immigrant. His contributions can be charted only in a broad way, and any specific summary such as that given below can at best be only suggestive; any comprehensive attempt to describe immigrant contributions would necessarily reach into every sphere of national life.

*Economic Growth*

Much of the hard labor required to convert our country from a vast area of undeveloped resources into a top-ranking industrial nation has been borne by immigrants and their descendants.

Realization of the great agricultural potentialities of the country has been due in no small measure to their efforts. Only in recent years have we begun to appraise the part of the immigrants in that distinc-



tive characteristic of American economic life, the moving frontier. The great impetus which immigration gave to our westward expansion and the conquest of the continent has been depicted by an eminent historian:

Without the influx of millions of Europeans this clocklike procession across the continent could not have occurred. The population would not have been so mobile. There would have been a frontier to be sure, but not the kind of frontier that produced the now accepted historical consequences.

Following in the wake of the first pioneers, many immigrant families of German, Scandinavian, Slavic, and other national strains have helped to extend the area of cultivation ever westward. Large portions of the Middle West and the West are now being tilled by descendants of these immigrant stocks. In the East many farms left idle by former native tenants, moreover, have been taken over and run profitably by Italian, Polish, and other immigrant families. The development of Pacific Coast agriculture has depended in part on crops from the Mediterranean imported by immigrants skilled in raising them, and the Japanese also brought to California exceptional talent in intensive cultivation and gardening. In all sections of the nation except the South the work of immigrants has helped to push the agricultural production of the country to its present high levels. The desirability of the immigrant farmer is specifically recognized in our present immigration law, which grants the skilled agriculturist preference within the quota.

Much of the heavy and difficult work of building our continent-wide transportation system was likewise performed by the different new immigrant groups at various periods of our history. In the middle of the nineteenth century the Irish

constituted a most important element in the laboring class. They took over a large part of the heavy work in the building of the Erie Canal and the other waterways which formed essential links in the transportation system of that era. In the construction of our vast system of railroads which had spanned the continent by the turn of the century, new laboring groups such as the Slavs and Italians worked along with the Irish. In the building of the far western railroads the Chinese were an important source of labor.

Even more significant is the role of the immigrants in the opening of our mines and the expansion of our industries. Here the development of individual industries is closely tied up with the coming of various immigrant groups to the United States. In specific industries the succession of immigrant groups employed reflects the changing character of immigration at various periods. The work of the New England textile mills was chiefly performed from 1820 to 1840 by New England farm girls, from 1840 to 1860 by the Irish, and after 1865 by Italians, Portuguese, Greek, and other new types of immigrants. Later large numbers of French Canadians went to work in these same mills.

A similar succession can be traced in the mining and metal industries. In general, the most recent immigrant groups have tended to hold the most arduous and lowest paid jobs, as the earlier comers advanced to more agreeable and profitable occupations. Thus the heavy work in the mining and metal industries which in earlier days was performed by English, Welsh, and other old-immigrant groups has been largely taken over by immigrants from Hungary, Poland, Italy, Yugoslavia, and other parts of eastern and southern Europe. In the early part of the century a large proportion of the Slavic

immigrants were employed in the coal and iron industry, in the steel mills, and in mining.

Indeed, in the rapid industrial expansion between 1890 and 1910 the new immigration from southern and eastern Europe which assumed such large proportions at this time, played an indispensable part. The United States Immigration Commission, which from 1907 to 1911 made a critical and searching investigation concerning the effect of immigration upon American life, covered in a 42-volume report, admitted that the great expansion of American industry during this period would have been impossible without the new immigrants.

Analysis of American economic history indicates that immigration has stimulated the growth of wealth in our country. The period from 1890 to 1910 saw the heaviest immigration in our history, totaling about 12,500,000 for the twenty years. American economy was expanding and wealth increasing at an unprecedented rate during this period. The statistics . . . , compiled by the noted economist I. A. Hourwich, show that, whereas the population rose some 46 per cent, coal production rose 220 per cent, steel production 606 per cent, and bank clearings (one of the best indices of business) 191 per cent. Heavy immigration naturally was not the sole cause of this rise, but it made a major contribution.

The United States Census Bureau in "A Century of Population Growth" estimated that during the nineteenth century immigrants contributed thirty million persons to the American population and during the same period added forty billion dollars to our wealth. As a corollary to this, those sections of our country where immigrants have settled have developed into the wealthiest parts of the country, and those with the smallest pro-

portion of foreign born have become the poorest . . . , as has been demonstrated to be true in earlier years, the ten states with the highest percentage of foreign born had a per capita income several times that of the ten states with the lowest percentage of foreign born.

The fact that this list segregates chiefly the southern states as those with the lowest percentage of foreign born and with the lowest income may be somewhat misleading. Natural resources and geographic position, of course, have been factors in the promotion of wealth. On the other hand, many analyses indicate that the wealth of the states with the largest ratio of foreign born is not due alone to superiority of natural resources (a superiority that is often questioned), but is also based on the ethnic and economic diversity of the immigrant groups which at an early period made these states centers of industry. Even in colonial times those colonies which showed the least prejudice against receiving foreigners were those which prospered. At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, James Madison declared: "That part of America which has encouraged them [the foreigners] most, has advanced most rapidly in population, agriculture, and the arts." The relative poverty of the South, according to some authorities, may be partially explained by the institution of slavery, which caused immigrants to shun the southern states, fostered the development of a one-crop economy, and barred the area from the stimulus to progress and diverse economic development which immigration might have provided.

. . . [It is also] clear that the states with a high percentage of foreign born, although scattered through the East, the Middle West, and the Far West, have a high per capita income. It is true that wealth and opportunity have attracted

newcomers, but economic history also shows that these newcomers have played an essential part in the continued progress of any area.

*Comparison of Percentage Foreign Born and Per Capita Income for Ten States with Lowest and with Highest Percentages of Foreign Born\**

HIGHEST TEN STATES

	Percentage Foreign Born	Per Capita Income
New York . . . . .	21.2	\$863
Massachusetts . . . . .	19.7	766
Rhode Island . . . . .	19.3	715
Connecticut . . . . .	19.2	827
New Jersey . . . . .	16.7	803
New Hampshire . . . . .	13.9	546
Michigan . . . . .	13.0	509
California . . . . .	12.6	805
Illinois . . . . .	12.3	726
Washington . . . . .	11.7	632
Average . . . . .	15.9	\$733

LOWEST TEN STATES

	Percentage Foreign Born	Per Capita Income
Mississippi . . . . .	.3	\$201
North Carolina . . . . .	.3	316
South Carolina . . . . .	.3	254
Alabama . . . . .	.4	268
Georgia . . . . .	.4	315
Tennessee . . . . .	.4	317
Arkansas . . . . .	.5	252
Kentucky . . . . .	.9	308
Oklahoma . . . . .	.9	358
Virginia . . . . .	.9	450
Average . . . . .	.48	\$313.7

As has been well said: "What is lacking in some sections is not resources but resourcefulness."

Not only have immigrants contributed

\* Population data from U. S. Census (1940); income data from U. S. Dept. of Commerce (1940). Suggested by a similar chart in Felix S. Cohen, *Immigration and National Welfare* (New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1940).

to our general economic growth and wealth but they have also brought to this country organizing ability, enterprise, scientific knowledge, and inventiveness, which speeded the tempo of our development and added immeasurably to the diversity of American life. The new industries and industrial processes introduced by immigrants have, for instance, played an important part in our whole economic advance. Thus, for example, the pottery and chinaware crafts were introduced to Pennsylvania by German immigrants at the end of the eighteenth century. A little later the French set up the first large munitions industry in Delaware. The French and the Swiss were the first watchmakers. Tanning was introduced by the Germans, at first in Pennsylvania and then in Wisconsin. The clothing industry was built up by the Germans and Austrians during the Civil War and was later taken over largely by Jewish, Russian, and Italian groups. Italians have played an important part in developing the domestic wine industry, especially in the Finger Lakes district of New York State and in California, where their vineyards have helped make these areas important centers of the industry. They have also been conspicuously successful as truck gardeners and have brought special skills to such crafts as jewelry cutting and stone masonry.

The German refugee immigration after the Revolution of 1848 was especially significant because of the large numbers of educated immigrants, scientists, and skilled workers it included. It was at this time that skilled craftsmen introduced into the United States special processes which had been developed in Europe in such fields as bookbinding, printing, lithography, furniture making, mill and glass work, and the art of piano construction. The chemical and drug industry, the

optometric and photographic industry, brewing, and other new industries were set up by these refugee immigrants. The contributions of present-day refugees in our country afford a dramatic parallel to those of these earlier refugees, for they have similarly introduced innovations into our industrial life and have even transferred complete industries, notably the diamond industry, from Europe to this country.

The role of immigration in promoting industrial progress may be further suggested by the mention of the names of a few immigrants who have been outstanding leaders in the development of special industries: Andrew Carnegie (Scottish) played such a role in the steel industry, Samuel Slater (English) in the cotton-mill industry, John Jacob Astor (German) in the fur industry, Michael Cudahy (Irish) in the meat-packing industry, Frank Assman (Swedish) in can processing, and Henry Lomb, John J. Bausch, and Charles Lembke (all German) in the optical industry. Other leading immigrant figures in industry include Joseph Bulova (Czech) in the watch industry, James Butler (Irish) in chain groceries, Leo Baekeland (Belgian) in bakelite and velos, Giuseppe Tagliabue (Italian) in thermometers, Conrad Worra (German) in aluminum products, Charles L. Fleischmann (a Hungarian Jew) in yeast, David Sarnoff (a Russian Jew) in radio, Frederick Weyerhaeuser (German) in the lumber industry, and William S. Knudsen (Danish) the head of General Motors. Immigrant producers, actors, artists, and technical experts have played a very important part in the motion picture industry, the show business, the theater, music, and the other arts. If diversity of industry and specialization are necessary for a high standard of living, as the economists state, immigrants have contributed

substantially to our present standard, considered the highest in the world.

#### *Immigrant Scientists and Inventors*

The scientific knowledge and inventive genius of many of our immigrants have been even more important to the industrial advance of the country and the increase of its productivity than the specific contributions already listed.

Basic discoveries made by immigrants in the field of pure science have extended the bounds of the knowledge on which advance in our industrial and economic life has depended. The work of Charles Steinmetz (German) and Michael Pupin (Serbian), who made important discoveries concerning the nature of electricity, has had an especially profound effect on industrial progress. Many other immigrants have made valuable contributions to scientific knowledge, as indicated by their representation in the 1944 edition of *American Men of Science*, where recent additions alone include the names of more than two hundred refugees who have fled to this country from Nazi Europe since 1933. Many of their inventions and new processes aided our war effort. The most striking example is the vital role played by Enrico Fermi and other recent immigrants in the development of atomic power, with its vast potentialities for peace as well as for war.

The great gains America has at various periods of her history received from newcomers from Europe are apparent in even a brief list of important discoveries and inventions made by immigrants.

John Ericsson (Swedish) invented the ironclad ship and the screw propeller. Alexander MacDougal (Scottish) made many other important inventions in the field of shipbuilding. Ole Evinrude (Norwegian) invented the outboard motor. David Lindquist (Swedish) invented the

modern electric elevator, Andrew Hallidie (Scottish) the cable car for streets, and Carl Oscar Hedstrom (Swedish) the motorcycle. Giuseppe Bellanca (Italian) made outstanding innovations in airplane design, and Octave Chanute (French) invented the glider. Advance in airplane design and development of the industry in more recent times have been greatly influenced by the work of Igor Sikorsky and Alexander de Seversky (both Russian).

John August Udden (a Swedish geologist) was responsible for the opening of the Texas oil fields. Albert Arent (a German metallurgist) did pioneering work in exploring the mining possibilities of the Rocky Mountains. Herman Frasch (German) developed the oil-refining process and the extraction of sulphur. Lucas Petrou Kyrides (Greek) made other important contributions to industrial chemistry. David Thomas (a Welshman) invented the hot blast furnace and has been called "the father of the American iron business." Louis Bonard (French) invented the circular loom for weaving hats and a machine for casting iron. Cornelis Bol (Dutch) invented the mercury vapor lamp. John Garand (French) invented the Garand rifle, and John Adolph Dahlgren (Swedish) made various inventions in naval gunnery. Conrad Huber (Russian) invented the flashlight. Emile Berliner (a German Jew) was responsible for important aspects of the development of the telephone and the gramophone. Alexander Graham Bell (Scotch) is most widely known as the inventor of the telephone. Immigrants likewise played prime roles in the development of printing techniques: Mathias Schwalbach (German) invented the first typewriter model and Otto Mergenthaler (a German Jew) the first linotype machine); Louis Prang (German) developed lithography and color printing.

Some of the chief marvels of engineering science today are the achievements of immigrant engineers. Gustave Lindenthal (Austrian) designed Hell Gate Bridge, Charles A. Schneider (German) the cantilever bridge over Niagara Falls. John A. Roebling (German) developed the use of steel wire cables for suspension bridges, such as Brooklyn Bridge. John F. O'Rourke (Irish) planned the tubes under the East River (New York City) and the subway tunnels, Ole Singstad (Norwegian) the Holland Tunnel, and Ole Hoff (Norwegian) other underwater tunnels. A. O. Ammann (Swiss) was head of the commission of engineers which designed and built George Washington Bridge.

Especially outstanding has been the work done by immigrants in the field of medicine and bio-chemistry, which has had beneficial effects on the health and living standards of our people and indirectly on our vigorous development. Rene DuBos (French) discovered tyrothricin, a drug superior in some respects to penicillin and sulfa drugs, Arthur Cushing (Scotch) the use of digitalis. Carl Beck (German) was one of the first users of the X ray. Simon Baruch (a German Jew) made important contributions to hydrotherapy and the surgery of appendicitis. Hans Zinsser (German) was an outstanding pathologist. George W. Raiziss (a Russian Jew) pioneered in the use of anti-septics and sulfa drugs. Isaac Levin (a Russian Jew) made important contributions to cancer research, and Hiram N. Vineberg (a Russian Jew) to gynecology. Joseph Goldmark (a German Jew) was a pioneer in medical education. Abraham Jacobi (a German Jew) was a pioneer in American pediatrics and established the first free clinic for children. Alexis Carrel (French) won a Nobel prize for his work in surgery. Casimir Funck (Polish)

brought to light important functions of vitamins. Refugee physicians and medical scientists have similarly during the last few years brought new knowledge and understanding to these fields and have made signal contributions to the health of many understaffed rural areas where they settled.

#### *General Effects on Progress*

The specific contributions of individual immigrants and of immigrant nationalities as listed above serve to illustrate the larger general process by which immigration has provided a spur to progress in our economic and cultural life. The variety of cultural heritages in our mixed population has been an important factor in the speed of our development. The new ideas and inventive genius brought here by immigrants have added to the diversity of our culture, rendered it more responsive to shifting situations, and speeded our rate of cultural change. In this process all parts of our life have been involved. Competition between different elements in our population and their ways of living has stimulated new ideas and made for new inventions. Instead of being static and rigid we have changed with the times and forged ahead.

#### *Complaints against Immigration*

For many years much of the recurrent controversy about the economic effects of immigration centered about the report of the United States Immigration Commission of 1907-1911. The general point of view and the sheer mass of data in the forty-two volumes have colored the discussion of economic aspects of immigration up to our day. Many of the current economic fallacies owe their strength to this source. The investigation of the Commission and the publication of its report took place during years when the volume

and intensity of immigration were at the highest peak. American society in general was affected by serious economic problems resulting from rapid industrialization and the growth of cities. The Commission's report, it is true, gave a detailed account — based on first hand investigation — of industrial conditions in which the immigrant was involved. Nevertheless the report is subject to the general criticism that it failed to separate undesirable economic conditions described from the causes which were responsible for them. Blame for the situation is attached to the immigrant, but on analysis this proves to be unjustified. Among the specific charges made against the immigrant were allegations that the "new" immigrants were inferior to the "old"; that immigration produced an oversupply of unskilled labor with a resultant reduction of wages and a lowering of the American standard of living; that native workers were displaced from occupations which were formerly theirs; that unionization was retarded; that immigrants lived in unsanitary slums; that the large numbers of the unskilled retarded the introduction of machinery; that immigrants worked under sweatshop conditions; that they had a high accident rate; that they utilized child labor.

Most of these points, even as applying to that era, have been refuted by more detailed analysis and by intervening developments. Hourwich, a noted labor economist, answered most of the charges in detail as early as 1912. It has been shown that the substandard economic conditions which were attributed to the immigrant were the product of the era of community indifference and cutthroat economic competition. The slums and sweatshops were part of the chaotic growth of cities and rapid industrialization. The immigrants themselves did not



originate these deplorable conditions. If immigrants were concentrated in unskilled and semi-skilled occupations, a fact which the Report tended to deplore, American economic development needed and absorbed millions of laborers, as we have already noted. However, the conditions of the immigrants improved rapidly with the passage of time, and later studies have confirmed a valid conclusion of the Immigration Commission itself: that the economic status of the immigrant was directly related to the length of his residence in the country.

The United States Immigration Commission Report was commendable in that it focused attention on immigration as an economic phenomenon, but at the same time it prejudiced the discussion of the problem by its failure to analyze the underlying conditions of American economic life and by its presentation of a distorted and one-sided picture of the role of the immigrant. Most of the charges made against immigration by the Commission's report no longer apply, as will be brought out in further detail later. Regulative controls such as tenement house laws, child labor laws, minimum wage laws, bans against the sweatshop, and unsanitary working conditions, together with broad-scale unionization of industry, have largely eliminated the evils which led to the type of charges listed by the Commission.

### *Job Displacement*

One of the most persistent and recurrent economic fallacies in popular thought is the notion that immigrants take away the jobs of native Americans. This rests on the misconception that only a fixed number of jobs exist in any economy and that any newcomer threatens the job of any old resident. Such a theory, sometimes referred to as the "lump of

labor fallacy," has been repeatedly refuted by competent economists. To quote Norman Bentwich:

An idea is abroad that there is a limited amount of work to be done in the country, and if a stranger is allowed to nibble at the lump, there will be less of it for the natives. All the economists of repute have shown this to be a fallacy.

William H. Beveridge similarly shows that the popular notion of a rigidly determined limit to job opportunities is erroneous:

The popular conception is of industry as rigidly limited — a sphere of cast iron in which men struggle for living room; in which the greater the room taken by any one man the less must there be for others; in which the greater number of men the worse must be the case of all. The true conception is of a sphere made of elastic material, capable of expansion and being in fact continually forced to expand by the struggling of those within.

Job opportunities in any society are not fixed at any particular level but expand with a rising population. The extent of the opportunities for employment depends on the stage of technological development and on the division of labor in relation to natural resources. The economies of modern industrialized nations are extremely fluid and have a high absorptive capacity for new workers. This is especially true of countries with a relatively sparse population such as the United States.

The facts of American economic history clearly demonstrate that with the increase in population both wealth and industry have expanded and job opportunities have multiplied. Since 1870, when immi-

gration began to assume important proportions, the total number of jobs has risen even more rapidly than the population itself. The population rose from 38,558,371 in 1870 to 122,775,046 in 1930, or about 200 per cent, whereas the number of the gainfully employed increased from 12,505,923 in 1870 to 48,829,920 in 1930, or nearly 300 per cent.

. . . [The table below] compares the increase in the total population with that in the number of gainful workers, decade by decade, from 1870 to 1930. It makes clear that during this whole period, when our population was growing at a very rapid rate, to a considerable extent because of immigration, the number of jobs in the country was growing even faster. It is significant that for the decades when the percentage increase in immigration over that of the total population increase was highest the increase in the number of gainfully employed was consistently about one-third higher than the increase in the total population.

The correlation between periods of large-scale immigration and of increase in the number of gainful workers may be explained in part by the stimulating effect

immigration tends to have on the nation's economy, a point clearly demonstrated earlier in this study. Other factors leading to expansion of the economy, such as technical improvements and capital accumulation, were of course important agents in the rise in the proportion of the population gainfully employed during this period. It is at least certain, however, that the multitude of immigrants arriving then was fully absorbed into the American economy and had a favorable rather than an adverse effect upon employment conditions. It has also been claimed, though it cannot be proved statistically, that the decline of immigration in the decade of the 1930's may well have been a factor in the slowing down of our economy in that period. Especially striking is the fact that the most severe unemployment in American history came during the last depression, which started about ten years after the end of large-scale immigration. On the other hand, the increase in the number of jobs since the decline of immigration has been steady and strong, reaching in 1947 a total of roughly sixty million.

As has already been demonstrated, industries of many diverse sorts have been established by immigrants at various eras in our history. These industries, often introducing new products to the American market, have been a substantial factor in expanding job opportunities for native — as well as foreign-born workers. The development of our export and import trade has depended heavily on such immigrant industries. The consumption level of the population of the United States as a whole has been raised by new foods and other new products introduced by immigrants, for, as advertisers well know, variety in the supply of products available tends to raise the consumption

*Comparison of Increase in Number of Gainfully Employed with Increase in Total Population, 1870-1930\**

	Total Population	Per Cent Increase	Number of Gainful Workers	Per Cent Increase in Gainfully Employed
1870	38,558,371		12,505,923	
1880	50,155,783	30.1	17,392,099	39.1
1890	62,947,714	24.8	22,735,661	30.7
1900	75,994,575	21.3	29,073,233	27.9
1910	91,972,286	21.0	38,167,336	31.3
1920	105,710,620	15.0	41,614,248	9.0
1930	122,775,046	15.1	48,829,920	17.3

\* Fifteenth Census of the United States (1930), Occupations: H. Dewey Anderson and Percy E. Davidson, *Occupational Trends in the United States* (1940).



level of any group. This factor had an important bearing on industrial expansion and the rise in per capita income during periods of heavy immigration.

#### *The Immigrant as a Consumer*

Arguments that immigrants take jobs away from native Americans overlook the fact that immigrants, like other residents in the country, are consumers and consequently expand the market. They not only take a place in our economy by meeting the demands for labor but as consumers create a demand for goods. The man who earns money spends it. The spending creates employment. Because immigrants are consumers they help to increase the job opportunities and contribute to the economic prosperity. New capital investment, a chief spur to employment, follows in the train of increased demand. It has been estimated that the total amount of capital equipment of all sorts required to cover the needs of a consumer may be reckoned at about four times the normal value of his consumption. Immigration by increasing the number of consumers provides a considerable stimulus to new investment.

Our first- and second-generation immigrants represent an important proportion of American consumers. In 1940 the foreign-born white population of the United States, 11,419,138 persons, constituted 8.6 per cent of the total population; the native whites of foreign or mixed parentage, another 23,157,580, comprised 17.5 per cent. Together, the foreign born and native born of foreign or mixed parentage, 34,576,718 consumers in all, constituted 26.1 per cent of the total population.

Statistics concerning our immigrants point toward a high rate of consumption on their part. Although prior to 1910

males predominated among immigrants, the proportion of females to males among immigrants has risen steadily during recent decades until today the old picture is reversed. By 1940 females made up 56 per cent of the total immigration, and 59 per cent by 1945, as shown in [the table below]. A high proportion of females in any group is considered an indication of a high level of consumption, because though many females do not have jobs all are consumers. In 1940, 67.4 per cent of foreign-born white males but only 16.7 per cent of foreign-born white females were gainfully employed. The fact that the age distribution of immigrants has customarily shown a preponderance of young adults also insures a relatively high level of consumption.

*Proportion of Males and Females in Recent Immigration\**

	Per Cent Males	Per Cent Females
1901-1910	69.8	30.2
1911-1920	63.5	36.5
1921-1930	55.6	44.4
1931-1940	43.4	56.6
1941-1945	41.0	59.0

In an earlier era the complaint was raised that immigrants tended to "under-consume," that is, to create fewer jobs through their consumption than they filled. If indeed this was ever true, it is no longer the case. Immigrants have striven through education to raise their economic status, and they have been quick to take over the material standards of the American way of life. The average level of education achieved by immigrants is practically equivalent to that of the native born, in spite of the fact that the total immigrant group includes many

\* U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Monthly Review, February, 1946.

older people who came here when it was too late for them to take advantage of the educational opportunities of this country. Educational level correlates with economic status and thus may be taken as an index of consumption levels. Housing and rentals, another important index of consumption levels, are no lower among foreign-born than among native-born groups at the present time, as brought out by the National Resources Committee's study:

In 1930 it was found that the median monthly rental of urban non-farm homes was slightly higher for foreign-born white (\$35.13) than for all native white (\$34.11). When the native white classification is further subdivided according to parentage an even greater difference is seen. The figures for those of native parentage is \$23.26 and for foreign or mixed parentage \$37.74.

The importance of the foreign born as consumers is further illustrated by the large number of businesses and industries that depend on the special interests and tastes of different nationality groups, national food habits being the most obvious example. Advertisers regard the foreign-born group as a very important market, as is shown by the large advertising allotment for foreign-language newspapers and foreign-language broadcasts.

#### *Immigrant Competition*

The competition offered by immigrants to native Americans has been greatly exaggerated in popular thinking.

Immigrants have in general come here in response to definite needs for labor in our economic system (although some groups, such as refugees, form an exception to this general rule) and have come to this country in large numbers, as official statistics show, only when conditions here were prosperous. In addition, immi-

grants have naturally tended to establish themselves in occupations where competition is at a minimum. To quote a well-known authority:

The immigrants in the United States not only seek out those industries in which opportunities for employment are most numerous, but also those into which, because of the handicaps of language and lack of money and experience, or because of national characteristics they fit most easily.

Immigrants have generally entered the economic scene by developing a role or economic function which is distinctive and would be difficult for a native to fulfill. Particular old-world skills or types of knowledge have been used by individual nationalities to develop specialties where competition with natives will not be severe. The Chinese laundry business, the Chinese and Greek restaurant business, the truck farming of Italians and Poles, the Greek sponge industry around the Gulf of Mexico, and many other examples might be cited. Although the specialized function of many immigrant groups does not show up in the occupational classifications of the Census, it is a factor not to be overlooked in considering the relationship between immigration and job competition.

The immigrant with his foreign accent and his ignorance of American customs and business procedures has usually been at a disadvantage in nearly all fields of work. Immigrants have therefore tended to take over the lowest paid and least desirable jobs in the American economy, and their coming has allowed native workers to rise in the economic scale. By the unskilled labor supplied by immigrants and the industrial expansion they have made possible, increased opportunities have been provided for skilled, white-collar, and professional workers. On the

whole, any displacement suffered by native Americans has been "displacement upwards" and has been advantageous. The history of the steel industry, the New England textile mills, the mine fields, and many other industries indicates that the native workers and older immigrants moved on to supervisory jobs, or to positions in skilled or white-collar jobs with higher prestige, when large numbers of immigrants entered the field. This was not displacement in any unfavorable sense, for it redounded to the economic advantage of the earlier groups. This movement of people up the economic and social scale is what has distinguished the United States from European countries. Immigration has been an important factor in the promotion of our open-class system, one of the cornerstones of American social democracy. . . .

Although in recent years unskilled immigrants have been represented to a less extent, the inflow of other immigrants has been so small that the group as a whole has represented a negligible amount of competition to native job holders. In addition, only part of this total have been wage earners who might conceivably offer competition to American workers. Old people, housewives, and children, who do not compete for jobs but actually swell the number of American consumers, have constituted a considerable proportion of the total. This proportion has been increasing steadily since 1900. Indeed, in the last fifteen years more than half the immigrants have been representatives of such groups, classified by immigration statistics as having "no occupation." The percentage in this category arriving from 1941-45 is more than double that from 1901-1910.

During the period of refugee immigration from Nazi Europe, as in some other eras of our history, a large number of

individuals entering the country set up their own businesses or industrial enterprises. Widespread interest in this fact has led to special investigations concerning the degree to which these new businesses have competed with native industry. These studies have shown that much of this industry does not compete with American industrial enterprise. Oftentimes industries set up by immigrants introduce new products to the American market or start the manufacture of products previously imported. Our export trade has also been enlarged by such new industry.

In 1941-42 a special study of refugee industries was set up by the Committee on Selected Social Studies and conducted by a corps of trained workers under the direction of Sophia M. Robison. Through this study more than 800 refugee enterprises were located, around 300 of which were in the field of manufacture and over 400 in the field of trade — a representative sample of the total of refugee enterprises. The largest numbers of refugee manufacturers were found in the apparel and textiles, food and beverages, leather, and diamond industries. About half reported that they had introduced to the American market something new or never before manufactured in this country. Of special importance is the transfer of the center of the diamond industry from Amsterdam to New York; this has resulted not only in the direct employment of large numbers of refugees and native Americans but indirectly in the employment of trained engineers and others to work in processes new to America. Two hundred refugee entrepreneurs in the group investigated were engaged in some form of foreign trade.

The twofold fact that much of this refugee enterprise was not competitive to American business and that through it

employment was given to native as well as to refugee workers was clearly indicated in the Robison study. Some 9,000 workers were discovered to be employed by the refugee enterprises covered in the study, 6,000 of whom were reported to be Americans. The study found:

In terms of averages, based on the facts in the refugee enterprise study, each refugee entrepreneur in business has created a job for approximately seven American workers in New York City. No data are available on the incalculable amount of additional business and employment created by the refugee demand for housing, food, clothing, transportation, amusement, etc.

Further facts regarding new industries which have been established by refugees and new industrial processes which have vitalized established industries are also included in the findings of the Committee for the Study of Recent Immigration from Europe. The preliminary report of this study concluded:

It is evident that the refugees, making up only an insignificant percentage of the immigrant population and an utterly negligible proportion of the total population of this country, could hardly offer serious competition to Americans or endanger their way of life. On the contrary, they have had a beneficial influence upon this country out of proportion to their numbers. They have had a stimulating effect upon the economic and cultural life of the nation. In business they have started new types of enterprises, stimulated existing ones, and developed new markets. In industry they have introduced new processes and produced articles hitherto unknown or not manufactured here. Moreover, in both these fields they have brought in capital and created job opportunities for Americans.

Similar reports come from countries the world over. Countries which have shel-

tered refugees as a humanitarian gesture have found them a valuable addition to their economies and have expressed the hope that their refugee population will wish to remain rather than to return to their homelands. Partly as a result of this, countries throughout the world have shown growing interest in the stimulating effect of immigration upon a nation's industry and in many cases are revising their immigration policy accordingly.

#### *Immigration and Unemployment*

The history of the United States shows that immigration, or the excess labor supply it might create, has never proved a substantial factor in producing unemployment. Expanding industry has had no difficulty in absorbing immigrant workers. The causes of unemployment are rather to be found in maladjustments of our economic system and are rooted chiefly in the fluctuations of the business cycle. No economist would challenge the conclusion that the unemployment problem would not be solved by further restricting immigration or by stopping it altogether.

The causes of unemployment have been the subject of many painstaking studies and detailed analyses. These studies make clear that unemployment in our country is the result of seasonal and cyclical variations in the general demand for labor, as well as of variations in the demands of individual employers. Seasonal demands for workers fluctuate widely in the manufacturing industries as well as in agriculture, as is shown by production and employment data for specific industries. Our industrial system operates on the assumption of an available labor supply to meet its peak periods of employment.

Recurring severe periods of unemployment, in this as in other industrialized

nations operating under a system of free enterprise, find their roots in the nature of the business cycle. According to economists, the cycle and the periods of unemployment which it brings are the result of such factors as over-expansion of production in relation to consumption, technological change, instability of credit, and changes in world price levels. Certain recent analyses have also emphasized the tendency to save beyond the available profitable private investment outlets, and thus to withdraw capital from circulation, as a critical factor in the production of unemployment. The business cycle is a world-wide phenomenon which strikes industrialized capitalist countries that do not receive immigrants as well as those that do.

#### *Some Unemployment Is Normal*

Under the American industrial system some unemployment is normal, and a sizable number of unemployed are to be expected even in prosperous times. Labor turnover and fluctuating industrial needs make this inevitable.

Admittedly it is difficult to establish any figure for what might be considered normal unemployment. For one thing, our statistics concerning unemployment in the past are far from complete. It was not until 1940 that the Bureau of the Census began to issue monthly reports on the labor force; these give a monthly estimate of the number of unemployed. Previous to 1940 there was no register of unemployment on a monthly or yearly basis over a continuous period. Various indirect methods of measuring unemployment, such as the reduced employment method by which the percentage of reduction from a certain level is calculated, have been used, however. Selected industries, too, have kept records which show fluctuations in their labor supply. Pro-

duction data in basic industries have also been used as an index of employment fluctuations. Trade unions have kept count of unemployed members, from which the total employment situation can be assessed. Thus, though we do not have absolute figures for the period previous to 1940, we do get considerable light on variations in unemployment.

The American Federation of Labor statistics from 1919 to 1938 cited in the table below show a variation from 75,000 unemployed in 1919 to 13,723,000 in 1933.

*Unemployment Estimates, 1919-38*  
(American Federation of Labor) \*

Year	Total Number Unemployed
1919 . . . .	75,000
1920 . . . .	1,401,000
1921 . . . .	4,270,000
1922 . . . .	3,441,000
1923 . . . .	1,532,000
1924 . . . .	2,315,000
1925 . . . .	1,775,000
1926 . . . .	1,669,000
1927 . . . .	2,050,000
1928 . . . .	2,220,000
1929 . . . .	1,864,000
1930 . . . .	4,770,000
1931 . . . .	8,738,000
1932 . . . .	13,182,000
1933 . . . .	13,723,000
1934 . . . .	12,095,000
1935 . . . .	10,052,000
1936 . . . .	9,395,000
1937 . . . .	10,933,000
1938 . . . .	11,032,000

The record further shows that the most severe unemployment in our history came not at a time when immigration was at its peak but in the 1930's, a full decade after immigration had first been drastically restricted. . . .

\* Congressional Record, Vol. 85 (Nov. 3, 1939), Appendix, part a, p. 841.

*Economic Effects of Immigration*

It seems to be a characteristic of the American industrial system that there are relatively large pockets of unemployment even in times of peak employment. Some occupations may show degrees of unemployment, but in others there is a condition of underemployment and jobs are offered which cannot be filled. This is true at the present time.

Economists in recent years have expressed the conviction that a certain amount of unemployment is not only normal but necessary for the smooth operation of our economic system. Their estimates vary, in general, from 1.5 per cent to 4.0 per cent of the total labor force. Some economists raise the ratio to 5.0 per cent, a figure commonly used in England. Applied to the United States' labor force, which now has reached the sixty million mark, this would indicate three million unemployed as normal. Although no categorical statement can be made as to what should be considered normal or necessary unemployment, the answer probably lies somewhere between one and three million unemployed in times of prosperity . . . , only in unusual situations when there are abnormal demands for workers — such as during the First and Second World Wars — has the figure dropped below one million. Since our economic system depends upon a flexible labor supply which can expand or contract, normally some portion of the population must be unemployed part of the time.

No economist would ever suggest, as sometimes does the man in the street during periods of economic crisis, that the deportation of ten million foreign-born workers would give jobs to ten million unemployed native workers. To quote from one of the world's most famous economists:

The notion that a bare reduction of the number of residents would serve to reduce the number of unemployed, and an increase to increase unemployment, has always been regarded as crude in the extreme by those who have given any thought to the problem involved.

Aside from displaying a misunderstanding of the general economic processes involved and of the immigrants' role as a consumer, such a solution would be ruled out by the occupational diversity of our economic system, which is categorized by the United States Census into 534 job classifications. It is not possible to transfer workers from one industry or occupation to another, or from one locality to another, with complete freedom. Immigrants like other elements in our population have found a place in an intricate occupational pattern in which they play an essential part, and elimination of them would not, as is sometimes naively supposed, help rid the country of unemployment. . . .

*Immigration in Times of Unemployment*

Although immigration in the long run is absorbed by the American economic system and does not create unemployment, large-size immigration in times of depression when unemployment is already a problem might tend to aggravate the situation. It is clear, however, that at no time in American history has immigration continued in times of depression on a scale that would seriously increase the dislocation.

In one of the most scholarly studies in the field, "Migration and Business Cycles," Jerome made a careful comparison of immigration statistics and unemployment indices for the last century. He found that immigration, even in the period before legislative restriction, had played no important role in intensifying

unemployment conditions. His statistical analysis showed that immigration had been largely self-regulatory in regard to economic conditions in this country, and he thus exploded the notion that during times of depression immigrants had kept flooding into the United States, displacing Americans from their jobs and adding to the rolls of the unemployed. Jerome found that from the days of the early depressions of 1826 and 1837 immigration had declined rapidly with the onset of a depression and had remained low until conditions improved. A graph of yearly immigration since 1820, when immigration statistics were first recorded, shows that immigration has progressed through a series of successive waves, rising and falling in accord with economic conditions in this country.

There has been a consistent negative correlation between periods of heavy immigration and periods of unemployment. Although business cycles have been practically concurrent in European countries and in the United States during most of the latter's history, it has been the pull of advantageous conditions in America rather than the push of unfavorable conditions in European countries which brought immigrants to this country. The United States has not been a dumping ground during adverse economic periods in Europe, but rather has attracted immigrants by virtue of its pull based on periods of rising prosperity, as is proved by the drop in immigration which inevitably occurred when economic conditions here began to worsen.

Before the adoption of our policy of restriction and consular control of the issuance of visas, however, some slight aggravation of unemployment conditions in this country resulted from the lag between the advent of the depression and a decline in immigration. Jerome found

that there was a lag of this kind, of between two and four months, resulting from the length of time it took news of the depression to reach the prospective immigrants and for plans to emigrate to be changed. . . .

Net immigration to the United States in times of depression has been cut down not only by the reduced flow of immigrants to the country but also by an increased flow of recent immigrants out of the country. Throughout the country's history, periods of unemployment have been marked by a substantial exodus of the foreign born back to their homelands. Because of these two factors, net additions to our immigrant population have been either very small or non-existent during periods of unemployment. In the last depression when admissions had been cut down to a low figure, departures outnumbered admissions and resulted in a net decrease in our immigrant population. Thus in 1932 more than 103,000 aliens departed from the United States, whereas only 35,600 came in; in 1933, 80,000 left and 23,100 entered the country. Instead of a net addition, our population suffered a net loss of 67,400 in the former year and of 57,000 in the latter. In fact, during the heart of the depression as a whole, from 1932 to 1936 inclusive, there was a net loss of 136,000 for the five years.

Our immigrants, then, because they have tended to return to their former country of residence in periods of depression, have acted as a safety valve by relieving the excess labor supply resulting from business contraction and thus have actually helped to ease the unemployment problem in times of industrial crises.

### *Dependency*

The foreign born as a group, moreover, do not add disproportionately to the



number of unemployed in our country. A favorite argument of spokesmen against immigration is that a large number of immigrants are admitted only to add to the public relief rolls and to become a burden to the American taxpayer. Such arguments evidence not only a lack of understanding of the generally favorable economic adjustment of immigrants but also ignorance of immigration law. A basic qualification for admission to the United States is that the immigrant meet tests to prove that he is not liable to become a public charge. Prospective immigrants from all countries are carefully screened to meet this test, and only those whose chances for success are favorable are permitted to enter the country. In addition, any immigrant who becomes a public charge within five years of his admission to the United States is deportable unless he can prove that the causes for so becoming arose subsequent to his admission. This tends to prevent immigrants from becoming dependent on public funds during the critical years of their adjustment.

Employment figures make it clear that immigrants have been successfully absorbed into the American economic system. In 1940 the Bureau of the Census reported that only a slightly higher proportion of foreign-born white males (10.6 per cent) were unemployed and seeking work than of native-born white males (9.3 per cent). This would indicate an average rate of dependency among the foreign born. . . .

Relief statistics have not distinguished between natives and the foreign born, so that the comparative rates are not available. Our only information regarding the foreign born on relief during the depression concerns the alien group alone. In the early days of the depression aliens were not discriminated against by the

Federal government in its distribution of relief through the Works Progress Administration (WPA), and they received the same help as citizens. In May, 1936, Harry Hopkins stated that in only 4 per cent of the total number of families on WPA relief was the head of the family an alien who had not declared his intention of becoming a citizen. He also stated that this was a smaller proportion than the proportion of aliens to the total population. Later on, WPA regulations concerning aliens were tightened. At first, no aliens were admitted to the rolls who had not declared their intention of becoming citizens; next, all aliens were put at the bottom of the list of preferences; and finally, in 1939, aliens were completely excluded from Federal relief rolls. The burden of taking care of indigent aliens was thus placed entirely upon local communities. This fact was in large part responsible for the higher proportion of aliens on relief rolls in large cities in the later years of the depression. Another factor that explains the concentration of aliens on metropolitan relief rolls was their virtual exclusion from all defense industry. Although the WPA discriminated against aliens, government aid in the form of unemployment insurance and other social security payments set up no such bars, except for the rulings of individual states. As of 1946, citizenship (or a long period of residence in the state) was required for old-age assistance in 23 states, for aid to the blind in 7 states, and for aid to dependent children in only one state, Texas.

Between 1936 and 1941 the Social Security Board collected statistics concerning the percentage of foreign born who have received old-age assistance in states with State-Federal programs. The proportion of foreign born among cases accepted in all states was 16 per cent, as



compared with 18 per cent foreign-born white in the entire population sixty-five years of age or older in April, 1940. Citizenship requirements reduced the percentage in many states.

The limited proportion of the foreign born who have been dependent upon public relief and in the care of the charitable institutions has been in part the result of the large number of mutual aid and benefit societies among the foreign born. National and local fraternal benefit associations, performing an extremely important function among the foreign born, have been established by nearly all sizable nationality groups in our country.

Organizations with private sources of support, set up along religious and nationality lines, have also aided in reducing the number of public dependents among the immigrants. The Jewish community is noted for its large number of welfare agencies. Organizations concerned with the welfare of particular nationalities, such as the Polish Social Service Bureau, have likewise done extensive work within their particular groups. Even foreign consular offices have shared in the care of newcomers.

The work done by private agencies in the care of the recent refugees affords an excellent illustration of the important function of such organizations. The refugees have never been a drain on the American taxpayer. Although many of them arrived here penniless, public funds could not be used for their support because aliens are subject to deportation if they become public charges during the first five years of their residence in this country, as has already been stated. Relief subsidies and aids of other kinds were extended through a number of private organizations, some of which were established especially for the purpose. The fact that no case is known in which a refugee

had to be deported as a public charge is an indication of what an effective job these organizations have done in aiding the adjustment of the refugee.

#### *Wage Scale and Standard of Living*

The complaint has sometimes been made that immigration tends to lower the American wage scale and hence the American standard of living. Whether or not there was any justification for such a complaint in earlier eras of our country's history, it is clear that at present such a claim would be altogether unfounded. In the first place, the stream of immigration is now too small to have any significant effect on wage levels. In the second place, with the progress of unionization the wage standard for the majority of occupational classes is controlled by the union through collective bargaining with employers. The right of labor in such collective bargaining was guaranteed by the Federal government through the Wagner Labor Relations Act passed in 1935. In the third place, government itself has assumed an active role in the insurance of proper wage and living standards. Minimum wage laws have set a floor below which wages cannot go even in the lowest paid occupations. Unemployment insurance and other forms of social security benefits have given the worker an increasingly high degree of protection. A wage standard protected by such controls will not be undermined by immigration in our day.

As to the long-range effect of immigration, the general history of the United States disproves the theory that immigration tends to lower the wage scale. No country has admitted so large a number of immigrants, yet no country has so high a wage scale or so high a standard of living. Wage rates actually rose steadily during the period of heaviest immigra-

tion, from 1890 to 1910, although it was at this time that the complaints that immigration tended to hold back the rise of the American wage scale were most numerous.

Opposition to immigration on the grounds that it tended to lower both American wages and the American standard of living was strongest during the early years of the twentieth century. This was a period when the unprecedented speed of our economic development and growth of our population led to temporary maladjustments of all kinds, as has already been mentioned earlier in this chapter. Unionization was in its early stages of development, and only the skilled trades had been satisfactorily unionized. Sweat shops, child labor, inadequate wage levels, and generally unsanitary or unsafe working conditions were widespread. Immigration played only a small part in this whole development, but it was nevertheless blamed for many conditions which were in reality the product of the rapid growth and industrialization of the country.

The United States Immigration Commission tended to throw some blame upon the immigrant population for substandard wages and other evils. It reported that a somewhat lower wage scale applied to foreign-born than to native workers, and it concluded from this that immigrants tended to undercut native-born workers. It has been shown, however, that they failed to consider several important elements in the situation in their analysis: the immigrants were concentrated largely in unskilled occupations, where the wage rate would necessarily be lower than in the skilled trades; the large numbers of unskilled workers entering the country were in specific response to the demands of expanding industry; the rising ratio of unskilled to skilled

workers during this period was the result not of the large supply of immigrant unskilled labor but of the mechanization of industry, which transferred delicate operations formerly performed by the skilled worker to the machine.

#### *Unionization*

At the time the Commission made its report it asserted that the immigrants were somewhat difficult to unionize and were therefore holding back labor's advance. It is true that the large majority of the immigrants were peasants from agricultural areas and had not been educated in the importance of labor organization. However, the fact that the bulk of the immigrants was employed in the unskilled and semi-skilled fields, which were late in becoming unionized, accounts largely for the lag in their unionization, as indicated by the Commission's report on union affiliation. Developments in unionization of the foreign born since the report was made have deprived the Commission's claim of any validity at the present time. . . .

During this period of our history, employers did find in unrestricted immigration a weapon against the union and tried to play off one immigrant group against another with some success. Unionization of the immigrant tended, however, rapidly to destroy this weapon in the hands of the employer. Individual nationality groups early showed remarkable solidarity in some of the most famous strikes in American history, such as the strike in the textile mills of Lowell, Massachusetts, in 1902, and in the meat-packing industry of Chicago in 1908. Foreign-born groups soon learned, moreover, to work with other nationality groups and with the native born in the promotion of their common interest as workers. The earliest large-scale unions, such as the National

Labor Union and the Knights of Labor, by 1880 consisted largely of the foreign born. The American Federation of Labor was founded by an immigrant, Samuel Compers, in 1886. The active role of immigrants in unionization created as much antagonism among certain elements of the population as did their retardation in unionization among other elements. The immigrants were in a dilemma. If they did not join the unions they were called strike breakers and if they did they were called radicals.

Signal successes of the foreign born in unionization have long since withdrawn from them the disfavor of the worker class. The United Mine Workers, one of the most powerful and successful organizations, has a large foreign-born membership and had less trouble in organizing the mine fields in Pennsylvania, where the foreign born predominated, than in organizing the miners of southern Illinois, where the miners were of old American stock. The clothing industry, made up largely of foreign-born workers, is among the most highly organized industries in the United States. Jews, Italians, Poles, and other immigrants make up a large proportion of the membership of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America and the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union. These two unions have an outstanding record for leadership in the American trade-union movement. In addition to the high level of wages established throughout the industry, these unions have been pioneers in labor education, the establishment of health centers, and other forms of social service. The government has itself adopted some of the reforms they initiated. Sidney Hillman, himself an immigrant, made an outstanding record in labor history as head of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers.

Immigration, in its present form under

the quota system, is no longer opposed by American labor organizations. When in the spring of 1946 the Gossett bill (H. R. 3663) proposed in one section of the bill that immigration quotas be cut in half, both the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organization sent representatives to hearings of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization to declare that their organizations opposed such further restriction. To quote from the statement of Mr. Leo Goodman, representative of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, at one of those hearings (Hearings before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization; House of Representatives, March 20, 1946):

Naturally, a labor organization representing 6,000,000 American workers would not be inclined to support measures which would threaten the job security of its own members. However, the CIO realizes, from past experience, that immigration is automatically checked in periods of unemployment while it rises in periods of prosperity; that in the past, immigrants have contributed in innumerable ways to the wealth and well-being of this country; that a large proportion of immigrants are not potential jobseekers but women and children; that new blood in industry, agriculture, business, and the professions enriches our national life; and that the best and most enlightened thought on this subject opposes arbitrary, prejudiced, and superficial legislation to curtail immigration into the United States.

The American Federation of Labor likewise took a stand in favor of preserving our quotas. Mr. Lewis Hines, representative of this organization at the hearings, declared that the United States by further reducing its quotas would be repudiating its share of responsibility for the displaced people of Europe:

We believe that because of the present unsettled situation in the world it would be inadvisable to adopt this portion of the bill. Most of our citizens desire that the United States set an example for other nations by continuing to offer succor and a haven to the oppressed and displaced persons uprooted as a result of the war. Our nation has a large share of the responsibility in the maintenance of a peaceful world. The American Federation of Labor therefore feels that we should maintain our present immigration quotas as an indication to the world that we intend to remain an active participant in world affairs, believing that to do otherwise, and especially to reduce our immigration quotas, would indicate that we are not willing to accept the responsibility of leadership. The United States as the leading world power must continue its tradition of humanitarianism toward the displaced people of the world.

In 1947 and 1948 both of these labor organizations went on record again in favor of the admission of larger numbers of displaced persons outside of the quota. The change in the attitude of the labor organizations is an indication of their growing concern with world problems.

Developments in the United States in the last forty years or so have rid the American worker of the fear that immigration might lower the wage scale and the American standard of living. The substandard conditions which made it possible for large numbers of immigrants to be brought into mine fields or steel mills

fifty years ago no longer exist. Legislation and collective bargaining have set up controls over wage rates and working conditions which immigration could not affect unless it were to be of immense size. Only in marginal fields such as migratory labor can the question of low standards seriously be raised, and this is a special problem which is gradually coming under control, affecting as it does the regulation of Mexican rather than European immigration. The careful screening of immigrants through strict interpretation of the "likely to become a public charge" clause in the immigration law is likewise a protection to the standards of American workers. Under present conditions the question of the unfavorable effect of immigration on wage and living standards in this country may be considered a closed issue. Indeed, analysis of our past experience with immigration shows that no important economic problems have ever been traceable to immigration. Nor at the present time are there outstanding problems in the country which are caused by immigration. Immigration at least on the scale permitted by our quota laws can still be used and has a stimulating rather than an adverse effect upon our general economy. Moreover, there is a good deal of evidence to show that our quotas could be substantially increased without prejudicing the economic interests of any groups in our country. . . .

## THE IMMIGRANT IN THE BODY POLITIC

*Edward Alsworth Ross: IMMIGRANTS IN POLITICS: The Political  
Consequences of Immigration*

ON a single Chicago hoarding, before the spring election of 1912, the writer saw the political placards of candidates with the following names: Kelly, Cassidy, Slattery, Alschuler, Pfaelzer, Bartzen, Umbach, Andersen, Romano, Knitckoff, Deneen, Hogue, Burres, Short. The humor of calling "Anglo-Saxon" the kind of government these gentlemen will give is obvious. At that time, of the eighteen principal personages in the city government of Chicago, fourteen had Irish names, and three had German names. Of the eleven principal officials in the city government of Boston, nine had Irish names, and of the forty-nine members of the Lower House from the city of Boston, forty were obviously of Hibernian extraction. In San Francisco, the mayor, all the heads of the municipal departments, and ten out of eighteen members on the board of supervisors, bore names reminiscent of the Green Isle. As far back as 1871, of 112 chiefs of police from twenty-two States who attended the national police convention, seventy-seven bore Irish names, and eleven had German names. In 1881, of the chiefs of police in forty-eight cities, thirty-three were clearly Irish, and five were clearly German.

In 1908, on the occasion of a "homecoming" celebration in Boston, a newspaper told how the returning sons of Boston were

greeted by Mayor Fitzgerald and the following members of Congress: O'Connell, Keliher, Sullivan, and McNary — following in the footsteps of Webster, Sumner, Adams, and Hoar. They were told of the great work as Mayor of the late beloved Patrick Collins. At the City Hall they found the sons of Irish exiles and immigrants administering the affairs of the metropolis of New England. Besides the Mayor, they were greeted by John J. Murphy, Chairman of the board of assessors; Commissioner of Streets Doyle; Commissioner of Baths O'Brien. Mr. Coakley is the head of the Park Department, and Dr. Durgan directs the Health Department. The Chief of the Fire Department is John A. Mullen. Head of the Municipal Printing Plant is Mr. Whelan. Superintendent of the Sewers Leahy; Superintendent of Buildings is Nolan; City Treasurer, Slattery; Police Commissioner, O'Meara.

The Irish domination of our Northern cities is the broadest mark immigration has left on American politics; the immigrants from Ireland, for the most part excessively poor, never got their feet upon the land as did the Germans and the Scandinavians, but remained huddled in cities. United by strong race feelings, they held together as voters, and, although never a clear majority, were able in time to capture control of most of the greater municipalities. Now, for all their fine Celtic traits, these Irish immigrants had neither the temperament nor the training to make

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a success of popular government. They were totally without experience of the kind Americans had acquired in the working of democratic institutions. The ordinary American by this time had become tinctured with the spirit of legalism. Many voters were able to look beyond the persons involved in a political contest and recognize the principles at stake. Such popular maxims as: "No man should be a judge in his own case," "The ballot a responsibility," "Patriotism above party," "Measures, not men," "A public office is a public trust," fostered self-restraint and helped the voters to take an impersonal, long-range view of political contests.

Warm-hearted, sociable, clannish, and untrained, the naturalized Irish failed to respect the first principles of civics. "What is the Constitution between friends?" expresses their point of view. In their eyes, an election is not the decision of a great, impartial jury, but a struggle between the "ins" and the "outs." Those who vote the same way are "friends." To scratch or to bolt is to "go back on your friends." Places and contracts are "spoils." The official's first duty is to find berths for his supporters. Not fitness, but party work, is one's title to a place on the municipal pay-roll. The city employee is to serve his party rather than the public that pays his salary. Even the justice of courts is to become a matter of "pull" and "stand in," rather than of inflexible rules.

A genial young Harvard man who has made the Good Government movement a power in a certain New England city said to me:

The Germans want to know which candidate is better qualified for the office. Among the Irish I have never heard such a consideration mentioned. They ask, "Who wants this candidate?" "Who is behind him?" I

have lined up a good many Irish in support of Good Government men, but never by setting forth the merits of a matter or a candidate. I approach my Irish friends with the personal appeal, "Do this for me!" Nearly all the Irish who support our cause do it on a personal loyalty basis. The best of the Irish in this city have often done as much harm to the cause of Good Government as the worst. Mayor C., a high-minded Irishman desiring to do the best he could for the city, gave us as bad a government as Mayor F., who thought of nothing but feathering his own nest. Mayor C. "stood by his friends."

The Hibernian domination has given our cities genial officials, brave policemen, and gallant fire-fighters. It has also given them the name of being the worst-governed cities in the civilized world. The mismanagement and corruption of the great cities of America have become a planetary scandal, and have dealt the principle of manhood suffrage the worst blow it has received in the last half-century. Since the close of the Civil War, hundreds of thousands of city-dwellers have languished in the bad water, bad housing, poor sanitation, and rampant vice in American municipalities run on the principles of the Celtic clan.

On the other hand, it is likely that our British, Teutonic, Scandinavian, and Jewish naturalized citizens — still more our English-Canadian voters — have benefited American politics. In politics men are swayed by passion, prejudice, or reason. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the average American had come to be on his guard against passion in politics, but not yet had he reached the plane of reason. This left him the prey of prejudice. Men inherited their politics, and bragged of having always "voted straight." They voted Democratic for Jefferson's sake, or Republican from love of Lincoln. The citizens followed ruts, while the selfish

interests "followed the ball." Now, the intelligent naturalized foreigner, having inherited none of our prejudices, would not respond to ancient cries of wartime issues. He inquired pointedly what each party proposed to do *now*. The abandonment of "waving the bloody shirt" and the sudden appearance of the politics of actuality in the North, in the eighties, came about through the naturalization of Karl and Ole. The South has few foreign-born voters, and the South is precisely that part of the country in which the reign of prejudice in politics has longest delayed the advent of efficient and progressive government.

In 1910 there were certainly three million naturalized citizens in the United States. In southern New England and New York they constitute a quarter of all the white voters. The same is true of Illinois and the Old Northwest. In Providence, Buffalo, Newark, St. Paul, and Minneapolis, there are two foreign voters to three native white voters. In Milwaukee, Detroit, Cleveland, and Boston, the ratio is about one to two. In Paterson, Chicago, and New York, the ratio is nearer three to five, and in Fall River it is three to four. When the foreigners are intelligent and experienced in the use of the ballot, their civic worth does not suffer by comparison with that of the natives. Indianapolis and Kansas City, in which the natives outnumber the naturalized ten to one, do not overshadow in civic excellence the Twin Cities of Minnesota, with three natives to two naturalized. Cleveland, in which the naturalized citizens constitute a third, is politically superior to Cincinnati, in which they are less than a sixth. Chicago, with thrice the proportion of naturalized citizens Philadelphia has, was roused and struggling with the python of corruption while yet the city by the Delaware slept.

### *The New Immigration and Citizenship*

Between 1895 and 1896 came the great shift in the sources of immigration. In the former year, 55 per cent of aliens came from northwestern Europe; in the next year, southern and southeastern Europe gained the upper hand, and have kept it ever since. With the change in nationalities came a great change in the civic attitude of the immigrants. The Immigration Commission found that from 80 to 92 per cent of the immigrants from northwestern Europe, resident five years or more in this country, have acquired citizenship or have taken out first papers. Very different are the following figures, which show the interest in citizenship of the newer immigrants:

	PER CENT NATURALIZED
Russian Hebrews . . . .	57
Austrians . . . . .	53
North Italians . . . .	46
Bulgarians . . . . .	37
Poles . . . . .	33
Lithuanians . . . . .	32.5
South Italians . . . .	30
Russians . . . . .	28
Magyars . . . . .	27
Slovaks . . . . .	23
Rumanians . . . . .	22
Syrians . . . . .	21
Greeks . . . . .	20
Portuguese . . . . .	5.5

In 1890 and in 1900, 58 per cent of the qualified foreign-born men were voters; by 1910 the proportion had fallen to 45.6 per cent. The presence of multitudes of floating laborers who have no intention of making this country their home, a marked indifference to citizenship on the part of some nationalities, and the stiffer requirements for naturalization imposed under the act of 1906, have caused the number of non-naturalized qualified foreigners in this country to swell from approximately



2,000,000 in 1900 to 3,500,000 in 1910. As things are going, we may expect a great increase in the number of the unenfranchised. No doubt the country is better off for their not voting. Nevertheless, let it not be overlooked that this growth in the proportion of voteless wage-earners subtracts from the natural political strength of labor. The appeal of labor in an industry like the cotton manufacture of the North, in which, besides the multitude of women and children, 70 per cent of the foreign-born men remain aliens after five years of residence, is likely to receive scant consideration by the ordinary legislature. Nor will such labor fare better at the hands of local authorities. The anti-strike animus of the police in Lawrence, Little Falls, and Paterson was voiced by the official who gave to the press the statement: "We have kept the foreign element in subjection before, and will continue to do so as long as I am chief of Little Falls' police." Thus, without intending it, some of our commonwealths are accumulating voteless workers, like those conservative European states which restrict manhood suffrage in the industrial classes.

*The Naturalized Immigrants and Their Leaders*

"Come over here quick, Luigi," writes an Italian to his friend in Palermo. "This is a wonderful country. You can do anything you want to, and, besides, they give you a vote you can get two dollars for!" This Italian was an ignorant man, but not necessarily a bad man. It would not be just to look upon the later naturalized citizens as caring less for the suffrage than the older immigrants. Some of them appreciate the ballot all the more from having been denied it in the old country. For the Declaration of Independence and the Fourth of July they show a naive enthusiasm which we Americans felt a genera-

tion ago, before our muck had been raked. "The spirit of revolt against wrong," says a well-known worker among immigrants, "is stronger in the foreign-born than in the natives, because they come here expecting so much democracy, and they are shocked by the reality they find. It is they who insist upon the complete program of social justice." Granting all this, there is no denying, however, that many of the later immigrants have only a dim understanding of what the ballot means and how it may be used.

Twenty-five years ago we knew as little of the ways of the ward boss as we knew of the megatherium or the great auk. The sources of his power were as mysterious as were the sources of the Nile before Speke and Baker. Now, thanks to Miss Addams and other settlement-workers who have studied him in action from close at hand, we have him on a film. The ward boss was the discoverer of the fact that the ordinary immigrant is a very poor, ignorant, and helpless man, in the greatest need of assistance and protection. Nevertheless, this man has, or soon will have, one thing the politician greatly covets, namely, a vote. The petty politician soon learned that by befriending and aiding the foreigners at the right time, he could build up an "influence" which he might use or sell to his own enrichment. So the ward politicians became pioneers in social work. For the sake of controlling votes, they did many things that the social settlement does for nothing.

It is Alderman Tim who gets the Italian a permit for his pushcart or fruitstand, who finds him a city-hall job, or a place with a public-service corporation, who protects him if he violates law or ordinance in running his business, who goes his bail if he is arrested, and "fixes things" with the police judge or the state's attorney when he comes to trial. Even before



Giuseppe is naturalized, it is Tim who remembers him at Christmas with a big turkey, pays his rent at a pinch, or wins his undying gratitude by saving his baby from a pauper burial or sending carriages and flowers to the funeral.

All this kindness and timely aid is prompted by selfish motives. Amply is Tim repaid by Giuseppe's vote on election day. But at first Giuseppe misses the secret of the politician's interest in him, and votes Tim-wise as one shows a favor to a friend. Little does he dream of the dollar-harvest from the public-service companies and the vice interests. Tim reaps with the "power" he has built up out of the votes of the foreigners. If, however, Giuseppe starts to be independent in the election booth, he is startled by the Jekyll-Hyde transformation of his erstwhile friend and patron. He is menaced with loss of job, withdrawal of permit or license. Suddenly the current is turned on in the city ordinances affecting him, and he is horrified to find himself in a mysterious network of live wires. With the connivance of a corrupt police force, Tim can even ruin him on a trumped-up charge.

The law of Pennsylvania allows any voter who demands it to receive "assistance" in the marking of his ballot. So in Pittsburgh, Tim expects Giuseppe to demand "assistance" and to take Tim with him into the booth to mark his ballot for him. Sometimes the election judges let Tim thrust himself into the booth despite the foreigner's protests, and watch how he marks his ballot. In one precinct 92 per cent of the voters received "assistance." Two Italians who refused it lost their jobs forthwith. The high-spirited northern Italians resent such intrusion, and some of them threaten to cut to pieces the interloper. But always the system is too strong for them.

Thus the way of Tim is to allure or to intimidate, or even combine the two. The immigrant erecting a little store is visited by a building inspector and warned that his interior arrangements are all wrong. His friends urge the distracted man to "see Tim." He does so, and kind Tim "fixes it up," gaining thereby another loyal henchman. The victim never learns that the inspector was sent to teach him the need of a protector. So long as the immigrant is "right," he may put an encroaching bay-window on his house or store, keep open his saloon after midnight, or pack into his lodging-house more than the legal number of lodgers. Moved ostensibly by a deep concern for public health or safety or morals, the city council enacts a great variety of health, building, and trades ordinances, in order that Tim may have plenty of clubs to hold over the foreigner's head.

So between boss and immigrant grows up a relation like that between a feudal lord and his vassals. In return for the boss's help and protection, the immigrant gives regularly his vote. The small fry get drinks or jobs, or help in time of trouble. The padrone, liquor-dealer, or lodging-house keeper gets license or permit or immunity from prosecution, provided he "delivers" the votes of enough of his fellow-countrymen. The ward boss realizes perfectly what his political power rests on, and is very conscientious in looking after his supporters. . . .

To the boss with a hold on the immigrant the requirement that the poor fellow shall live five years in this country before voting presents itself as an empty legal formality. In 1905 a special examiner of the Federal Department of Justice reported: "Naturalization frauds have grown and spread with the growth and spread of the alien population of the United States, until there is scarcely a city

or county-seat town . . . where in some form these frauds have not from time to time been committed." In 1845 a Louisiana judge was impeached and removed for fraud, the principal evidence being that he had issued certificates to 400 aliens in one day. The legislature might have been more lenient could it have foreseen that in 1868 a single judge in New York would issue 2500 of such certificates in one day! The gigantic naturalization frauds committed in the Presidential campaign of 1868 resulted in an investigation by Congress and in the placing of congressional elections under Federal supervision. During the month of October two New York judges issued 54,000 certificates. An investigation in 1902 showed about 250,000 fraudulent certificates of naturalization in use in that city. . . .

It is in the cities with many naturalized foreigners or enfranchised Negroes that the vice interests have had the freest hand in exploiting and degrading the people. These foreigners have no love for vice, but unwittingly they become the cornerstone of the system that supports it. The city that has had the most and the rawest foreign-born voters is the city of the longest and closest partnership of the police with vice. Tammany Hall first gained power by its "voting gangs" of foreigners, and ever since its Old Guard has been the ignorant, naturalized immigrants. Exposed again and again, and thought to be shattered, Tammany has survived all shocks, because its supply of raw material has never been cut off. Not the loss of its friends has ever defeated it; only the union of its foes. The only things it fears are those that bore from within — social settlements, social centers, the quick intelligence of the immigrant Hebrew, stricter naturalization, and restriction of immigration.

In every American city with a large,

pliant foreign vote have appeared the boss, the machine, and the Tammany way. Once the machine gets a grip on the situation, it broadens and intrenches its power by intimidation at the polls, ballot frauds, vote purchase, saloon influence, and the support of the vicious and criminal. But its tap-root is the simple-minded foreigner or Negro, and without them no lasting vicious political control has shown itself in any of our cities. . . .

#### *The Loss of Political Like-Mindedness*

If the immigrant is neither debauched nor misled, but votes his opinions, is he then an element of strength to us?

When a people has reached such a degree of political like-mindedness that fundamentals are taken for granted, it is free to tackle new questions as they come up. But if it admits to citizenship myriads of strangers who have not yet passed the civic kindergarten, questions that were supposed to be settled are reopened. The citizens are made to thresh over again old straw — the relation of church to state, of church to school, of state to parent, of law to the liquor trade. Meanwhile, ripe sheaves ready to yield the wheat of wisdom under the flails of discussion lie untouched. Pressing questions — public hygiene, conservation, the control of monopoly, the protection of labor, go to the foot of the docket, and public interests suffer.

Some are quite cheerful about the confusion, cross-purposes, and delay that come with heterogeneity, because they think the variety of views introduced by immigration is a fine thing, "keeps us from getting into a rut." The plain truth is, that rarely does an immigrant bring in his intellectual baggage anything of use to us. The music of Mascagni and Debussy, the plays of Ibsen and Maeterlinck, the poetry of Rostand and Hauptmann, the

fiction of Jókai and Sienkiewicz were not brought to us by way of Ellis Island. What we want is not ideas merely, but fruitful ideas, fructifying ideas. By debating the ideas of Nietzsche, Ostwald, Bergson, Metchnikoff, or Ellen Key, American thought is stimulated. But should we gain from the introduction of old Asiatic points of view, which would reopen such questions as witchcraft, child-marriage, and suttee? The clashing that arise from the presence among us of many voters with medieval minds are sheer waste of energy. While we Americans wrangle over the old issues of clericalism, separate schools, and "personal liberty," the little homogeneous peoples are forging ahead of us in rational politics and learning to look pityingly upon us as a chaos rather than a people.

#### *Political Mysticism vs. Common Sense*

. . . The Italian historian and sociologist Ferrero, after reviewing our immigration policy, concludes that the Americans, far from being "practical," are really the mystics of the modern world. He says:

To confer citizenship each year upon great numbers of men born and educated in foreign countries — men who come with ideas and sympathies totally out of spirit with the diverse conditions in the new country; to grant them political rights they do not want, and of which they have never thought; to compel them to declare allegiance to a political constitution which they often do not understand; to try to transform subjects of old European monarchies into free citizens of young American republics over night — is not all this to do violence to common sense?

#### *Oscar Handlin: THE IMMIGRANT AND AMERICAN POLITICS*

. . . IT is true that the relation of the immigrant to politics — to the struggle for possession and control of the instruments of power as organized in the state — presents only one phase of a complex problem. For politics in the life of the immigrant, as in the life of the entire community, occupied only one limited and restricted sphere. Other foci of interest, beyond the scope of this paper, were often more important. But in government the instruments of social control received their most formal organization and in that sphere they are most readily subject to analysis.

In the bewildering array of climates, backgrounds, cultures, and traditions that produced America's immigrants there

was little that was common beyond the fact that they were emigrants. The crossing supplied a universal element which justifies generalizations that comprehend Irishmen and Japanese, Germans and Chinese, Scandinavians and Slavs. For all these left an old world to come to a new; all made the perilous transition from one society to another. The diverse groups here considered felt the results of migration with varying degrees of sharpness and of permanence, but all were influenced so long as they retained their immigrant character.

Those factors which are not the products of migration can only be confusing and must be eliminated even if they are, somehow, otherwise connected with the

Oscar Handlin, "The Immigrant and American Politics," in David F. Bowers, ed., *Foreign Influences in American Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 84-98. Used by permission. [Footnotes omitted.]

immigrants. The second generation, for instance, is subject to so many unique influences that it presents a problem in itself. Similarly certain individual variations must be excluded. Not all newcomers have acted like immigrants. The role of such men as James Wilson, William Cobbett, and Joseph Pulitzer would have been the same had they been born in America rather than in Scotland, England, and Germany. Nor could it be reasonably asserted that the ideas of Francis Lieber who came to the United States had more influence here than those of Adam Smith who did not. In the realm of individual ideas and personal development, place of birth was of only slight consequence; the universal currency of thought enabled the exceptional man to make his mark wherever he was. Only in respect to movements by masses of people was migration significant, for only in the mass was common foreign nativity strong enough to outweigh the other factors which entered into the formation of political attitudes.

Immigrant influence impinged upon American politics in two ways. Immigrants became citizens and, as participants, as voters and officeholders, made American government feel the effects of migration directly. At certain moments they also became an issue, a subject for debate, and consequently significantly affected political developments.

As voters, newcomers stood apart from the rest of the community in the character and direction of their reactions. These differences were not due, as contemporaries thought, to the fact that foreigners were "ignorant, credulous . . . brutalized by oppression," for native voters of the same class were rarely more enlightened. The divergence arose from a difference in background and experience which invari-

ably colored responses to new and complex problems.

With few exceptions, immigrants were complete strangers to the democratic process. In no country where emigration was a considerable phenomenon did the suffrage extend to those sections of the population which departed for America. Even in England, property qualification kept farm and city laborers from voting until the Reform Bill of 1867. Where the right to the ballot did exist, it had little meaning. The Irish peasants, for instance, had that privilege before Catholic emancipation in 1829; but they were the tools of their landlords. Carted off to the polls in groups, cheered by the abundant flow of liquor, they voted in public as the Tory bosses told them to. Even further from self-government were the depressed subjects of the feudal monarchies of eastern Europe. To all, the very techniques of democracy were foreign. In no case was politics anything real or close to the people. Government was simply a taskmaster, a tax collector, a crime punisher, over which they had no control and from which they wanted most the favor of being left alone.

With no experience to guide them, immigrants were hardly prepared to act intelligently about the problems of American politics. A few, but very few, had read and thought about America, and had an inkling of what its democracy meant, but the overwhelming mass rarely knew what to make of the new circumstances they faced. Indeed, on arrival, the more pressing problems of finding a job and making the countless physical adjustments to the new life, completely overshadowed the question of participating in the government of their new country. Out of the welter of strangers about them there often emerged a compatriot here

long enough to know the ways of the new world, who could furnish assistance. This aid paid heavy dividends. For when the voting privilege came — a privilege which had no meaning because it had no counterpart in their previous existence — it was inevitable that the newcomers should turn to the same source for advice and guidance.

Here originated the immigrant boss. He did not always have to be an immigrant; the new citizens were preyed upon by ambitious politicians whom Godkin described as "keen, shrewd, cunning, unscrupulous Americans, determined to live on the public and ready to do anything that may be necessary for that purpose." . . .

The issues which did concern them [the immigrant] were completely different, hardly touched the affairs of the native born at all, and generally tended to bring the immigrants even closer to the machine. Almost all came from countries in which nationalism was already a potent force; and the process of emigration stimulated further what was already latent. Contact with other groups generally heightened pride in the homeland. Outside local politics, therefore, the chief interest of foreign-born citizens lay in developments in their native countries and that interest invariably affected their attitudes toward American politics. There is little doubt, for instance, that the anti-British feeling of the Democratic-Republican Party first attracted Emmett and the Irish émigrés, and that frequent twistings of the lion's tail by Democratic presidents from Madison to Cleveland were required to hold the Irish vote.

The intrusion of these attitudes into American politics gave rise to the charge that the immigrant became "a naturalized foreigner, not a naturalized citizen; a man

who from Ireland, or France, or Germany, or other foreign lands, renounces his native country and adopts America, professes to become an American, and still . . . talks (for example) of Ireland as 'his home,' . . . resents anything said against the Irish as said against him, . . . forms and cherishes an Irish interest, brings hither Irish local feuds, and forgets, in short, all his new obligations as an American." But more important, the persistent nationalist sentiments, to which the machine could cater without hesitation, at once obscured more immediate issues and ensured party loyalty.

Sometimes the party which profited from the firm grip of the machine on the immigrant vote was Republican, sometimes Democratic, sometimes both. For there was never a foreign vote, always foreign votes. One could not expect the Scandinavians and Slavs, the Irish and Orangemen, the Greeks and Turks, Protestants and Catholics, Jews and Gentiles, to work together. Old world rivalries frequently made these more hostile to each other than to the natives. In addition, the conditions of settlement often turned one group against another. The Italians of Boston turned the Irish out of the North End by working at lower wages and living in cheaper quarters, so that an inveterate enmity arose between them. And because the Irish were Democrats the Italians became Republicans. But though there was no general "foreign vote," perhaps not even a Greek or German vote for the whole United States, there were in each community specific immigrant votes, marshaled and controlled by organizations. The concern with foreign problems, the absence of interest in the important American issues, and the lack of familiarity with the techniques of American political life, drove the immigrants into

the control of the machine. Group loyalty was equated with party loyalty, and one sentiment strengthened another.

A second set of conditions shaped the reactions of foreign-born citizens as voters. Immigrant ideas — the fundamental assumptions and attitudes basic to their thinking — differed widely. There were few similarities between Germans and Italians for instance. In some ways the ideas of one group were closer to those of the natives than to those of another group; the Irish were more like Americans than like Chinese. But in one respect, a product of the transition, there existed a fundamental cleavage between the ideas of immigrants and those of native Americans.

The process of migrating perpetuated a conservatism alien to the dominant trends in American political life. Perhaps the most prevalent myth about immigrants links them with radicalism, but nothing could be farther from the truth. The overwhelming majority were exceedingly conservative in politics, as in other forms of social expression. The peasant origins of many, and the comparative backwardness of the societies from which they emigrated, bred a submissiveness which was not shed in the crossing. In fact the very process of emigration fostered it. Forms, ways of doing things, which in the old country needed no justification, in the new had to be bolstered continually by a rigid traditionalism. Thus, the Polish or Italian peasant, transplanted to Warsaw or Naples, might become a socialist or anarchist; but, in Chicago or Cleveland, he was so preoccupied with defending what was familiar that disruptive influences made no impression upon him. Migration froze development.

One important aspect of this conservatism was a respect for, and willingness to accept, authority; another was the

weighty influence of clericalism. Both diverged radically from the American pattern. The insistent individualism of the nineteenth century left little place for authority as such. In the political life of the period, the influence of the native churches was waning; religious factors played only a minor role in the great decisions of the era. But among immigrants, both were powerful. Feudal backgrounds, rigid class lines, and oppressive governments at home left no room for doubts in their minds as to the part of authority in man's life. And religious influences, already strong to begin with, were immeasurably strengthened by the transition to the new world. The Church was one of the few institutions that crossed the ocean with them, and its influence mounted steadily under the pressure of new circumstances. The activity of the Catholic Church is most familiar but the same part was played, at the beginning at least, by others — Lutheran, Jewish, and Greek Orthodox, for example.

The pressure of this conservatism was reflected in the failure of immigrants to participate in the widespread radical movements that swept the country up to 1914. The pre-Civil War humanitarian reforms drew their numbers almost entirely from native elements. The Granges and the Populist Party found no support in the German and Scandinavian areas of the Middle West; in fact, these groups actively opposed them. The socialists drew few recruits from the Jews, Italians, and Irish of the cities, and, in the labor movements, the unions in which immigrants were strongest, the cigar makers, for instance, were among the most conservative. Like the factors which made them members of political machines, those which encouraged their conservative ideas kept the foreign born apart from the native citizens and encouraged



the immigrant groups to lead political lives of their own.

Both sets of influences waned as immigrants adjusted to their new milieu. In some groups they disappeared within the first generation; in others they persisted for three or more. The general complex of social factors which determined the rate of immigrant adjustment is beyond the scope of this paper, which can only point to the inverse correlation of immigrant adjustment with political separatism. Those groups like the English and Scotch, which came from societies most similar to that of the United States and which adjusted most readily to the new life, rarely acted as a unit politically; those which had difficulties in the process of settlement retained their distinctiveness longest.

While these forces operated to separate the immigrant from his native fellow citizen, pressures equally powerful at times cut apart the native from the immigrant. Expressed in movements that were sporadic, violent, and largely irrational, these operated sometimes on a local, sometimes on a national, scale. . . .

The simplest explanation is that nativism, or anti-Catholicism, or anti-Semitism, or racism, the various elements from which the anti-immigrant movements are compounded, are natural and inherent in the character of American society and emerge more or less frequently and continuously. If that were true, one could expect to find Americans always hostile to foreigners, Catholics, or Jews. Yet the signs of general anti-immigrant feeling were rare in the nineteenth century, there was no sentiment against the Catholics before 1830, or against the Jews before 1880. Even the Chinese in California were not always unwelcome; as late as 1852, the leading newspaper of San Francisco predicted, "The China boys will yet

vote at the same polls, study at the same schools and bow at the same altar as our own countrymen." The elements of the anti-immigrant movement were not always present; they were produced after the newcomers arrived.

Nor did immigration alone create the anti-immigrant movements. For there was no correlation at all between the arrival of foreigners and the intensity of the hostility to them. The period of greatest immigration in terms of numbers was the decade after 1905. That was also the period when the "new" immigration from southern and eastern Europe was heaviest. Nevertheless, there were no important traces of enmity then.

The ultimate causes for these movements must be sought in the character of the adjustment of the immigrants within the community after they reached it. First, two distinct reactions must be differentiated. On the one hand, there is the vague dislike of strangers, the prejudice against that which is different — a reaction probably found in every society. To the extent that immigrants retained the characteristics that segregated them from the natives, there were always some who felt them alien and resented them. But that is quite different from the organized attempt to turn the machinery of the state against the foreign born, to place them under legal disabilities, and to consign them to an inferior political status. Even if they were considered different, there was an added factor which made the immigrants the subjects of political attack.

. . . Each movement arose at a time of crisis when other, more important, problems faced the community. In the 1850's, Know-Nothingism intruded at a moment when sectional divisions threatened the union and when the impetus of the humanitarian reforms had upset the internal equilibrium of American society. The



Workingman's Party arose in a period when the effects of the panic of 1873 and of the exhaustion of the mining frontier necessitated a radical change in the economy of California. The Klan gathered strength in the wake of a postwar reconstruction and serious economic depression.

In each case the origins of the movement lay in a source not directly connected with immigration. The American Party gained its support from the anti-slavery agitation; the Workingman's Party from the effort to improve labor conditions; and the Klan from the reaction to the internationalism of the war years. In each case the ultimate objectives of the party had little connection with the immigrants. The New England Know-Nothings were abolitionists and reformers; those in the middle states were anxious to evade the slavery issue and were most concerned with stressing national unity; while the Southerners were primarily interested in perpetuating slavery and in repressing the abolitionists. The Workingman's Party was actually a workingman's party; as such it cooperated with the Granges in enacting the radical constitution of 1878. The Klan was most interested in restoring the American way of life as of 1913 and in spreading its gospel of 100 per cent Americanism. In all three, anti-immigrant policy was conceived as a means toward an end — abolition, higher wages, and conservative, middle-class Americanism.

To some extent there was a basis for linking the immigrants with these issues. The Irish in the North were proslavery, the Germans in Texas were antislavery, Chinese labor was cheap, and there were undoubtedly radicals and internationalists among the foreign born of 1920. But in each case the immigrants were not the essential element in the situation. The

Irish were not the most important proslavery element in the North, nor were the Germans the greatest threat to slavery. The Chinese did not cause the depression of 1873 or exhaust the Comstock lode; usually their labor did not even compete with that of the whites. And the influence of aliens in the radical movements of the early twenties was slight. That hardly mattered though, because in each case the means soon became far more important than the ends. The American Party's Philadelphia Convention of 1856 saw the strange spectacle of delegates from Massachusetts who were anti-foreign because they were antislavery and delegates from Virginia who were anti-foreign because they were proslavery join in the same party because they were both antiforeign.

The first reaction of the community entering a crisis was to find a basis of unity. Characteristic of all three movements was the "insistent, imperative, and even intolerant demand for likemindedness." Thus T. R. Whitney, a Know-Nothing apologist, insisted in 1856, with the Civil War already in sight: "The American people, those born and reared on American soil have but one opinion as to the general principles which embody our institutions, or, in other words, our system of government. They differ only in measures of immediate or local policy." Such unity was, however, artificial, and could be supported only when it centered in something to oppose. At this moment, any group which, for one reason or another, stood apart could become a scapegoat. The outsiders furnished a *Gegenidee*, a "counter-conception" to which all the qualities the community feared and disliked could be ascribed and around opposition to which it could unite.

Therein lay the significance of the immigrant in American politics. The prac-

tice of politics was not often rational. The elements that went into the struggle for, and the exercise of, power rarely permitted neat delineations in terms of class, interest, or ideas. The presence of immigrant groups at critical moments presented a unique obstacle to the clear-cut apprehension of issues. The immigrants themselves reacted in terms of adherence to a party machine and of stubborn traditionalism, while, from time to time, others

discovered in the persistent strangeness of the newcomers a continual temptation to evade instead of face problems. Sometimes, as in 1854–1856, that merely delayed the ultimate solution. But it was also a substantial factor in preventing political parties from acquiring a rigid class or ideological affiliation, and thus contributed to set one of the conditions of American democracy.

### *John Palmer Gavit: AMERICANS BY CHOICE*

#### *I. What Is an American?*

THERE are two kinds of Americans in the United States from the point of view of citizenship — those who are Americans by the accident of birth, and those who are Americans by choice. An old Scotch carpenter many years ago heard the writer discoursing upon the fact that certain of his ancestors had shared with the cradles and spinning wheels the cramped quarters of the Mayflower, and noted the pride with which the narrator dwelt upon two hundred and fifty years of Americanism in every drop of his blood on both sides of his family. Then he spoke: "Ah, yes, nae doot it is a verra wonderful thing that your ancestors were starved out of the old country sae lang syne, while mine stayed until twenty years ago, when I cam' over of my ain accord." . . .

Now, what is "an American"? What is it that makes a nation of us, if not a distinctive race? What is it that the immigrant joins, body and soul, when he becomes "an American"?

Every little while somebody arises with

ashes upon his head and bemoans the threatened disappearance of what he calls "the American type." Perhaps we know what the expression may mean in New England — a combination of English, Scotch or Welsh, who in turn would be part Dane, Pict and Scot, Saxon, Normans and Celt; with perhaps a strain of French or maybe of Dutch. In Pennsylvania very likely it would be English Quaker — or Platt-Deutsch. The French-Spanish combination in the Gulf region, the Scandinavian or German in the Middle West and Northwest, the Spanish-Mexican along the Rio Grande and in Southern California, and so on, are "American" by a title as good as that of those who trace their descent from the Pilgrim fathers. We cannot isolate any physical characteristics; we cannot segregate any particular racial descent; one may search in vain for any definable hereditary mental or spiritual characteristic that will fit or typify all or even many of the "pie-bald millions" who inhabit and vote, attain success and honor, and at need enlist or submit to conscription for war, in the varied jurisdictions of our tremendous

stretch of territory. Even local adherence to our slogans of liberty, democracy, consent-of-the-governed, and all the rest of our ecstatic vocabulary, no longer insulates or distinguishes us in the world. The upspringing democracies of the Old World, to which we have given example and inspiration as well as emancipation from old autocracies, swear by all these phrases as exuberantly as we, and may even outstrip us in the political incarnation of the ideals which hitherto we have regarded as so peculiarly our own!

Let us come straight to the fact that the absence of exclusive racial marks is the distinguishing physical characteristic of the American. True of him as of no other now or ever in the past, is the fact, that he is, broadly speaking, the product of all races. It is of our fundamental history and tradition from the beginning that in America all peoples may find destination if not refuge, and upon a basis of virtual race equality mingle and for good or ill send down to posterity in a common stream their racial values — and their racial defects. Whether we like it or not, this is the fact. We are not a race, in any ethnic sense. At most, we are in the very early stages of becoming one.

Leaving for the long future, then, the evolution of the hereditary type, is there so soon something "home grown," some "integration of culture," that is peculiarly our own?

In the attempt to fix the boundaries for the new Poland, the Peace Conference sought in vain for some limits of language or of political unity on which to base their demarcation. It came down at last to a simple question:

"Do you want to be Poles?"

And the question was enough.

Who doubts the answer to the question: "Do you want to be American?" There is something more than love of

home; something higher than the liking of a cat for the warm place under the familiar stove, that stirs the heart of every normal American when he sees the Stars and Stripes. The alien who makes it his intention to become a citizen of the United States may not be able to put it in words, but he means, and he knows that he means something real and vital, recognizes a substantial distinction, when he says that he wants to be an American.

There must be, there is, there has been always, in the midst of the racial chaos which today constitutes perhaps our greatest social problem, something that may be called nationally even if not yet racially American; something indigenous to this soil as to no other. It belongs to us. . . .

There are essentials distinctively American upon which we can base our definition of "America" and typify her in the human being who by spirit, vision and vigilance best represents our tradition and our aspiration. Such a definition will hold against the world — even against those of our own household who neither exemplify nor understand it. The sum total of these essentials is not paralleled now, nor in history, anywhere else on earth. . . .

## II. *Immigrants, "New" and "Old"*

We are talking and behaving now about the immigration of the past few years — allowing for the vastly greater bulk of it and the intensified peril involved in its bulk — just as we talked and behaved about the Irish immigration that began in the early thirties and the German immigration that began to bulk large in the early forties. Comparatively small as was the size of that joint inflow, it made the problem that awakened the Know-Nothing and Native American movement of mid-century, and eventually culminated

in the naturalization legislation now in force. Each phase of immigration has been "the new immigration" at its time; each has been viewed with alarm; each has been described as certain to impair the physical quality of our people and destroy the standards of living and of citizenship. . . .

Russian and Austrian, Greek, Roumanian, Portuguese, the latest comers, are in the midst of the same process.

The vast numbers, especially of the Russian Jews and Austro-Hungarians, herded in masses in certain of our great cities, have given us a kind of social indigestion; it must be cured if at all by a slow process of absorption, and we have not yet learned just what to do about it. Certainly unintelligent excitement, to say nothing of unlawful violence and mob persecution, and the exaggeration both of the degree and of the nature of the ailment, offer small promise of betterment. Nature, the normal processes of population movements and racial assimilation work calmly on while we shout and worry. And candid study of the process is reassuring. Conditions have been confused, resentments aroused, and progress retarded by the various kinds of hysteria excited by the World War — but then, there was similar hysteria in the old Know-Nothing days, and we lived through this.

Meanwhile we may try to know and understand the facts. This is not so easy as might be supposed, for the facts are hard to get. In hardly any other field may one find a better illustration of the mischief that may be wrought by inadequate or misinterpreted statistics, creating legends which cannot endure the test of candid, to say nothing of scientific, examination.

In the files of the Naturalization Bureau at Washington is a vast mass of original

data which should be of priceless value. Each one of the nearly three million declarations of intention, and more than a million petitions — not to speak of the final certificates of citizenship — contains what amounts almost to a cross-section of the life-history of an immigrant. But all this has remained in an undigested and now probably indigestible mass.

In point of fact, the only substantial body of statistical information about the naturalization of the foreign-born voter which hitherto has been even ostensibly sufficient for the student as a basis for any racial comparisons is that gathered by the United States Immigration Commission of 1907. To this report, which has come to be called "the Bible of the immigration question," is attributable almost entirely the familiar, conventional generalization that there is a marked distinction in what might be called quality of assimilability between the immigration of former years and that of the three decades preceding the Great War; between the so-called "old immigration" and the "newer." This distinction is drawn in the report and in most of the writings of individuals based upon it, between the group of races from Northern and Western Europe — the English-speaking races, the Scandinavians, Germans, Dutch, Belgians, French and so on, and those from Southern and Eastern and Southeastern Europe, Russia, Austria-Hungary, the Balkan States, Italy, Greece, Turkey-in-Europe, Asia Minor, etc.

This quality of assimilability was regarded by the commission as inferable to a large extent from the degree to which the representatives of these racial groups were naturalized or had exhibited interest in naturalization at least to the extent of declaring intention to become citizens. It was assumed in a general way that a racial group showing a high proportion of per-

sons who had become citizens, or taken steps thereto, might fairly be regarded as more adaptable to American life, customs and ideals than one in which relatively few naturalized citizens were found. With this assumption as a starting point, it seemed reasonably obvious that inasmuch as the "older" race showed the higher percentage of naturalized persons, the inference of a difference of essential civic quality followed as a matter of course.

Inasmuch also as this inference coincided with the general public impression and prejudice to precisely the same effect, it occurred to nobody to dispute or seriously to question its validity. Anybody could tell you offhand that the Englishman, Frenchman, German or Swede was more available for citizenship and more easily assimilated than the Syrian, Croatian and Sicilian. It was a matter of common knowledge! And the Immigration Commission gave you the statistics — as if you needed any! For example, the first column in Table I, compiled from their report, shows the percentages naturalized for the "old" and "new" races who had been in the United States ten years or more. As is to be expected, the "old" races show the highest percentages on both counts.

The commission recognized a general "tendency on the part of wage-earners of foreign birth to acquire citizenship," and that this tendency "increased according to length of residence in this country." But it construed its statistics as showing that while "more than three-fourths of the Bohemians and Moravians, Danish, Germans, Irish, Norwegian, Scotch, Swedish, and Welsh races who had been in the United States ten years or longer had been fully naturalized," there was a "lack of political or civic interest" (only 37.7 per cent) on the part of the Southern and

Table I\*

*Column 1, per cent fully naturalized of male employes who were twenty-one years of age or over at time of coming and who have been in the United States ten years or over, compared with Column 2, the per cent resident in the United States ten years or over, of those reporting as to citizenship who have been here five years or over.*

RACE	Per Cent	Per Cent
OLD	74.0	80.5
Swedish	87.6	79.0
German	81.5	82.6
Irish	80.0	83.8
Bohemian and Moravian**	79.7	56.0
Norwegian	77.5	69.2
Danish	77.3	77.3
Scotch	76.9	80.7
Welsh	76.4	94.6
English	67.0	78.0
French	64.8	57.1
Dutch	64.7	76.8
Canadian, Other	49.6	81.0
Canadian, French	27.7	77.9
NEW	37.7	38.9
Finnish	65.7	38.5
Hebrew, Other	54.2	56.3
Italian, North	49.3	38.0
Hebrew, Russian	48.3	37.1
Lithuanian	41.1	39.2
Polish	39.8	44.0
Italian, South	34.0	34.8
Russian	33.6	36.8
Magyar	26.9	31.4
Croatian	26.8	23.5
Slovak	25.3	42.8

Eastern European wage-earners" with a similar residence of ten years or longer, and proceeded to assert that these did not possess that "tendency to acquire citizenship" which increases according to length

\* Compiled by the Americanization Study from Report of the Immigration Commission, vol. i, p. 488, table 100.

\*\* The Bohemians and Moravians are classified by the Immigration Commission with the "new" races.

of residence in this country. This assertion was supposed to be supported by the facts given in the foregoing table regarding the races from Southern and Eastern Europe showing low percentages of individuals who had come to this country when twenty-one years of age or older, who had lived here ten years or over and were naturalized.

As we shall see from the statistics gathered and analyzed for this study, the factor of residence "ten years or over" with all its implications is exceedingly important — is, in fact, the major factor in the whole situation. The indictment against the "new" immigration hangs upon it, and falls down when the term "ten years or longer" is analyzed, even in the light of the statistics presented by the Immigration Commission itself in support of the indictment. Indeed, the commission was not entirely without compunctions on this point, and presented a table exhibiting the probability that of the male employes from whom it derived its information those of the "older" races had been in the United States *considerably* longer than ten years, while those of the "newer" races had been here only *slightly* longer than ten years. While it did not emphasize the point — and at a superficial glance this might seem a quibble — it is of importance scarcely to be overestimated.

The commission remarks indeed that "on account of the difference in the length of time the various races have been coming to the United States, a comparison of the older with the more recent immigrants is hardly fair."<sup>1</sup> But it failed to appreciate the vital significance of the point. And it apparently did not take adequate notice of the further fact shown in the second column of Table I, that of those of the

"older" races who reported information in regard to citizenship, 80.5 per cent had been in the United States over ten years, while only 38.9 per cent of the "newer" races had been here so long. That is, only 19.5 per cent of the "older" races, as compared with 61.1 per cent of the "newer" had been in the country between five and nine (less than ten) years. This means, of course, that the immigrants of the "older" races had had on the average a much longer time than those of the "newer" to acquire "civic interest" and seek naturalization. The "over" added to five years means for the "recent" races a margin between five and nine years in most cases, while for the "older" races it usually means much more than ten. Both statistics and experience confirm the assertion that every year of residence *added to ten* increases as it were geometrically the probability of efforts toward citizenship.

Professor Edward A. Ross, who among the students of this question is one of the most uncompromising in generalizing from the reports of the Immigration Commission to the disadvantage of the "newer" races, deduced that "with the change in nationalities came a great change in the civic attitude of the immigrants." He made little or no allowance for the fact that the "civic attitude" of the "newer" immigrants naturally would not have had time to develop as in the case of those who had been here longer; he made even less for any changes in industrial and social life in this country which might help to account for this alleged change in attitude, by intensifying the hardships of the only kind of employment the "newer" immigrants could get, by low wages due to an overstocked labor market, or by the increased herding of foreign-born in city slums, which last of

<sup>1</sup> Abstracts, vol. i, p. 485.



itself might tend to retard the process of adjustment and assimilation. Professor John B. Clark saw something of this, when he remarked that

there is far more likeness between different branches of the European family than there is between the economic conditions into which immigrants came in the third quarter of the last century and those into which they come today. Then they could have farms for the asking, while now most of them go into mills, mines, shops and railroad plants or become employes or tenants on farms owned by others.<sup>2</sup>

Professor John R. Commons, discussing the differences in the proportions naturalized among the various racial groups, calls attention to the fact that

it is not so much a difference in willingness as a difference in opportunity. . . . In course of time these differences will diminish, and the Italian and the Slav will approach the Irishman and the German in their share of American suffrage.<sup>3</sup>

The war has created an entirely new situation with regard to both immigration and naturalization; it is entirely impossible to forecast the effects, either of the chaotic conditions in Europe or of the reconstruction period in America, upon the influx of foreign-born into America, upon the duration of their stay here, or upon the attitude toward citizenship of those already here and entitled to citizenship by length of residence. The wholesale naturalization of immigrants in the national army during the war, regardless of length of residence or any of the other requirements ordinarily so rigidly, so meticulously enforced, has swept into citizenship so large a proportion of human

material available and hitherto constituting the bulk of the "naturalization problem" that the old generalizations have become both useless and misleading.

Even the statistics afforded by the census have been the subject of uncritical use on which pessimistic generalizations have been based. The Thirteenth Census (1910) showed for the decade since that of 1900 a decrease of 12.4 per cent in the proportion of foreign-born white males twenty-one years of age and over, naturalized. Referring to this decrease, Professor Ross predicted<sup>4</sup> that "as things are going, we may expect a great increase in the number of the unenfranchised." Of course he could have foreseen the war and its profound effects upon the whole question; but he might have observed in the same census the fact that there had been a precisely identical (12.4 per cent) decrease in the number of foreign-born whites who had been in the country nine years or more — even if his prejudice on the subject prevented his recognizing in this remarkable coincidence a striking evidence of the direct relation between length of residence and naturalization.

### III. 26,000 Petitioners Speak for Themselves

When, early in the progress of the Americanization Study, it became apparent that almost no adequate statistical data were available in regard to naturalized citizens or the really significant aspects of the naturalization process, and that the condition of the files at Washington was such as to prohibit the segregation of the documents for any single year without an inordinate expenditure of labor and time, our recourse was the local courts.

The twelve months from July 1, 1913, to June 30, 1914, were selected as the

<sup>2</sup> John B. Clark, *A Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, 1910, vol. I, p. 52.

<sup>3</sup> John R. Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America*, 1907, pp. 191-192.

<sup>4</sup> Edward A. Ross, *The Old World and the New*, 1914, p. 266.



latest year of reasonably normal conditions antedating the war. Twenty-eight courts were visited, with a total of 26,284 naturalization petitions filed or more than one in five of the whole number of petitions for naturalization (123,855) filed in the fiscal year in the whole United States. The courts were widely scattered through the East, Middle West and Far West, and are of a varied character as regards nature of racial and other characteristics which might affect the human factors in the matter.

In Table II, the relative numbers and percentages are arranged in the order of magnitude, and this arrangement is illuminating in its display of what the Immigration Commission and the writers who have taken their cue therefrom have interpreted as "civic and political interest" exhibited in relative desire for citizenship. With the exception of Italy, the races from the "recent" source of largest immigration show a higher proportion seeking naturalization than the proportion they represented in the population. It can fairly be said that the desire to become citizens is as evident among these immigrants of the new races as among those of the earlier, entirely leaving out of consideration the length of residence which operates in favor of the older immigrants.

How did these applicants for citizenship fare? However much they may have desired citizenship, did they get it? Did they pass the examination? And in respect of the reasons for denial of those who were rejected, how did the "recent" races account for themselves as regards those matters which really answer the questions of moral and intellectual fitness?

Well, to begin with, the percentage of all denials (3,033) among these more than 26,000 petitioners was 11.5 — almost exactly that (11.2) of the whole United States during the entire period of eleven years, 1908-1918, as shown by the reports

of the Commissioner of Naturalization.

Fourteen countries showed a per cent of denials exceeding that for all countries. Of these only four supply the "new" immigration. And of the seven showing a lower than 11.5 per cent denials, five constitute the "new" immigration. This would point to greater success on the part of the new races in attaining their naturalization papers. The qualifying fact here, as elsewhere, is that more than twice as many petitioners belong to the "new" races as to the "old."

Table II

*Comparison by race of (1) naturalization petitioners studied and (2) unnaturalized males 21 years or over in nine cities where petitions were filed.*

COUNTRY OF BIRTH	PETITIONERS STUDIED 1913-1914		UNNATURALIZED* FOREIGN-BORN WHITE MALES 21 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER IN NINE CITIES** IN 1910	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Russia	7,864	29.9	107,393	24.5
Austria	3,875	14.7	59,252	13.5
Italy	3,591	13.7	98,595	22.5
Hungary	2,443	9.3	31,194	7.1
Germany	2,305	8.8	35,425	8.1
Ireland	1,773	6.7	16,453	3.8
England	831	3.2	14,807	3.4
Sweden	616	2.3	8,675	2.0
Rumania	569	2.2	5,778	1.3
Norway	389	1.5	4,084	0.9
Canada	385	1.5	9,229	2.1
Scotland	288	1.1	5,299	1.2
Denmark	200	0.8	1,881	0.4
Switzerland	197	0.8	4,039	0.9
Finland	144	0.6	2,395	0.5
Turkey in Asia	142	0.5	1,883	0.4
Holland	139	0.5	930	0.2
Turkey in Europe	92	0.5	1,650	0.4
Greece	90	0.3	5,393	1.2
France	86	0.3	4,116	0.9
Wales	32	0.1	294	0.1
Spain	23	0.1	932	0.2
Portugal	8	..	92	..
No Information	23	..	..	..
Other	179	0.8	17,728	4.1
Total	26,284		437,517	

\* Includes aliens and those holding first papers.

\*\* Cleveland; New York (Boroughs of Manhattan, Bronx and Queens); Bridgeport, Connecticut; Cincinnati; Paterson, New Jersey; Portland, Oregon; Rochester, New York; Seattle, Washington; Worcester, Massachusetts.

A study of the figures covering the reasons for denial among the petitions analyzed illuminates special aspects of this matter, showing as it does how large a proportion of the denials are for reason of a purely technical character.

As for the less mechanical, the average percentage of denials for the whole United States for the period 1908-18 on the ground of "immoral character" was 4.0 per cent. With the exception of Turkey in Europe, not one of the "newer" races came up to this average in these court records for 1913-14. The figures generally show that cause to be negligible anyway.

In considering the statistics of denials on the ground of "ignorance," it is to be remembered that the examinations which disclose this "ignorance" do not go as a rule to the subject of illiteracy or general intelligence, but deal in the majority of cases with the understanding of the petitioner as to the form of government, and sometimes decidedly minute details of the history, of the United States. The average percentage of denials on the ground of "ignorance" in the whole United States during the eleven years 1908-18 was 10.3. The records of the petitions of every one of the "recent" races except Italian for the year 1913-14 (if one may judge by this study of more than one-fifth of them) was far better than that average though generally higher than that of the old races.

Generally speaking, the immigrant is in this country in the average case anywhere from 5.4 to 12.7 years before he files his declaration of intention to seek citizenship. Having filed his declaration of intention after an average residence in this country shown in all courts as 6.8 years — nearly two years more than the five-years' minimum residence required for the *completion* of citizenship — our average immigrant *waits more than five years longer* before he files his final petition for natu-

ralization — although under the law he need have waited only two. These are very surprising figures for those who have been complaining that we have hurried aliens into citizenship. Once the applicant has his petition filed, the process becomes more expeditious, the figures collated for the year 1913-14 showing an average interval between petition and certificate of naturalization of 4.9 months. The law requires in any event an interval of at least ninety days.

What light do the petitions throw upon the question of the relative "civic and political interest" of the various racial groups, as shown by the interval that elapses between their attainment of the age of twenty-one years, or, if they come here after they are twenty-one, between their arrival and their filing of the final petition? The striking thing is that almost without exception the countries showing the longest intervals are those representing the old immigration.

If anything, those of the so-called older immigration left their homelands at a later age, while a larger proportion of the newer came in younger manhood. But from both, as a whole, they were young men. More than 60 per cent of them were between the ages of eighteen and thirty years. Of the 26,284 applicants for citizenship whose petitions were examined, 16,586 (over three fifths) came to this country between the ages of eighteen and thirty. The preponderance is striking.

These men, the cream of our immigration — regardless of any fanciful distinction of race "older" or "newer" — came in the flower of their young manhood to try hazard of new fortunes in what they rightly believed to be the land of promise and opportunity; lived here from five to twelve years before they registered in formal declaration their intention to become citizens; lived here upward of five

years more before filing their final petition for citizenship, and nearly nine out of ten of them passed their examinations and were admitted.

There is visible in these statistics a distinction of race — a very interesting and inspiring distinction, but it is not one between “older” or “newer” races. It has little to do with any supposititious difference of racial quality or character. . . . Certainly to a discerning eye this fact stands forth:

Those from countries where at the time of their migration there was either autocratic government or political discontent, or inferior economic opportunity, head the list of those who seek, and upon examination prove, their title to fellow-membership with us.

Certain inferences and conclusions seem to be warranted on the whole by our examination and analyses of the compilations of the United States Census, the Immigration Commission of 1907, the Naturalization Bureau and the Americanization Study. It is not possible to reproduce here all the supporting tables.

First and most important is the destruction of the legendary presumption of some change for the worse in recent years in the inherent character-quality of immigration to this country, and in the attitude of the typical immigrant of those years toward American citizenship. There has been no such change.

Second, it is evident that such difference as exists among races is not an inherent racial quality but a difference between the political, social and economic conditions at the time of migration in the country of origin. Those nations whose people are most free from tyranny and oppression and most contented with the conditions under which they live at home, send the fewest immigrants to America;

their immigrants come at a later age, and when they do come they retain longest or altogether their original citizenship.

Third, and broadly corollary, is the fact that the major, not to say exclusively controlling, factor in the political absorption of the immigrant is *length of residence*. The longer the individual lives in America the more likely he is to seek active membership therein.

Fourth, the interval between arrival and petition for naturalization — or even the original declaration of intention, — is much longer than has generally been supposed. The average immigrant, regardless of racial extraction, does not concern himself about political privileges or activities until after long years of a residence and the attainment of a considerable degree of permanent social and economic status.

Fifth, whether from northwestern or from southeastern Europe, whether from the so-called “recent” or “older” immigration, the racial groups show a slower desire for citizenship and a lower rate of naturalization while they are employed in the more poorly-paid industries; both the individual interest and the rate increase as the individuals toil upward in the social and economic scale.

The inherent thing in the racial quality, experience and character of the immigrant that leads some to seek citizenship earlier than others; the essential element in the “quality of assimilability,” in the display of “civic and political interest,” is a human thing, which lies and always has lain broad upon the face of nearly all of the statistical tables over which students have labored so intricately and pontificated so solemnly — in some instances so absurdly. It is a thing so obvious that it is difficult to understand why so many of them have overlooked it.

## THE IMMIGRATION ISSUE TODAY

*Frank L. Auerbach: WHO ARE OUR NEW IMMIGRANTS?*

YOU have asked me to discuss with you the topic: "Who Are Our New Immigrants?" This is a particularly pertinent problem for the National Council on Naturalization and Citizenship and the council's member organizations. Since you all are concerned with the integration of the immigrant into the American community, it is, of course, essential for you to have the very best understanding of who the immigrants are you want to help, not only as individuals but as a group, and where your services will most be needed.

I should like to examine with you today two questions which have an important bearing on the broad subject "Who Are Our New Immigrants?" I should like to examine whether we can anticipate from which countries our immigrants are likely to come in the near future, and further, whether the regional distribution of our immigrants in the United States has been influenced in the past and will be influenced in the future by the operation of our immigration laws.

Of course, it is impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy who our new immigrants will be. But we get some indication of our future immigration under the regular immigration laws if we examine data collected by the Visa Division of the Department of State on the number of persons who have registered for immigration under oversubscribed quotas with the various American consular offices abroad.

The most recent available compilation shows that on November 1, 1951, 773,465 aliens were registered with American consulates as intending immigrants under oversubscribed quotas. Of these 773,465 aliens, 13,760 are classified as qualified immigrants, that is aliens who had already been examined by American consular officers and were ready for visa issuance except for the availability of quota numbers. By far the largest number, 759,705, are listed as unqualified immigrants, that is, they have not been examined yet by American consular officers but have signified their interest in coming to this country as immigrants by submitting registration forms.

### *Quota Nationalities*

Let us examine these intending immigrants by their quota nationality, that is the quota to which they are chargeable under existing laws. By far the largest group of these prospective immigrants, 262,680, are chargeable to the German quota. The next largest group, 138,125, are chargeable to the Polish quota; 36,866 to the quota of the Netherlands; 29,692 to the quota of Rumania; 28,999 to the quota of Yugoslavia; 24,201 to the quota of Italy; and 22,352 to the quota of Austria. Aliens registered on other quota waiting lists are all below the 20,000 mark for each quota nationality.

These figures must be evaluated with care. Many of those registered, it must

be expected, will never come to this country; some may have registered on a sudden impulse and may have long since given up their plan to come to this country; others may be discouraged by long waiting periods; and still others may not be able to meet the requirements of our immigration laws. In evaluating the significance of these quota waiting lists in relation to our future immigration, we must, of course, also take into account the annual quotas established for these various countries. Even if all the 262,680 aliens registered for immigration to the United States under the German quota would wait until their turn is reached and if they all could meet the requirements of our immigration laws, it would take much more than 10 years for them to come to this country. The German quota is 25,957 annually. Portions of the annual quota will be absorbed by immigrants with first and second preference-quota status. Immigration from other countries will be curtailed for years to come by the so-called "mortgaging" of these quotas under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended. If you take, for example, Poland with an annual quota of 6,524, you have to realize that through the admission of displaced persons 25 percent of this quota is already used until the fiscal year of 1954, and 50 percent of it is used from the year 1954 to the year 2,000.

#### *Volume of Future Immigration*

The extent to which the volume of future immigration will be affected by the admission of displaced persons is shown by the following data which list the annual quota of each country and the fiscal year through which annual quotas have in part been absorbed — 25 percent through 1954 and 50 percent through the year as indicated — by visas issued to displaced persons:

COUNTRY	ANNUAL QUOTA	YEAR
Albania . . . .	100	1956
Austria . . . .	1,413	1955
Bulgaria . . . .	100	1963
China . . . . .	100	1964
Czechoslovakia . .	2,874	1958
Danzig . . . . .	100	1962
Estonia . . . . .	116	2146
Germany . . . . .	25,957	1953
Greece . . . . .	310	2013
Hungary . . . . .	869	1989
Iran . . . . .	100	1956
Latvia . . . . .	236	2274
Lithuania . . . .	386	2090
Poland . . . . .	6,524	2000
Rumania . . . . .	291	2019
Trieste . . . . .	100	1958
Turkey . . . . .	226	1964
U.S.S.R. . . . .	2,798	1980
Yugoslavia . . . .	938	2114

The significance of the data which I have given you, however, is not to predict the waiting period for immigrants under any given quota, but rather to show under which quotas we have heavy registrations and thus can anticipate a full use of these quotas for years to come.

You have to consider another aspect and that is that immigrants chargeable to open quotas do not appear on the State Department's list of aliens registered as intending immigrants under oversubscribed quotas. The immigration from some of these countries is not negligible. From Great Britain — with an annual quota of 65,721 — 131,592 aliens have entered the United States as immigrants during the last 10 years; and from Ireland — with an annual quota of 17,853 — 25,377 have come during the same period. From the nonquota countries of the Western Hemisphere, some 300,000 immigrants have come between 1941 and 1950. In other words, we see that we may anticipate a continued pressure on our quotas from the countries of central and southern

Europe, a moderate immigration from countries with open quotas, and a significant number of immigrants coming as nonquota immigrants from the Americas.

#### *Regional Concentration of Immigrants*

Many studies have been made on the cultural and ethnic background of immigrants who have come to the United States, their occupations, age, and sex composition, and their place of settlement. Little, if any, attention has been given, however, to the question of the extent to which the operation of the existing immigration laws is responsible for the concentration of our immigrants in a very few States in this country. New York, California, Texas, Michigan, New Jersey, and Massachusetts have always been the States with the largest alien population. According to data prepared by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, of the 2,260,984 aliens who submitted annual address reports in January 1951, 24 percent lived in New York State, 14 percent in California, 7 percent in Texas, 6 percent in Massachusetts, and 5 percent in New Jersey and Michigan. All other States had a registered alien population of one percent or less with the exception of Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, Arizona, and Washington, which had between one and five percent aliens. Mr. Mackey, the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, told you at your recent annual meeting at New York that of recently naturalized aliens three-fifths lived in just four States: New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, and California. Fifty-nine percent resided in large cities of 100,000 inhabitants or more. Twenty-seven percent resided in urban areas with populations of 25,000 to 100,000.

Let me now examine whether this continued regional concentration of our immigrants is at least in part due to the operations of our immigration laws. There

are three important provisions in our immigration laws which, I believe, tend to perpetuate the geographical trend of our immigrant settlement.

#### *Pertinent Provisions of Immigration Laws*

The first important provision, a very sound and commendable one which, however, encourages the geographical concentration of immigrants, is based on the principle of reuniting families. This principle has found its expression particularly in those provisions of our immigration laws which give nonquota status to children and wives of American citizens and to husbands of American citizens, by marriage, before January 1, 1948, and preference-quota status to parents of American citizens, husbands of American citizens, by marriage, since January 1, 1948, and to children and wives of permanent resident aliens. We must realize that if a sufficiently large demand exists from these preference-quota categories, the entire quota of a country may be absorbed by these preference groups. The only group of immigrants which enjoys a quota preference without belonging to the relative groups are skilled agriculturists in quotas of over three hundred; but as you know, there has been in recent years little demand for preference status by qualified agriculturists.

Thus, we see that, particularly in countries with small quotas, the entire quota in a given year may consist of fireside relatives of American citizens and permanent resident aliens. It is not surprising that these immigrants will move in with their families in this country and so further increase the urban trend in immigration settlement.

There are two other important provisions in our immigration laws which, I believe, tend to concentrate new immigrants in the areas of existing settlements of foreign-born. First of all, our immigra-



tion laws require an immigrant to prove that he is not likely to become a public charge. In most cases, aliens prove this by submitting affidavits of support with which you all are very much familiar. American consular officers normally will accept such affidavits of support as evidence only if the affiant can show that he has some legal prospective immigrant. Thus, this affiant will usually be a relative or a very close friend. Again, it is likely that the new immigrant, once he comes to this country, will move in with his affiant, or at least will move into the same community in which his affiant lives since he expects, as a rule, help from the affiant in making a start in this country.

The contract-labor clause of our immigration laws is the third provision which, in my opinion, at least indirectly, prevents a wider geographical distribution of our new immigrants. As you know, this law, with some exceptions, makes an alien inadmissible if a job involving predominantly manual labor is promised to him in this country. Thus, employment opportunities in this country which may exist away from the traditional areas of immigrant settlement, under existing law, cannot be offered to our new immigrants before their arrival and first settlement in this country.

#### *Departures from General Trend*

Due to special legislation, two significant departures from this general trend which I just described have taken place in recent years. The first is the wartime legislation facilitating the immigration of war brides of American soldiers. This group of new immigrants, who are now rapidly becoming our new citizens, has spread throughout the country more widely than any other group of immigrants in recent years. This obviously is due to the fact that our soldiers who married abroad have come from all parts of

the country and thus took their brides back home to practically all the States of the Union.

The other important departure from the traditional trend of immigrant settlement is the settlement of displaced persons who have come under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended. Although no final statistics are available at this time, preliminary data indicate that these immigrants spread more widely throughout the country than other immigrants who have come under our regular immigration laws. You will remember that in the case of these displaced persons, the three provisions of our law which I believe are at least in part responsible for the continued pattern of our immigrant settlement, as a rule, did not apply. They were not only exempt from the contract-labor law but they were required to have assurances of employment, housing, and against becoming a public charge. These assurances took the place of the affidavit of support, so that the sponsors of these displaced persons, in most instances, were prospective employers, and not necessarily relatives or close friends. And finally the admission of these displaced persons was not predicated on nonquota or preference-quota status on the basis of relationship.

What can we learn from this experience for the future? Immigration under existing law, I believe, will continue to follow the same pattern, geographically speaking, as past immigration has followed. Should, however, any of the now pending omnibus immigration bills be enacted, we may see a significant change in this pattern, a change which potentially could be of great importance to your future work.

All omnibus immigration bills introduced in Congress during the second session of the Eighty-second Congress, contain identical provisions which would give a preference of 50 percent of each



quota "to qualified quota immigrants whose services are determined by the Attorney General to be needed urgently in the United States because of the high education, technical training, specialized experience, or exceptional ability of such immigrants and to be substantially beneficial prospectively to the national economy, cultural interests, or welfare of the United States," and to the spouses and children of these skilled aliens. As I said before, this provision is identically provided in the House-passed Walter Omnibus Bill, H.R. 5678; the McCarran Bill, S. 2550; and in the so-called Humphrey-Lehman Bill, S. 2842. Aliens qualified for these preferences will be attracted to come to this country by employment, not by relationships. Their skills may be needed in any part of our country whether there may or may not be a large foreign-born population. Whatever is left in the omnibus bills of the contract-labor law, and very little is left of it, does not apply to these skilled aliens who are entitled to a 50 percent quota preference. This provision of the omnibus bills will open the doors of our country to new seed immi-

grants, persons who do not come attracted by family ties but come on the merit of their skills and their usefulness to our country. Questions have been raised during the consideration of the omnibus bills whether they would be prohibitive of new seed immigration. I believe these fears were not only unfounded but it seems that the proposed legislation would permit much more new seed immigration than our immigration laws do now.

I have no doubt that sooner or later a provision providing for this so-called selective immigration of aliens needed in this country will become law. Such legislation, it appears, will bring immigrants to many communities which never have had experience with newcomers and which are thus not prepared to assist them with the manifold problems of integration and adjustment. The organizations you represent which have accumulated years of valuable experience in this field of immigrant adjustment will then be called upon either to expand their activities or to share community organizations throughout the country.

#### THE WALTER-MC CARRAN IMMIGRATION BILL

Calendar No. 1072

82d CONGRESS

2d Session

S. 2550

(Report No. 1137)

In The Senate of The United States

January 29 (legislative day,

January 10), 1952

#### A BILL

To revise the laws relating to immigration, naturalization, and nationality; and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act, divided into titles, chapters, and sections according to the following table of contents, may be cited as the "Immigration and Nationality Act." . . .

#### TITLE II — IMMIGRATION

##### Chapter I — Quota System

Numerical Limitations; Annual Quota

Based Upon National Origin;

Minimum Quotas

Sec. 201. (a) The annual quota of any

quota area shall be one-sixth of 1 per centum of the number of inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920, which number, except for the purpose of computing quotas for quota areas within the Asia-Pacific triangle, shall be the same number heretofore determined under the provisions of section 11 of the Immigra-

tion Act of 1924,<sup>1</sup> attributable by national origin to such quota area: *Provided*, That the quota existing for Chinese persons prior to the date of enactment of this Act shall be continued, and, except as otherwise provided in section 202 (e), the minimum quota for any quota area shall be one hundred.

### PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE ON THE VETO OF IMMIGRATION BILL

TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

I return herewith, without my approval, H. R. 5678, the proposed Immigration and Nationality Act.

In outlining my objections to this bill, I want to make it clear that it contains certain provisions that meet with my approval. This is a long and complex piece of legislation. It has 164 separate sections, some with more than forty subdivisions. It presents a difficult problem of weighing the good against the bad, and arriving at a judgment on the whole.

H. R. 5678 is an omnibus bill which would revise and codify all of our laws relating to immigration, naturalization and nationality.

A general revision and modernization of these laws unquestionably is needed and long overdue, particularly with respect to immigration. But this bill would not provide us with an immigration policy adequate for the present world situation.

Indeed, the bill, taking all its provisions together, would be a step backward and not a step forward. In view of the crying need for reform in the field of immigration, I deeply regret that I am unable to approve H. R. 5678.

In recent years our immigration policy has become a matter of major national

concern. Long dormant questions about the effect of our immigration laws now assume first-rate importance. What we do in the field of immigration and naturalization is vital to the continued growth and internal development of the United States — to the economic and social strength of our country — which is the core of the defense of the free world.

Our immigration policy is equally, if not more, important to the conduct of our foreign relations and to our responsibilities of moral leadership in the struggle for world peace.

In one respect this bill recognizes the great international significance of our immigration and naturalization policy, and takes a step to improve existing laws. All racial bars to naturalization would be removed, and at least some minimum immigration quota would be afforded to each of the free nations of Asia. . . .

But now this most desirable provision comes before me embedded in a mass of

<sup>1</sup> *National Origins Quota formula:*

"The annual quota of any nationality . . . shall be a number which bears the same ratio to 150,000,000 as the number of inhabitants in continental United States in 1920 having that national origin bears to the number of inhabitants in continental United States in 1920, but the minimum quota of any nationality shall be 100."

[Editor's note.]

legislation which would perpetuate injustices of long standing against many other nations of the world, hamper the efforts we are making to rally the men of East and West alike to the cause of freedom, and intensify the repressive and inhumane aspects of our immigration procedures. The price is too high, and in good conscience I cannot agree to pay it.

I want all our residents of Japanese ancestry, and all our friends throughout the Far East, to understand this point clearly. I cannot take the step I would like to take, and strike down the bars that prejudice has erected against them, without, at the same time, establishing new discriminations against the peoples of Asia and approving harsh and repressive measures directed at all who seek a new life within our boundaries.

I am sure that with a little more time and a little more discussion in this country the public conscience and the good sense of the American people will assert themselves, and we shall be in a position to enact an immigration and naturalization policy that will be fair to all.

In addition to removing racial bars to naturalization, the bill would permit American women citizens to bring their alien husbands to this country as non-quota immigrants, and enable alien husbands of resident women aliens to come in under the quota in a preferred status. These provisions would be a step toward preserving the integrity of the family under our immigration laws, and are clearly desirable.

The bill would also relieve transportation companies of some of the unjustified burdens and penalties now imposed upon them. In particular, it would put an end to the archaic requirement that carriers pay the expenses of aliens detained at the port of entry, even though such aliens have arrived with proper travel documents.

But these few improvements are heavily outweighed by other provisions of the bill which retain existing defects in our laws, and add many undesirable new features.

The bill would continue, practically without change, the national origins quota system, which was enacted into law in 1924, and put into effect in 1929. This quota system — always based upon assumptions at variance with our American ideals — is long since out of date and more than ever unrealistic in the face of present world conditions.

This system hinders us in dealing with current immigration problems, and is a constant handicap in the conduct of our foreign relations. . . .

The inadequacy of the present quota system has been demonstrated since the end of the war, when we were compelled to resort to emergency legislation to admit displaced persons. If the quota system remains unchanged, we shall be compelled to resort to similar emergency legislation again, in order to admit any substantial portion of the refugees from communism or the victims of overcrowding in Europe.

With the idea of quotas in general there is no quarrel. Some numerical limitation must be set, so that immigration will be within our capacity to absorb. But the over-all limitation of numbers imposed by the national origins quota system is too small for our needs today, and the country-by-country limitations create a pattern that is insulting to large numbers of our finest citizens, irritating to our Allies abroad, and foreign to our purposes and ideals.

The over-all quota limitation, under the law of 1924, restricted annual immigration to approximately 150,000. This was about one-seventh of 1 per cent of our total population in 1920. Taking into account the growth in population since

1920, the law now allows us but one-tenth of 1 per cent of our total population. And since the largest national quotas are only partly used, the number actually coming has been in the neighborhood of one-fifteenth of 1 per cent.

This is far less than we must have in the years ahead to keep up with the growing needs of our nation for manpower to maintain the strength and vigor of our economy.

The greatest vice of the present quota system, however, is that it discriminates, deliberately and intentionally, against many of the peoples of the world. The purpose behind it was to cut down and virtually eliminate immigration to this country from Southern and Eastern Europe.

A theory was invented to rationalize this objective. The theory was that in order to be readily assimilable, European immigrants should be admitted in proportion to the numbers of persons of their respective national stocks already here as shown by the census of 1920.

Since Americans of English, Irish and German descent were most numerous, immigrants of those three nationalities got the lion's share—more than two-thirds of the total quota. The remaining third was divided up among all the other nations given quotas.

The desired effect was obtained. Immigration from the newer sources of Southern and Eastern Europe was reduced to a trickle. The quotas allotted to England and Ireland remained largely unused, as was intended. Total quota immigration fell to a half or a third—and sometimes even less—of the annual limit of 154,000.

People from such countries as Greece, or Spain, or Latvia were virtually deprived of any opportunity to come here at all, simply because Greeks or Spaniards or Latvians had not come here before 1920 in any substantial numbers.

The idea behind this discriminatory policy was, to put it baldly that Americans with English or Irish names were better people and better citizens than Americans with Italian or Greek or Polish names. It was thought that people of West European origin made better citizens than Rumanians or Yugoslavs or Ukrainians or Balts or Austrians.

Such a concept is utterly unworthy of our traditions and our ideals. It violates the great political doctrine of the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal." It denied the humanitarian creed inscribed beneath the Statue of Liberty proclaiming to all nations:

"Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free."

It repudiates our basic religious concepts, our belief in the brotherhood of man, and in the words of St. Paul that "there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free \* \* \* for ye are all one in Christ Jesus."

The basis of this quota system was false and unworthy in 1924. It is even worse now. At the present time this quota system keeps out the very people we want to bring in. It is incredible to me that, in this year of 1952, we should again be enacting into law such a slur on the patriotism, the capacity and the decency of a large part of our citizenry.

Today we have entered into an alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty, with Italy, Greece and Turkey against one of the most terrible threats mankind has ever faced. We are asking them to join with us in protecting the peace of the world. We are helping them to build their defenses, and train their men, in the common cause. But through this bill we say to these people:

You are less worthy to come to this country than Englishmen or Irishmen; you Italians, who need to find homes abroad in the hundreds of thousands—

you shall have a quota of 5,645; you Greeks, struggling to assist the helpless victims of a Communist civil war — you shall have a quota of 308; and you Turks, you are brave defenders of the Eastern flank, but you shall have a quota of only 225!

Today, we are “protecting” ourselves, as we were in 1924, against being flooded by immigrants from Eastern Europe. This is fantastic. The countries of Eastern Europe have fallen under the Communist yoke — they are silenced, fenced off by barbed wire and mine fields — no one passes their borders but at the risk of his life.

We do not need to be protected against immigrants from these countries — on the contrary we want to stretch out a helping hand, to save those who have managed to flee into Western Europe, to succor those who are brave enough to escape from barbarism, to welcome and restore them against the day when their countries will, as we hope, be free again.

But this we cannot do, as we would like to do, because the quota for Poland is only 6,500, as against the 138,000 exiled Poles, all over Europe, who are asking to come to these shores; because the quota for the now subjugated Baltic countries is little more than 700 — against the 23,000 Baltic refugees imploring us to admit them to a new life here; because the quota for Rumania is only 289, and some 30,000 Rumanians, who have managed to escape the labor camps and the mass deportations of their Soviet masters, have asked our help. These are only a few examples of the absurdity, the cruelty of carrying over into this year of 1952 the isolationist limitations of our 1924 law.

In no other realm of our national life are we so hampered and stultified by the dead hand of the past as we are in this field of immigration. We do not limit our

cities to their 1920 boundaries — we do not hold our corporations to their 1920 capitalizations — we welcome progress and change to meet changing conditions in every sphere of life, except in the field of immigration.

The time to shake off this dead weight of past mistakes is now. The time to develop a decent policy of immigration — a fitting instrument for our foreign policy and a true reflection of the ideals we stand for, at home and abroad — is now.

In my earlier message on immigration, I tried to explain to the Congress that the situation we face in immigration is an emergency — that it must be met promptly. I have pointed out that in the last few years, we have blazed a new trail in immigration, through our displaced-persons program.

Through the combined efforts of the Government and private agencies, working together not to keep people out, but to bring qualified people in, we summoned our resources of good will and human feeling to meet the task. In this program, we have found better techniques to meet the immigration problems of the 1950's.

None of this fruitful experience of the last three years is reflected in this bill before me. None of the crying human needs of this time of trouble is recognized in this bill. But it is not too late. The Congress can remedy these defects, and it can adopt legislation to meet the most critical problems before adjournment.

The only consequential change in the 1924 quota system which the bill would make is to extend a small quota to each of the countries of Asia. But most of the beneficial effects of this gesture are offset by other provisions of the bill. The countries of Asia are told in one breath that they shall have quotas for their nationals, and in the next, that the nationals of the

other countries, if their ancestry is as much as 50 per cent Asian, shall be charged to these quotas.

It is only with respect to persons of Oriental ancestry that this invidious discrimination applies. All other persons are charged to the country of their birth. But persons with Asian ancestry are charged to the countries of Asia, wherever they may have been born, or however long their ancestors have made their homes outside the land of their origin. These provisions are without justification.

I now wish to turn to the other provisions of the bill, those dealing with the qualifications of aliens and immigrants for admission, with the administration of the laws, and with problems of naturalization and nationality. In these provisions too, I find objections that preclude my signing this bill.

The bill would make it even more difficult to enter our country. Our resident aliens would be more easily separated from homes and families under grounds of deportation, both new and old, which would specifically be made retroactive. Admission to our citizenship would be made more difficult; expulsion from our citizenship would be made easier. Certain rights of native-born, first-generation Americans would be limited.

All our citizens returning from abroad would be subjected to serious risk of unreasonable invasions of privacy. Seldom has a bill exhibited the distrust evidenced here for citizens and aliens alike — at a time when we need unity at home, and the confidence of our friends abroad.

We have adequate and fair provisions in our present law to protect us against the entry of criminals. The changes made by the bill in those provisions would result in empowering minor immigration and consular officials to act as prosecutor, judge and jury in determining whether

acts constituting a crime have been committed. Worse, we would be compelled to exclude certain people because they have been convicted by "courts" in Communist countries that know no justice.

Under this provision, no matter how construed, it would not be possible for us to admit many of the men and women who have stood up against totalitarian repression and have been punished for doing so. I do not approve of substituting totalitarian vengeance for democratic justice. I will not extend full faith and credit to the judgments of the Communist secret police.

The realities of a world only partly free would again be ignored in the provision flatly barring entry to those who made misrepresentations in securing visas. To save their lives and the lives of loved ones still imprisoned, refugees from tyranny sometimes misstate various details of their lives.

We do not want to encourage fraud. But we must recognize that conditions in some parts of the world drive our friends to desperate steps. An exception restricted to cases involving misstatement of country of birth is not sufficient. And to make refugees from oppression forever deportable on such technical grounds is shabby treatment indeed.

Some of the new grounds of deportation which the bill would provide are unnecessarily severe. Defects and mistakes in admission would serve to deport at any time because of the bill's elimination, retroactively as well as prospectively, of the present humane provision barring deportations on such grounds five years after entry.

Narcotic drug addicts would be deportable at any time, whether or not the addiction was culpable, and whether or not cured. The threat of deportation would drive the addict into hiding beyond the



reach of cure, and the danger to the country from drug addiction would be increased.

I am asked to approve the reenactment of highly objectionable provisions now contained in the Internal Security Act of 1950 — a measure passed over my veto shortly after the invasion of South Korea. Some of these provisions would empower the Attorney General to deport any alien who has engaged or has had a purpose to engage in activities “prejudicial to the public interest” or “subversive to the national security.”

No standards or definitions are provided to guide discretion in the exercise of powers so sweeping. To punish undefined “activities” departs from traditional American insistence on established standards of guilt. To punish an undefined “purpose” is thought control.

These provisions are worse than the infamous Alien Act of 1798, passed in a time of national fear and distrust of foreigners, which gave the President power to deport any alien deemed “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.” Alien residents were thoroughly frightened and citizens much disturbed by that threat to liberty.

Such powers are inconsistent with our Democratic ideals. Conferring powers like that upon the Attorney General is unfair to him as well as to our alien residents. Once fully informed of such vast discretionary powers vested in the Attorney General, Americans now would and should be just as alarmed as Americans were in 1798 over less drastic powers vested in the President.

Heretofore, for the most part, deportation and exclusion have rested upon findings of fact made upon evidence. Under this bill, they would rest in many instances upon the “opinion” or “satisfaction” of immigration or consular employees. The

change from objective findings to subjective feelings is not compatible with our system of justice. The result would be to restrict or eliminate judicial review of unlawful administrative action.

The bill would sharply restrict the present opportunity of citizens and alien residents to save family members from deportation. Under the procedures of present law, the Attorney General can exercise his discretion to suspend deportation in meritorious cases. In each such case, at the present time, the exercise of administrative discretion is subject to the scrutiny and approval of the Congress.

Nevertheless, the bill would prevent this discretion from being used in many cases where it is now available, and would narrow the circle of those who can obtain relief from the letter of the law. This is most unfortunate, because the bill, in its other provisions, would impose harsher restrictions and greatly increase the number of cases deserving equitable relief.

Native-born American citizens who are dual nationals would be subjected to loss of citizenship on grounds not applicable to other native-born American citizens. This distinction is a slap at millions of Americans whose fathers were of alien birth.

Children would be subjected to additional risk of loss of citizenship. Naturalized citizens would be subjected to the risk of denaturalization by any procedure that can be found to be permitted under any state law or practice pertaining to minor civil law suits.

Judicial review of administrative denials of citizenship would be severely limited and impeded in many cases, and completely eliminated in others. I believe these provisions raise serious Constitutional questions. Constitutionality aside, I see no justification in national policy for their adoption.



Section 401 of this bill would establish a Joint Congressional Committee on Immigration and Nationality Policy. This committee would have the customary powers to hold hearings and to subpoena witnesses, books, papers and documents. But the committee would also be given powers over the Executive Branch which are unusual and of a highly questionable nature.

Specifically, Section 401 would provide that "the Secretary of State and the Attorney General shall without delay submit to the committee all regulations, instructions, and all other information as requested by the committee relative to the administration of this act."

This section appears to be another attempt to require the Executive Branch to make available to the Congress administrative documents, communications between the President and his subordinates, confidential files, and other records of that character. It also seems to imply that the committee would undertake to supervise or approve regulations. Such proposals are not consistent with the Constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers.

In these and many other respects, the bill raises basic questions as to our fundamental immigration and naturalization policy, and the laws and practices for putting that policy into effect.

Many of the aspects of the bill which have been most widely criticized in the public debate are reaffirmations or elaborations of existing statutes or administrative procedures.

Time and again, examination discloses that the revisions of existing law that would be made by the bill are intended to solidify some restrictive practice of our immigration authorities, or to overrule or modify some ameliorative decision of the Supreme Court or other Federal courts.

By and large, the changes that would

be made by the bill do not depart from the basically restrictive spirit of our existing laws — but intensify and reinforce it.

These conclusions point to an underlying condition which deserves the most careful study. Should we not undertake a reassessment of our immigration policies and practices in the light of the conditions that face us in the second half of the twentieth century?

The great popular interest which this bill has created, and the criticism which it has stirred up, demand an affirmative answer. I hope the Congress will agree to a careful re-examination of this entire matter.

To assist in this complex task, I suggest the creation of a representative commission of outstanding Americans to examine the basic assumptions of our immigration policy, the quota system and all that goes with it, the effect of our present immigration and nationality laws, their administration, and the ways in which they can be brought into line with our national ideals and our foreign policy.

Such a commission should, I believe, be established by the Congress. Its membership should be bipartisan and divided equally among persons from private life and persons from public life. I suggest that four members be appointed by the President, four by the President of the Senate, and four by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

The commission should be given sufficient funds to employ a staff and it should have adequate powers to hold hearings, take testimony, and obtain information. It should make a report to the President and to the Congress within a year from the time of its creation. . . .

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

The White House,  
June 25, 1952.

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## SPEECH OF SENATOR MCCARRAN

MR. MCCARRAN. Mr. President, at the outset I ask unanimous consent that the clerk may read an article published in the *Daily Worker*, the Communist voice of America, of June 26, 1952, under the caption "Truman vetoes bill periling foreign-born."

THE PRESIDENT, pro tempore. Without objection, the clerk will read.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

### TRUMAN VETOES BILL PERILING FOREIGN-BORN

Washington, June 25, — President Truman today vetoed the McCarran-Walter bill, which would bar immigration, hitting particularly at the colored peoples, and which would impose thought control on the foreign born.

The danger still exists, however, that the vicious measure may become law unless there is mass protest to the Senators and Members of the House. Before going to the President, the bill was passed by tremendous majorities.

Representative Francis E. Walter, Democrat, Pennsylvania, who sponsored the bill in the House, said he will move tomorrow to override the President's veto. He said he expects his motion to pass without question because anyone who read the bill or listened to the debate will vote to override.

MR. MCCARRAN. Mr. President, it is difficult to formulate, point by point, answers to the veto message on the omnibus immigration and naturalization bill, because the points contained in the veto message are in most instances vague generalities based upon conclusions which are not supported by the provisions of the bill. . . . Notwithstanding the fact that every agency of the Government which is concerned with immigration and naturalization has urged the President to sign

the bill, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Visa Division, our Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Justice, and the Department of State, he has vetoed the bill. Notwithstanding the fact that over 100 nationwide patriotic, civic, and religious organizations have urged the President to approve the bill, he has vetoed it. Notwithstanding the fact that as much care and time and effort has gone into this bill as into any legislation which has been in the Congress in the last generation, the President has vetoed it. Notwithstanding the fact that the bill passed both Houses of the Congress by overwhelming majorities, the President has vetoed it.

Why is it that the President of the United States has vetoed this measure?

His first principal objection is that the bill retains the basic pattern of our present national origins quota system which he attacks as unfair and discriminatory. The President complains that the national origins quota system is at variance with our American ideals, is out of date, and unrealistic. If his veto is sustained, what do we have? We have the national origins quota system which has been the law of this land since 1924. Indeed, Mr. President, may I point out that even the so-called Humphrey-Lehman substitute measure contains the national origins quota system formula.

Mr. President, the basic principles upon which the national origins quota system is founded are fair and just. Furthermore, the national origins quota system is the only system that has been suggested which is practicable and reasonable for the control of immigration. In a word, the national origins quota system allocates quota numbers on the basis of the

ratio of each racial group in the United States to the aggregate population.

Let it be emphasized, Mr. President, that although the national origins quota system has been in effect since 1929, no one has yet come forth with a satisfactory substitute for the allocation of quota numbers. If this veto is sustained we shall continue to have the national origins quota system under the present law, but without the desirable revisions within such system which are made by the instant bill. If this veto is sustained we will not have met the problem of the oriental races which are presently inadmissible to the United States. If this veto is sustained we will not have those provisions of the bill which grant non-quota status to husbands of citizens. If this veto is sustained we will not have the system of selective immigration within our quota system so that we can meet the needs in this country of aliens of special skill or knowledge. If this veto is sustained we shall not have those provisions of the bill which are designed to prevent the separation of families by permitting a more liberal designation of the quota to which certain relatives of admissible aliens may be charged.

In his veto message the President next proceeds to criticize those provisions of the bill which are designed to strengthen the exclusion and deportation procedures so that we can prevent the entry and cause the deportation of subversives, criminals, and undesirables. The President states in his message that we have adequate and fair provisions in our present law to protect us against the entry of such aliens. If the President of the United States would consult the experts of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice, and the Visa Division of the Department of State he would know, as the committee of the Sen-

ate which studied our immigration system for five years found out, that our present laws are shot through with weaknesses and loopholes, and that criminals, Communists, and subversives of all descriptions are even now gaining admission into this country like water through a sieve and we cannot under our present laws effectively exclude or deport them.

The sponsors of this bill, Mr. President, have leaned over backward in the drafting of the bill, in the acceptance of amendments and in refining the language in conference, in order to avoid the strained misconstructions which the opponents of the bill have been giving the provisions of this measure which they charge would establish unfair or arbitrary procedures. Mr. President, the criticisms of the bill in this respect in the veto message of the President are unfounded and untrue. They are, moreover, in most respects a rehash of the misconstructions, not of this bill, but of the provisions of existing law which we incorporated in this bill because experience demonstrated that they are fair, workable, and sound. . . .

Although the President commends the provisions of the bill which remove racial ineligibility to naturalization and to immigration, one of the grounds for his veto is that the bill sets up special provisions with regard to the quotas to which persons of races indigenous to an area designated as the Asia-Pacific triangle shall be charged. He protests what he terms "this discrimination against the oriental groups" and what he regards as its adverse effect on our foreign relations. The fact is, however, that these provisions have the unqualified endorsement of every major oriental group in the United States as the only fair and reasonable solution to this problem, and the Department of State has repeatedly taken the position — and takes the position to this

moment — that the bill marks a decided advance in our foreign relations in the Far East.

Let me say also, Mr. President, that not only has the Department of State endorsed the bill because it would be a step in the direction of better foreign relations but the Department of State has expressed itself to the White House that a veto of this measure would have serious adverse effects on our foreign relations in the Far East.

Mr. President, I think it is time to call a halt to name calling in the guise of a Presidential veto. I think it is time here and now to remind the Senate that on another occasion the President of the United States vetoed a bill which would have removed, once and for all, racial barriers to naturalization. I refer, of course, to the President's veto of such proposed legislation in the closing days of the Eighty-first Congress.

The veto now before the Senate, if sustained, would for the second time dash the hopes of 86,000 orientals within our borders who have been our friends and neighbors for a quarter of a century, and who have hoped to realize their ambitions to become American citizens.

The President states that all our citizens returning from abroad would be subjected to serious risk of unreasonable invasions of privacy, but he does not explain how this would come about under the provisions of the bill. I say to you, Mr. President, that there is nothing in the bill which is before us which would permit unreasonable invasions of privacy of citizens, as alleged by the President.

The President alleges that the bill contains provisions which would result in empowering minor immigration and consular officials to act as prosecutor, judge, and jury in determining whether acts constituting a crime have been committed.

Nowhere in the bill, Mr. President, is there a provision which would permit such action in the administration of the immigration laws.

The President objects to the reenactment by this bill of certain provisions contained in the Internal Security Act of 1950. He alleges that such provisions in our law constitute thought control. Mr. President, those provisions are already in the law of the land. In fact, certain provisions of the Internal Security Act have been modified by the bill in order to remove even a possibility of misconstruction that there would be even a semblance of thought control.

The President's veto message on the omnibus immigration and naturalization bill not only misrepresents the facts, but also conceals material facts from the Congress and the American people.

The veto message does not disclose the fact that all the departments which would be concerned in any way with the administration of this measure recommended to the President that it be signed. The veto message does not disclose the fact that the Justice Department said enactment of this bill was required in the national interest. The veto message does not disclose the fact that the State Department said failure of the President to approve this bill would greatly embarrass the United States in the conduct of foreign relations throughout all Asia, and particularly in the conduct of relations with Japan. The veto message does not disclose the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency urged the President to sign this bill in the interests of national security. The veto message does not disclose the fact that when some person or persons in the executive office of the President sent to the State Department a memorandum purporting to find objectionable provisions in this bill, and virtually ordering the State

Department to revise its previous favorable report on the bill, both the policy committee of the Department and the Department itself not only refused to revise the previous favorable report, but took the critical memorandum from the executive offices and analyzed it point by point and answered it point by point. The State Department literally took that critical memorandum to pieces and showed it up for what it was — a piece of chicanery. But the Presidential veto message does not reveal any of that.

The President has vetoed this bill because it fails to repeal existing law, because it fails to tear down the barriers which Congress has erected to protect this country against a flood of unregulated immigration.

Toward the end of the veto message, the President gets to one of the points which seems to concern him most. There is a frantic overtone in the veto message when it speaks of the provisions respecting the joint congressional committee on immigration and naturalization policy. The President complains that this committee "would be given powers over the executive branch which are unusual."

Specifically, the President says, this section of the bill would provide that —

The Secretary of State and the Attorney General shall without delay submit to the committee all regulations, instructions, and all other information as requested by the committee relative to the administration of this act.

The President objects most strenuously to that provision. The President says it is unconstitutional for the Congress to demand that a joint congressional committee be given, on request, information relative to the administration of an act of Congress. Mr. President, if it is uncon-

stitutional, this provision in the bill will have no force and effect, and the President has nothing to worry about. He is worried because he knows it is not unconstitutional, and he does not like the idea of Congress asserting itself.

The President says the provision requiring the submission of regulations to a joint congressional committee, on request, "seems to imply that the committee would undertake to supervise or approve regulations." And then the President declares: "Such proposals are not consistent with the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers." Apparently the President of the United States does not realize that the power of an executive department to make regulations is a power which must be delegated to it by the Congress. Without such delegation of power by the Congress, no executive department has the power to make regulations. The President himself has certain regulatory powers, the extent of which, under the Constitution, is in my opinion much narrower than the license which the President has exercised in this regard; but an executive department which would make regulations under this act, assuming this body overrides the Presidential veto, would be making regulations not by virtue of any power of the President, but entirely by virtue of a grant of authority, a delegation of authority, if you please, from the Congress of the United States. What the President is really saying on this point is that after the Congress has delegated regulatory authority to an agency in the executive branch, the Congress has no right to approve or disapprove the regulations which that executive department writes; that the Congress has no authority to seek to supervise regulations which are written by authority of Congress.

The President is not satisfied with the work of the committees of Congress in

revising and codifying, over a 3-year period, the immigration laws. The President wants the immigration laws reassessed and revised. He says so in his message. But how does he want it done? Does he want the Congress to do it? No: He wants a commission to do it — a commission of 12 members, with the President and Vice President appointing 8 of the 12. Mr. President, this is a direct insult to the Congress of the United States.

Mr. President, on yesterday the House of Representatives passed this measure over the presidential veto by a vote of 278 to 113. It did so because it realizes that this bill establishes a fair and sound immigration and naturalization system which is urgently needed by this country. The House of Representatives passed this bill over the veto of the President because the membership of that great body has confidence in the ability and integrity of the many experts of this Government who have produced this bill as an answer to a crying need. The House of Representatives passed this bill over the President's veto because the Members of that great body are aware of the thousands of hours of work which have gone into this bill during the course of some 4 years' time by the appropriate committees of the Congress. Mr. President, on yesterday the coauthor of this bill, Representative Walter, of Pennsylvania, when he took the floor in furtherance of his advocacy that the House should override the veto,

spoke at length regarding the system of "ghost writing" and "ghost writers." When he had concluded, the House to a man, without regard to political lines, rose to cheer his position. He denounced the writing of messages by the President through the pens of "ghost writers" who enter the White House through the back door, or the side door, as the case may be.

Mr. President, one might become exasperated at this veto message, because the preparation of and the work on this bill have cost the people of the United States two-thirds of a million dollars and have consumed nearly 3½ years' time, during which time the departments of the Government entrusted with immigration and naturalization have given to the bill their best thought, their best efforts, and long and tedious hours. After almost 4 years of study, the bill is now vetoed. If there be weak spots in the bill, as there might be in any bill, the bill is subject to congressional review and amendment.

Mr. President, the people of the United States today are watching the action of this body as they watched and applauded the action of the body on the other side of the Capitol. In God's name, in the name of the people of America, in the name of the future of America to which we all look, let us have the courage today to override this unfortunate veto message, which has come to the Senate and to the House of Representatives.



EXCERPTS FROM REPORT BY PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION  
ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION,  
"Whom We Shall Welcome"<sup>1</sup>

IT seems clear that those who took part in the discussions before the commission, or who submitted written views, represented a large segment of public opinion. And it is equally clear that by far the greater number of those who expressed views to the commission are in agreement that the Act of 1952 is not based upon sound fundamental principles, and that, although it did work some improvements, the act continued and enlarged many existing discriminations, and inaugurated new and serious inequities. . . .

Comparatively few of the organizations and individuals appearing before the commission were in favor of the Act of 1952. However well-intentioned, the statements of approval were generally without documentation of any sort, and were seemingly the result either of special benefits conferred by that law or of emotion and deep-rooted fears and prejudices.

Some, admitting we are a nation of immigrants expressed the opinion that we had not yet properly digested or integrated many of the later arrivals into our way of life; that immigration should now be kept at a minimum or eliminated; that eventually the country would not be able to support an increase in population due to immigration; that increases in the number of immigrants now authorized would invite unemployment, multiply the hazards to security, have an adverse effect on the national economy, and be productive of other evils and dangers.

And there were those who think that, although discriminations against southern and eastern Europeans might be eliminated, im-

migration should be largely limited to Europeans, on the ground that this nation owes its cultural, social and economic concepts and traditions to European civilization; and that people of other races and religions cannot be assimilated in any helpful degree.

This does not mean, of course, that no arguments in favor of the Act of 1952, supported by objective study of relevant facts, exist. The fact that the law was enacted by more than a two-third vote in both houses of Congress over the President's veto would negate such an idea. But it is also true that no arguments sufficient to meet the overwhelming weight of evidence against the desirability of much of the Act of 1952 were given to the commission. . . .

The arguments against it generally, and as it is written into the Act of 1952, are that it embodies principles inconsistent with the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States, and the institutions of government which have made our nation strong and great and the hope of free peoples everywhere.

Moreover, it is argued, the national origins quota system is based on unsound theories, long since proved invalid — fallacies that are becoming more and more dangerous in a troubled world where colonial empires are rapidly disappearing and national pride is strengthening into demands for national independence.

The national origins quota system is criticized on the ground that it is based on a concept of biologically distinct races, and also on the theory that some races are superior to others. The Act of 1952, it was said, promotes a claim of Nordic supremacy, discriminates in favor of the nations of Western and Northern Europe, especially Great Britain and Ireland, and against the nations of Southern and Eastern Europe, the Near East and Asia.

It was argued that laws which deny the inherent dignity and worth of the individual, which deny the equality of man, and which embody discriminations based on race, creed, color, and national origin have no place on

<sup>1</sup> The commission borrowed for the title of its report words by George Washington, "Whom We Shall Welcome." In 1783 George Washington said:

"The bosom of America is open to receive not only the opulent and respectable stranger but the oppressed and persecuted of all nations and religions; whom we shall wellcome (Washington's spelling) to a participation of all our rights and privileges, if by decency and propriety of conduct they appear to merit the enjoyment."



our statute books, and are a denial of all we profess to be and believe.

Such laws, it was contended, are detrimental to our foreign policies, are the source of much antagonism and bitterness against us, impair our relationships with other nations, and leave us prey to damaging propaganda by those who promote an ideology that would substitute a police state for individual freedoms.

The national origins quota system purports to fix immigration quotas on the basis of the national origins of our population. But the act does not do this. It uses the national origins of the population of 1920, not of 1950. It excludes from consideration Negroes, American Indians and other non-white people. Thus, it fails to take into account the national origins of the current population.

Complaint was made that the assignment of quotas on such a basis disregarded the fact that the nations receiving the largest quotas did not use them. Although the permissible total quota was approximately 154,000 annually, during the last twenty years an average of but 54,095 quota numbers were used annually. Immigration fell to a trickle during World War II, and this helped to bring down the twenty-year average. But in the other years during that period, the national origins quota system alone has held normal immigration to a figure ranging annually from one-third to a little over one-half of the total authorized.

It was argued to the Commission that if it was thought in 1924, when the quota system was enacted, that approximately 154,000 immigrants annually was a reasonable amount, such a total is unrealistic today, in view of the changed conditions, our greatly expanded economy and our need for additional manpower. . . .

The Commission was repeatedly told that the national origins quota system is the product of fear—fear of strange people, languages and customs, and unfounded belief that people of western and northern Europe and their descendants make better citizens than immigrants from other areas.

The proud record of immigrants from those other areas, in time of peace as well as war, was cited as proof that the United States has nothing to fear from the repeal of policies which have been harmful at home, and which have created enemies abroad. The burden of

the discussion on this phase of the problem was to the effect that we can no longer afford to indulge ourselves in policies based on mistaken theories, themselves inconsistent with the principles we preach.

Great emphasis was placed, in opposition to the national origins system, on the fact that it is inflexible and does not allow room for consideration of the conditions under which more than ten million persons, refugees, expellees, escapees, and displaced persons of various categories, are living in the Europe of today. It was agreed that the United States alone cannot solve this problem. But many insisted that some additional action is imperative, and promptly, to encourage other nations in a position to help, and to give some hope to desperate human beings, innocent victims of totalitarian lust for power. . . .

There was unanimous agreement that as to all immigrants, no matter what their race or creed or color or national origin, stringent security measures should be enforced. Precautions against the admission of subversives, criminals, or other undesirables were favored as were safeguards on health and other such grounds. . . .

The attention of the Commission was directed to the provisions of the Act of 1952 for the determination of quota areas within the Asia-Pacific triangle, and for the limitation of quotas assigned to colonies or other dependent areas of a governing country. These provisions, it was suggested, have the effect of deliberately discriminating on account of race and color to such an extent as practically to deny all immigration, except for a token amount, to the people in the areas described.

The commission was told for example, that the Jamaicans, formerly within the quota assigned to Great Britain, are restricted by the device of treating colonies separately, to a quota of 100 annually, instead of the approximately 1,000 who have been arriving annually, a reduction of 90 per cent. The Japanese and Chinese, in whose behalf the naturalization laws were liberalized, are also given a negligible quota.

The commission was told that the new law is a mixture of discriminations based on nationality, and on race irrespective of nationality, and on geography irrespective of any other factor. Persons of as much as one-half Asiatic blood are charged by the 1952 act to the Asiatic country of either of their parents,

without regard to the fact that they may have been born and bred elsewhere. . . .

Many other objections to the Act of 1952 were submitted to the Commission. Witnesses objected to the unreviewable discretion of minor officials to deny visas. The Commission was told that the prohibitions of the 1952 act apply with great severity to those who may have been convicted overseas of political offenses under the very system that challenges all the free peoples of the world. . . .

Much concern was expressed about changes brought about by the 1952 act in the naturalization law. There was widespread attack against provisions discriminating between native and naturalized citizens and making "second-class citizens" of the latter. Objection was voiced to the enlargement of grounds for denaturalization and to their retroactive effect.

It was contended that if any naturalized citizen commits an offense, except for fraud in obtaining citizenship, he should be punished in the same way as a native-born citizen and not be subjected to loss of citizenship and deportation. Strong representations were made to the Commission that the punishment of exile, for aliens and naturalized citizens, was a relic of the feudal ages. . . .

This summarizes many, but not all, of the complaints against the Act of 1952 submitted to the Commission during the course of the hearings, and in written statements filed subsequently. The recent immigration legislation was described by those in opposition as the product of isolationism, of baseless fears and prejudices, and a shameful retreat from the principles embodied in the organic laws of our nation. It was pictured as an arrogant, brazen instrument of discrimination based on race, creed, color, and national origin — a return to approval of ex post facto offenses and punishments — weapons of tyranny which liberty-loving peoples have fought since the dawn of civilization.

The consensus was to the effect that the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 injures our people at home, causes much resentment against us abroad, and impairs our position among the free nations, great and small, whose friendship and understanding is necessary if we are to meet and overcome the totalitarian menace.

The gist of the appeal to the Commission was for a fresh look at the problem, with the

hope for legislation based on humanitarian principles, designed to fulfill our duties and obligations to suffering mankind, and adequate for our needs and for our security.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The immigration and nationality law embodies policies and principles that are unwise and injurious to the nation.

It rests upon an attitude of hostility and distrust against all aliens.

It applies discriminations against human beings on account of national origin, race, creed and color.

It ignores the needs of the United States in domestic affairs and foreign policies.

It contains unnecessary and unreasonable restrictions and penalties against individuals.

It is badly drafted, confusing and in some respects unworkable.

It should be reconsidered and revised from beginning to end.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The national origins quota system should be abolished.

2. There should be a unified quota system, which would allocate visas without regard to national origin, race, creed, or color.

3. The maximum annual quota immigration should be one-sixth 1 per cent of the population of the United States, as determined by the most recent census. Under the 1950 census, quota immigration would be open to 251,162 immigrants annually, instead of the 154,657 now authorized.

4. All immigration and naturalization functions now in the Department of State and the Department of Justice should be consolidated into a new agency, to be headed by a Commission on Immigration and Naturalization whose members should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

5. The maximum annual quota of visas should be distributed, as determined by the proposed Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, on the basis of the following five categories:

The Right of Asylum

Reunion of Families

Needs in the United States

Special Needs in the Free World

General Immigration

6. For the next three years, within the maximum annual quota, there should be a

statutory priority, implementing the Right of Asylum, for the admission annually of 100,000 refugees, expellees, escapees, and remaining displaced persons.

7. The allocation of visas within the

maximum annual quota should be determined, once every three years, by the proposed Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, subject to review by the President and the Congress. . . .

#### STATEMENT BY SENATOR MCCARRAN REGARDING THE REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, Jan. 1, 1953 — For release today, the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, which has been operating by misuse of defense funds, has issued a propaganda blast against the Immigration and Nationality Act.

The Commission's press release about its report appears to be a rehash of the "line" which was first laid down in the 1951 statement of the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born, which was parroted by the radical, left-wing clique in the Congress when the new law was under consideration and which, I regret to say, was again parroted by the President in his message vetoing the legislation.

The American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born, which has been repeatedly cited as "one of the oldest auxiliaries of the Communist Party in the United States," and the National Lawyers Guild, which has been cited as the "foremost legal bulwark of the Communist Party," spearheaded the fight against the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. . . .

This new blast is part of the attempt to sell a "package" bill as a substitute for the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. This approach, of itself, should make it clear that the real objective is not merely to correct alleged deficiencies in the law, but to make basic changes in policies which have been in force down through the years.

I have not seen the report of the . . . Commission; but if the advance press release issued by the Commission is a fair account of the report itself, then the report contains charges which are ridiculous to the point of self-refutation.

The press release states that the Commission has charged in its report that the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 "violates American principles." But the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was approved

by the State Department, the Department of Justice, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Does the Commission think the people of America will believe that all these arms of our Government approved a law which "violates American principles"?

. . . . .

It seems obvious that notwithstanding the lip service which the Commission's report pays to the security provisions of the new law, the net effect of these recommendations of the Commission would be an emasculation of our security procedures and the opening of the gates to a virtually unrestricted flood of aliens, irrespective of assimilability. Knowing as I do the genesis of this report, I am confident that a detailed analysis of it will provide further underscoring of these points.

Although the Act has been in effect only a week, the Commission is now presuming to "evaluate" how the new law is operating and where and how it should be changed. The new law is the consummation of five years of the most intensive and objective effort ever performed under the direction of a committee of the Congress. This Act became law over the veto of the President; but its enactment was recommended by every agency of the Federal Government concerned with immigration matters as essential in the national interest; and every such agency recommended that the President sign the bill instead of vetoing it.

More than a hundred Nation-wide organizations, such as the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and the Japanese-American Citizens League, and including the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, endorsed the Act as fair and sound legislation.

In attacking the Act, the . . . Commission appears to be using the same "big-lie" catchphrase technique which appears in the current series of articles attacking the Act in the Communist *Daily Worker*, which has issued a call to action to all comrades for an all-out fight against the new law. . . .

This officially sets the Communist line, and all Communists will follow the line so set.

Beneath the wave of racial and religious bigotry which these opponents of the Immigration and Nationality Act are attempting to arouse in America, the rock of truth is that the Act does not contain one iota of racial or

religious discrimination. It is, however, tough, very tough, on Communists, as it is on criminals and other subversives, and that is why they are squealing.

It is a tragic fact that the out-and-out Reds have ready colleagues in this fight: the "pinks," the well-meaning but misguided "liberals" and the demagogues who would auction the interests of America for alleged minority-bloc votes. In my work with the Senate internal security subcommittee, I have learned to know them for what they are; and I shall fight them with the last ounce of my energy.

## INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

### *Carter Goodrich: POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF MIGRATION*

I HAVE been asked to discuss the possibilities and limits of international control of migration. "Possibilities and Limits,"—I think these words were chosen with care. Let me begin with the limits.

The most cursory examination of the question shows how far we are from "One World" in any literal sense of the phrase. If the United Nations were really One World, we might expect that the movement of individuals from one nation to another would be as free from restrictions as movement from one to another of the states of the United States. Or alternatively, if migration were not to be entirely free, we might expect that, in a One World, it would be a world body which decided which regions should be open to immigration and on what terms. Obviously we are far from any such situation. Discussion in international bodies may influence the immigration policies of individual nations; witness the interesting precedent of the Indian-South African issue on the agenda of the recent session of the General Assembly. Conceivably such discussion might even influence our own policy. Moreover, for certain special areas such as the trust territories, some questions regarding migration may become matters for decision or review by an international authority. But no one need either hope or

fear that the major decisions on international migration will soon be taken in any such way. Freedom to migrate is not held to be one of the fundamental freedoms, though I have heard the great French labor leader, Léon Jouhaux, argue that it should be. For the foreseeable future, migration between nations will not be free and unrestricted; and it will continue to be the Congress of the United States and not the Assembly of the United Nations which determines who may enter the United States.

These limitations are obvious and I doubt if they are worth debating. Indeed, if we were to take the word "Control" in my title strictly, perhaps I should consider my assignment already completed. But I hope you will permit me to interpret my subject more broadly as referring to international action in the field, for in the guidance of migration there remain genuine and significant possibilities of international cooperation. Here, indeed, the contrast between international and internal migration is not so great as may sometimes be thought. Dr. Penrose has pointed out that "in practice," for the world as a whole, "migration has never taken place on a scale adequate to bring the distribution of population into any thing approaching a close correspondence with the distribution of

From the Milbank Memorial Fund *Quarterly*, April, 1947, Volume XXV, No. 2, page 153.

resources."<sup>1</sup> But this applies not merely between nations but also between parts and sections of a country like the United States. Even with legal freedom of movement, and in spite of all our traditional mobility, the statement remains obviously true.<sup>2</sup>

To improve this distribution within the United States, we do not take Americans and put them where we think they'll be well off. We have, however, found that we can do some useful though limited things by conscious planning. We have used the United States Employment Service to assist prospective migrants with information concerning opportunities at a distance and with aid in reaching them; and in my judgment we should do much more by this means than we have done. Through the Resettlement Administration and other agencies, federal and state, we found that it was possible to do something to keep settlement from hopeless areas, to rescue some of the victims of misguided settlement, and — rather less confidently — to promote settlement in more promising areas.<sup>3</sup> The National Resources Board, moreover, and our regular Departments have studied the distribution of our resources in sufficient detail to make such guidance possible.

The possibilities of international action are somewhat analogous. The need for it may be thought of as more urgent, since the chances that the individual migrant can successfully make his own investigations and his own arrangements are in general less. Many have argued that migratory movements between nations must be more "orderly" or more closely organized than in the past. Paul van Zeeland, for example, in presiding over the recent meeting of the International Labour Organisation's Permanent Migration Committee, declared that "Spontaneous migration, as in the past, was possible in a less organized world when there was much free land. . . ." Again, the contrast — though real — may not be as great as it appears. How much of mass migration over-

seas has ever been "spontaneous" in the full sense? How much of it, that is, has been the movement of individual migrants deciding independently on their destinations and buying tickets to that destination out of their own resources? Call the roster of methods of migration organized on a large scale by business enterprise or by government action — slavery; the transportation of indentured servants — which played so great a part in our origins that most white Americans claiming colonial ancestry would be eligible for membership in the Sons and Daughters of American Indenture; the transportation of convicts overseas; indenture again in the nineteenth century moving very large numbers of migrants from Asia to destinations in the Atlantic and the Pacific; contract labor in our own nineteenth century; state-aided migration from Britain to the Dominions; and so on. Poverty fills the emigrant ships, and poor men cannot usually plan and pay for long sea voyages. The problem is less that of substituting organized for unorganized migration than that of finding ways of organizing or guiding migration that are consistent with the standards we wish to apply today to human and to international relations.

There are already, of course, significant precedents and beginnings of international action. The plight of refugees could not fail to force itself on international attention. Their emergency rescue has been recognized, however imperfectly, as an international responsibility necessitating the use of public funds as well as the activity and the money of devoted private agencies. A series of inter-governmental bodies — the Nansen Office and its successor agencies for refugees for the First World War; the League High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany; the Inter-governmental Committee for Refugees in its two forms, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration — have faced this responsibility. With the hard core — a very hard core — of the refugee problem remaining unsolved, the United Nations has before it as a pressing issue the organization of a new agency, the International Refugee Organization, and the determination of the power and resources to be given to it. The tragic basis of initial selection, and the difficult political decisions as to which of the "uprooted persons" are to be treated as permanent refugees and which are to be sent

<sup>1</sup> Penrose, E. F.: *Population Theories and Their Application*. Stanford University, Food Research Institute, 1934, pp. 177-178.

<sup>2</sup> Goodrich, Carter and Associates: *Migration and Economic Opportunity*. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936, Ch. IX.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Part II.

back to their own countries, set this problem apart. The special circumstances have necessitated the expenditure of sums for emergency maintenance, particularly by UNRRA, of a magnitude quite out of the range of any suggested aid to ordinary migration. Yet on the ultimate problems of placement and settlement, the problem of the refugee merges with that of the more ordinary migration in search of wider economic or social opportunity.

For the more ordinary forms of migration, discussion centers on two lines of activity — first, the setting of international standards to which the organization of migration should conform; and second, the specific encouragement or organization of migration by international agencies. The principal illustrations of the former lie in a series of Conventions and Recommendations adopted at successive conferences of the International Labour Organisation.<sup>4</sup> The subjects covered include information and assistance to migrants. Nations should, for example, “enact and enforce penalties for the repression of misleading propaganda relating to emigration and immigrations”; and either public agencies or voluntary nonprofit organizations should supply to migrants “in their languages or dialects or at least in a language which they can understand” information regarding “employment and living conditions in the place of destination, return to the country of origin” and similar questions. Other provisions call for regulations of the operations of recruitment, introduction and placement for migrants from abroad, and for the exclusion from such operations of private employment agencies conducted for profit. Still others list the points to be covered in case the state is to supervise the terms of the contract between the migrant and the recruiting agency. Another recommendation deals, somewhat cautiously, with the charges for recruitment, transport and placing and expresses the opinion that these charges “should not, as a rule, be borne by the migrant.” Still other pro-

visions cover repatriation and the protection of migrants on board ship.

A quite different set of provisions deals with the conditions under which the migrant shall work in the new country. The leading principle is that of “equality of treatment” with nationals. This principle should apply, so far as the questions are matters of government regulations, to “conditions of work and more particularly remuneration, and the right to be a member of a trade union.” Again, subject in some cases to the extension of reciprocal treatment, foreigners should have the same rights and benefits as nationals under unemployment insurance, workmen’s compensation and other forms of social insurance.

Finally, a 1939 Recommendation suggests that states “between which the volume of migration is fairly considerable or between which collective migration takes place” should conclude “bilateral or plurilateral agreements” regulating more precisely the recruitment, introduction and placement of migrants. A considerable number of such agreements were in force between European countries during the years between the wars.<sup>5</sup> During the war an agreement between the governments of the United States and Mexico provided in unusual detail for the protection of Mexican workers imported into the United States.

When the I.L.O.’s Permanent Migration Committee met last August in Montreal, it regarded this as one of the most promising lines of further development. One of its principal recommendations was that the International Labour Conference should be asked to draw up a “model agreement” which would guide governments in negotiating bilateral agreements. Such a model agreement would — it was suggested — include the principles contained in the earlier conventions and recommendations. It would, however, go further than the latter, which were almost entirely concerned with migration for wage employment, and add standards that would be applicable to migration for agricultural or mixed agricultural and industrial settlement. In particular, it would include provisions relating to the technical selection and vocational training of migrants and perhaps also to the methods of organizing colonization enterprises.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, footnote to p. 535.

<sup>6</sup> International Labour Office, Permanent Migra-

<sup>4</sup> International Labour Office: *International Labour Code, Book XI*, pp. 519–542. The specific quotations in this and the two subsequent paragraphs are from Articles 852, 856, 857, and 883, respectively. The reference indicates which Articles of the Code are from conventions and which are from recommendations and how widely the conventions had been ratified in 1939.



Here, then, is a process of standard-setting which has had value in the past and promises somewhat greater usefulness in the future. If the nations ratify these conventions, if they follow these recommendations, if they base their agreements on the proposed "model," migration should be more orderly than in the past. It should be conducted with less heedlessness of human needs and should give rise to fewer human tragedies. Yet these methods, promising as they are, have the same limitation as most of the methods worked out for the guidance of migration within the United States. They are likely to be more effective in preventing unsuccessful movement than in promoting successful movement. Certainly they give no guarantee of promoting any great increase in migratory movement.

This point was recognized in the discussions of the Permanent Migration Committee. Many speakers stressed "the necessity of international cooperation in fulfilling the conditions necessary for a large-scale immigration." The Committee's Report noted "with satisfaction that the representatives of several immigration countries have reported the readiness of their governments to receive a considerable number of immigrants both industrial and agricultural, as soon as satisfactory arrangements can be made, more particularly for their transport, reception, and absorption into the national community."<sup>7</sup> Yet financing could not in all cases be carried on successfully by the countries immediately concerned. The International Labour Office has agreed that "the financing of migration must be considered as a part of general economic development and the revival of international trade. If a country is carrying out development schemes and if these schemes require immigration of labor for their execution, the necessary additional capital for such migration might naturally be provided within the framework of the general expenditure on the development project, whether the sources for this expenditure are national or foreign investment."<sup>8</sup>

tion Committee: "Report," (mimeographed) 1946, p. 14 and Appendix II. This will be printed as an appendix to the Minutes of the Governing Body.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 5 and 20.

<sup>8</sup> International Labour Office, Permanent Migration Committee: "Forms of International Co-

Impressed by this reasoning, the Committee suggested that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development should be urged

- (a) when it considers projects of economic development, to take into account the extent to which such projects contribute towards the solution of migration problems.
- (b) when it makes loans for economic development, to include migration costs in appropriate cases within the scope of such development.<sup>9</sup>

In my judgment the proposal has genuine interest and relative merit. If the Bank is to pursue a bold and generous policy of development — and if it does not it will not fulfill the hopes placed upon it — one of its important criteria of judgment should indeed be the effect of its decision on the distribution of the world's population in relation to resources.

In outlining these possibilities of international action, I have deliberately paid little attention to questions of organization. I have not discussed the proposals for a separate specialized agency to deal with migration. I am not anxious to raise questions of jurisdiction. My material has been drawn heavily from the experience of the I.L.O. and from the discussions of one of its committees. The I.L.O. has succeeded in enlisting the cooperation of both emigration and immigration countries. It has started to do a job and should go on with it. But obviously it can do only a part of the total job. Its own Committee urged all countries to cooperate in the task "through the appropriate organs of the United Nations and through appropriate specialized agencies."<sup>10</sup> Its boldest single proposal, as we have seen, was one for action by the International Bank. The study of migration needs and possibilities is an essential function of the Economic and Social Council and its Population Commission. Certainly the concerted and coordinated effort of the family of international organizations is needed if we are to make full use of the possibilities of international action in the field of migration.

operation in the Field of Migration" (mimeographed), 1946, p. 46.

<sup>9</sup> International Labour Office, Permanent Migration Committee: "Report," p. 24.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.



## *Suggestions for Additional Reading*

The literature on this subject is enormous. An excellent bibliography can be found in "Immigration in the United States: A Selected List of Recent References" (Washington, 1943) compiled for the Library of Congress by Anne L. Baden. A useful but much shorter list is in D. F. Bowers, ed., *Foreign Influences in American Life* (Princeton, 1944), part II, and in Brown and Roucek, *One America* (New York, 1946), pp. 660-701. For a recent critical discussion of the historical literature on immigration see E. N. Soveth, *American Historians and European Immigrants, 1875-1925* (New York, 1948).

Comprehensive surveys include G. M. Stephenson, *A History of American Immigration, 1820-1924* (Boston, 1926); R. L. Garis, *Immigration Restriction* (New York, 1927); Carl Wittke, *We Who Built America* (New York, 1939); and E. L. Jordan, *Americans* (New York, 1939). More limited as to period but still general in scope are M. L. Hansen, *The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860* (Cambridge, 1940); Ella Lonn, *Foreigners in the Confederacy* (Chapel Hill, 1940); and M. R. Davie, *Refugees in America* (New York, 1947), dealing with fugitives from the totalitarian upheavals in the twentieth century. M. L. Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History* (Cambridge, 1940), is a collection of essays touching many aspects of the subject.

A descriptive bibliography pertaining to the particular groups that formed the so-called "old" immigration and "new" immigration can be found in Brown and Roucek, *One America*, pp. 665-680. A few of these intensive group studies are: W. F. Dunaway, *The Scotch-Irish of Colonial Pennsylvania* (Chapel Hill, 1944); W. A. Knittle, *The Early Eighteenth Century Palatine Emigration* (Philadelphia, 1936); Ralph Wood, ed., *The Pennsylvania Germans* (Princeton, 1942); J. A. Hawgood, *The Tragedy of German America: the Germans in the United States of America during the Nineteenth Century and After* (New York, 1940); C. J. Child, *The German-Americans in Politics, 1914-1917* (Madison, 1939); Carl Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*

(Columbus, 1936); W. F. Adams, *Ireland and Irish Emigration to the New World from 1815 to the Famine* (New Haven, 1932); E. F. Roberts, *Ireland in America* (New York, 1931); T. C. Blegen, *Norwegian Migration to America, 1825-1860* (2 vols., Northfield, 1931-1940); C. C. Qualey, *Norwegian Settlement in the United States* (Northfield, 1938); A. B. Benson and Haboth Hedin, eds., *Swedes in America, 1638-1938* (New Haven, 1938); Jacob van Hinte, *Nederlanders in Amerika* (2 vols., Groningen, 1928); B. H. Wabeke, *Dutch Emigration to North America, 1624-1860* (New York, 1944); Giovanni Schiavo, *The Italians in America before the Civil War* (New York, 1934); P. K. Hitti, *The Syrians in America* (New York, 1924); Wasyl Halich, *Ukrainians in the United States* (Chicago, 1937); B. J. Hendrick, *The Jews in America* (New York, 1923); Peter Wiernik, *History of the Jews in America* (New York, 1931); Manuel Gamio, *Mexican Immigration to the United States* (Chicago, 1930); M. L. Hansen, *The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples* (New Haven, 1940); Bruno Lasker, *Filipino Immigration to Continental United States and to Hawaii* (Chicago, 1931); Yamato Ichihashi, *Japanese in the United States* (Stanford University, 1932); and J. H. Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom* (New York, 1947), the best history of the American Negro.

The process of assimilation, though discussed in other works, is the main concern of Donald Young, *American Minority Peoples* (New York, 1932); T. J. Woolfer, *Races and Ethnic Groups in American Life* (New York, 1933); M. R. Davie, *World Immigration* (New York, 1936); Bertram Schrieker, *Alien Americans* (New York, 1936); W. C. Smith, *Americans in the Making* (New York, 1939); Oscar Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants, 1790-1865* (Cambridge, 1941); Carey McWilliams, *Brothers under the Skin* (Boston, 1943); Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: the Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (2 vols., New York, 1944).

Nativist attitudes and movements are studied in Gustavus Myers, *History of Bigo-*

try in the United States (New York, 1943), and, with reference to particular instances, in R. A. Billington, *The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860* (New York, 1938); J. M. Mecklin, *The Ku Klux Klan* (New York, 1924), the twentieth-century successor of the Reconstruction organization; L. J. Levinger, *The Causes of Anti-Semitism in the United States* (Philadelphia, 1925); and Carey McWilliams, *Prejudice, Japanese-Americans: Symbol of Racial Intolerance* (Boston, 1944). For immigrant autobiographies, see the bibliography in A. M. Schlesinger, *Paths to the Present*, pp. 278-283. T. C. Blegen, *Grass Roots History* (Minneapolis, 1947), pays special attention to immigrant experiences in America.

Immigrant contributions to American civilization form the subject matter of R. E. Stauffer, ed., *The American Spirit in the Writings of Americans of Foreign Birth* (Boston, 1922); O. G. Villard and others, *The Influence of Immigration on American Cul-*

*ture* (New York, 1929); A. H. Eaton, *Immigrant Gifts to American Life* (New York, 1932); William Seabrook, *These Foreigners* (New York, 1938); and Louis Adamic, *A Nation of Nations* (New York, 1947). T. J. Wertenbaker's volumes, *The Old South* (1942) and *The Middle Colonies* (1938), in his series, *The Founding of American Civilization* (New York), stress such influences in the colonial period. B. J. Hovde, "Notes on the Effects of Emigration upon Scandinavia," *Journal of Modern History*, VI (1934), 253-279, is one of the few studies exploring the reflex action of emigration upon the countries of origin. For a splendid account of the impact of the great migration on the immigrants themselves, see Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted* (Boston, 1951).

In addition to the above, every magazine, from the *Atlantic Monthly* through the *World's Work*, has had articles of periodic significance on the subject. A quick reference to *Readers' Guide* will be rewarding.